Origin of Intentionality by Murphy, Darryl J.
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Scholars Commons @ Laurier 
Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) 
2008 
Origin of Intentionality 
Darryl J. Murphy 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Murphy, Darryl J., "Origin of Intentionality" (2008). Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive). 1061. 
https://scholars.wlu.ca/etd/1061 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ 
Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca. 
1*1 Library and Archives Canada 
Published Heritage 
Branch 
395 Wellington Street 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada 
Bibliotheque et 
Archives Canada 
Direction du 
Patrimoine de I'edition 
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada 
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-46152-5 
Our file Notre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-46152-5 
NOTICE: 
The author has granted a non-
exclusive license allowing Library 
and Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats. 
AVIS: 
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, 
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans 
le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, 
sur support microforme, papier, electronique 
et/ou autres formats. 
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in 
this thesis. Neither the thesis 
nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission. 
L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. 
Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de 
celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation. 
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting 
forms may have been removed 
from this thesis. 
Conformement a la loi canadienne 
sur la protection de la vie privee, 
quelques formulaires secondaires 
ont ete enleves de cette these. 
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, 
their removal does not represent 
any loss of content from the 
thesis. 
Canada 
Bien que ces formulaires 
aient inclus dans la pagination, 
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. 

Origin of Intentionality 
by 
Darryl J. Murphy 
Master of Arts, University of Guelph, 2005 
THESIS 
Submitted to the Department of Philosophy 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Wilfrid Laurier University 
©2008 
ABSTRACT 
The modern origins of intentionality reside in the early work of Franz Brentano— 
specifically, his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1876) and the notion of the 
"intentional inexistence" of the object of consciousness presented therein. "Intentional 
inexistence", says Brentano, is the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the 
objects that occupy our desires, aversions, thoughts, and all of our conscious activities in 
general. According to Brentano, "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental inexistence. In 
his book on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that 
the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is 
in the thinking intellect." This reference to sensation has prompted scholars, almost 
invariably, to identify Aristotle's theory of sensation (or aisthesis) as the source of 
Brentano's concept and, in doing so, to disregard the reference to Aristotle's theory of 
intellect (or nous) that concludes the passage. Contrary to conventional wisdom, that 
interprets intentionality as a recapitulation of Aristotle's theory of sensation, I argue that 
the notion of nous is the only notion in Aristotle's psychology that is sufficient to respond 
to what we today call the "problem of intentionality" (or that set of problems 
encapsulated in the phrase), and that Aristotle seems to have been led to characterize 
nous the way that he does for many of the same reasons that Brentano is led to postulate, 
or, rather, reinvigorate, the scholastic notion of intentional inexistence. 
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PART I - INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1. THE PURPOSE AND CENTRAL CONCEPTS OF THE 
PRESENT STUDY 
Introduction 
The goal of the present study is to begin to formulate a single solution to two problems: 
(1) what I will refer to as the "conventional problem of intentionality," and (2) what I will 
refer to as the "genetic problem of intentionality" for now, but will later argue is the 
overarching problem that encapsulates the first. As I will argue, these two problems and 
the muddled understanding of the notion of intentionality that they derive from are at the 
heart of the greater concern of the cognitive sciences—namely, the desire to achieve a 
robust and coherent account of the emergence and workings of consciousness. And so, 
towards a resolution to the problem enumerated above, and towards a more 
thoroughgoing understanding of intentionality itself, this book will revisit the roots of the 
notion of intentionality in Aristotle's philosophical psychology set out in his DeAnima. 
My central thesis is this: Contrary to conventional wisdom, we ought to understand 
intentionality as a derivative of Aristotle's notion of the intellect (or nous) rather than his 
notion of sensation (or aisthesis). As I will demonstrate, Brentano's notion of intentional 
inexistence has far more in common with Aristotle's notion of intellect (nous) and has the 
potential to render a far more substantial and naturalistic notion of intentionality than the 
predominant notion that is primarily derived from Aristotle's theory of sensation 
{aisthesis). Furthermore, I will argue that nous is the only notion in Aristotle's 
2 
psychology that is sufficient to respond to what we today call the "problem of 
intentionality" (or, rather, the set of problems encapsulated in the phrase), and that 
Aristotle seems to have been led to characterize nous in the way that he does for many of 
the same reasons that Brentano is led to postulate, or, rather, reinvigorate, the scholastic 
notion of intentional inexistence. This argument is at loggerheads with both the argument 
that we traditionally attribute to Brentano, namely, that it is with his theory of sensation 
that Aristotle addresses the problem,1 and with more recent suggestions that that Aristotle 
addresses this problem with his notion of imagination (phantasia).2 
This introductory chapter will proceed in three parts: the first will briefly explain 
the problem in response to which the notion of intentionality was formulated, the notion 
of intentionality itself, and the problems resulting from its formulation in Brentano. The 
second will elaborate upon those aspects of Aristotle's psychology with which I propose 
we revise the currently received notion of intentionality. Specifically, I will discuss 
Aristotle's notion of intellect (nous) understood, for the time being, through the reading 
of Lloyd Gerson (2004), and its various similarities to intentionality in Brentano. Having 
thus introduced most of the concepts central to this study, I will proceed to outline the 
various parts and chapters of the study, to introduce its lesser theses, and to reiterate its 
central goal and thesis. 
§ 1. Intentionality and Associated Problems 
§ 1.1. THE CONVENTIONAL PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY 
The conventional problem of intentionality3 lies in our inability to explain what Caston 
describes as "that feature of our mental states in virtue of which they can correctly be said 
3 
to be of or about something or, more generally, possess content" and to do so using 
strictly physicalistic language ("physicalistic" being one of the adjectives applied to 
sciences that have as their basic components discrete particles that compound to make the 
world and its many objects). The concept from which this problem gets its contemporary 
name—the concept of intentionality—was first (re)introduced to modern thinkers by 
Franz Brentano. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (referred to throughout 
what follows as Psychology), Brentano addresses this problem through his analysis of 
consciousness, which begins by establishing an important ontological distinction:5 "All 
the data of our consciousness are divided into two great classes—the class of physical 
and the class of mental phenomena."6 Among physical phenomena Brentano includes 
"color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which 
I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination."7 Mental phenomena, 
on the other hand, include "Every idea or presentation [Vorstellung] which we acquire 
either through sense perception or imagination."8 The term "presentation" does not, as 
one might expect, refer to any sort of mental image or its content. Rather, the term 
"presentation" refers to the presence of content in our intellectual activities. By way of 
example Brentano offers the hearing of a sound, or the seeing of a color, the suggestion 
being that the act of hearing (or, rather, the activity in which one becomes conscious of 
sound) and the act of seeing (similarly characterized) are "presentations" whereby the 
subject is brought into a relationship (which we call consciousness) with the sound. An 
understanding of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena is integral to an 
understanding of Brentano's Psychology in general and his theory of intentionality in 
particular. Brentano prepares us for this distinction between mental and physical 
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phenomena through his deliberate inclusion of five individual sense-specific phenomena 
among the class of the physical. Among the class of mental phenomena Brentano adds to 
his previous examples, "every judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every 
inference, and every conviction or opinion, [and] every doubt"9 
And so Brentano's analysis of consciousness primarily involves, first, the 
definition of mental phenomena, and second, the thorough elaboration of the various 
types of mental phenomena and their efficacy. He begins his analysis by defining mental 
phenomena in the most general sense. In this much-quoted passage Brentano tells us 
that, 
Every mental phenomena is characterized by what the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or 
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, 
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood 
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In 
presentation something is presented, in judgement 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate 
hated, in desire desired and so on.10 
To paraphrase, Brentano tells us that the distinguishing characteristic of mental 
phenomena is that they are content-full and that what makes them content-full is that 
some content exists, in a literal sense, within them. Brentano uses the phrases 
"intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object", "immanent objectivity", and "includes 
something as object within itself to refer to the content-fullness of mental phenomena. 
And so he says that in every mental phenomenon, e.g. judgement, "something is affirmed 
or denied, in love loved, in hate hated."11 
5 
Mental differ from physical phenomena in that mental phenomena contain an 
object, whereas physical phenomena do not. A colour, for example, does not contain 
anything as an object in the sense that its colouredness is influenced by something within 
it that is discernable from its whole. There is no aspect of the whiteness of this sheet that 
makes it a white of a certain sort except that it simply is white of a certain hue.12 In 
contrast, the intensity of my love for my wife is influenced by my wife; it is tempered by 
the way she exists for me. Following Brentano, an entire branch of the philosophical 
community has come to refer to that which distinguishes mental from physical 
phenomena as their "intentionality". The difficulty in understanding this notion often 
arises from a failure to grasp Brentano's initial distinction between mental and physical 
phenomena. 
This theory of intentionality has given rise to an entire school of thought and, 
some might argue, the continental/analytic rift in professional philosophy.13 Brentano is 
explicit with respect to whose work he believes the theory of intentionality originated in: 
namely, Aristotle. He does not, however, explicitly identify in which of Aristotle's 
works this theory is to be found. A few vague suggestions are made in a footnote: 
Brentano tells us that "Aristotle himself spoke of this mental inexistence. In his book on 
the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense 
contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the 
thinking intellect."14 This reference to Aristotle's theory of sensation has prompted 
scholars to identify this theory as the source of Brentano's concept15 and, in doing so, to 
disregard the reference to Aristotle's theory of intellect that concludes the passage. This 
reading interprets intentionality as a recapitulation of Aristotle's description of sensation 
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and its characterization as the receiving of the form of an object without its matter (DA 
412a3-6), the practical import of which is that intentionality in Brentano is that which 
accounts for the simple presence of an object in thought, or, as recent commentators like 
Sorabji and Caston suggest, it accounts for the underlying subject of every predication. 
As Caston (1998) rightly points out,16 Aristotle's theory of sensation, as well as 
any of its derivatives and recapitulations, is insufficient to adequately account for the 
problem defined above as the conventional problem of intentionality. This is because 
both Brentano and Aristotle are very clear that sensation is a bodily activity.17 This is 
clear, for Aristotle's part, when he says, "if the old man [whose vision has deteriorated 
due to his advanced age] could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well 
as the young man." (DA 408b20-21) These comments are made within the context of a 
discussion concerning the deterioration of one's intellectual capacities, i.e., one's ability 
to think. In fact, Aristotle goes on to say that "thinking and reflecting decline through the 
decay of some other inward part and are themselves impassible." (DA 408b24-25) It is 
important to notice that although one's capacities for sensation and for thought are 
similarly vulnerable to degradation, the degradation of one does not necessarily entail the 
degradation of the other. If, however, sensation were adequate to account for the 
intentionality of thought, then in the event of the degradation of one's capacity for 
sensation we could expect a concurrent degradation in the capacity to think. In light of 
these deficiencies of Aristotle's theory of sensation to account for the intentional 
character of mental phenomena, we are led to consider from what other elements of 
Aristotle's psychology one might derive an understanding of intentionality. 
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§ 1.2. T H E GENETIC PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY 
Unfortunately, Brentano's articulation of intentionality gives rise to a myriad of other 
problems both ontological and epistemological.18 Not the least of these problems is what 
I will refer to as the genetic problem of intentionality. Stated briefly, this is the problem 
of generating a genetic account of consciousness (i.e., an account of how consciousness 
comes to be and passes away) that is consistent with the qualifications Brentano 
stipulates with respect to intentionality. Specifically, the passage cited above stipulates 
that (1) every mental phenomenon, i.e., every instance of consciousness, is conditioned 
by intentionality, and (2) that intentionality is itself the antecedent condition of the object 
of consciousness.19 Further to this, Brentano states that "the term 'consciousness,' since 
it refers to an object which consciousness [Bewusstsein] is consciousness of, seems to be 
appropriate to characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing 
characteristic, i.e., the property of intentional inexistence of an object."20 This has the 
effect of stipulating that (3) consciousness is the antecedent condition for the presence of 
an object. The cumulative effect of these three stipulations is that Brentano's 
conceptualization of consciousness involves a circularity that precludes the possibility of 
accounting for the genesis of consciousness. This is because, according to the previous 
stipulations, each element of his model is conditioned by another: the presence of 
consciousness is conditional upon its object; the presence of the object is conditional 
upon intentionality; the presence of intentionality is conditional upon consciousness, or: 
Consciousness — Object 
Object = Intentionality 
Intentionality = Consciousness 
8 
And so, aside from any of the epistemological criteria one might devise with respect to 
the adequacy of a theory of intentionality, the preceding analysis demands that such a 
theory account for the genesis of consciousness, at least in the human organism. 
We shall explore this and other problems associated with intentionality more 
thoroughly in the following chapter. For now, we will turn our attention to those aspects 
of Aristotle's psychology that I propose will serve as the basis for the revision of the 
currently received notion of intentionality. 
§ 2. Gerson 's Reading of Intellect in Aristotle 
Gerson's interpretation of nous in Aristotle is based upon a series of analogous 
relationships that situate nous (or, rather intellect) in Aristotle's overall picture of the 
living organism. According to Gerson's Aristotle, all bodies are the composite of form 
and matter. Living bodies, on the other hand, are the composite of a soul and some body 
that is itself made up of form and matter. In living bodies, however, the composite-body 
is subject to the efficacy of soul. It is the soul that animates the body literally enlivening 
the form/matter composite. This, says Gerson, is what Aristotle means when he 
describes the soul as the first actuality of a potentially living body. (DA 412al9-21)21 
Gerson's understanding of nous is an extension of this analogy: in souls that possess 
intellect (nous) it is the soul that is subject to its activity. This analogy emerges, says 
Gerson, from Aristotle's comment that "[i]t is doubtless better to avoid saying that the 
soul pities or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his 
soul." (DA 408bl 1-13)22 After which Aristotle says that the soul is the subject of 
thought "in so far as it has intellect." (DA 408b26-27) 
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Gerson's discussions concerning the role of intellect in Aristotle's psychology 
reveals in his interpretation an emphasis upon efficient causation. For Gerson it is 
intellect that is responsible for the actualization of intelligible forms; this process is what 
Aristotle calls "thinking." Specifically, this process involves the immediate relation of 
nous to its object of thought. Conjoined with its ensouled body, nous becomes identical 
with its object through its own initiative. From this account we can understand that in 
order for nous to bring about the actualization of form it must exhibit certain qualities: 
first and foremost nous must be non-bodily. Aristotle must conceive it as such because, 
according to Gerson, "[w]hen thought has become each thing in the way in which a man 
who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the 
power on his own ability), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense 
from discovery; and thought is then able to think of itself." (DA 429b5-9) Aristotle's 
account of the efficient operation of nous requires Aristotle to further characterize it 
using the infamously troubling list of characteristics we find: (i) first at DA 14, where 
intellect is said to be a "sort of substance," that it "comes to be in us," that it is 
"indestructible" (phtheiresthai), and that it is "unaffected" (apathes)-^ (ii) later at DA 
429al4-b5, where we are told intellect is "unmixed" (amige) and "separate" (choristos); 
and (iii) finally at DA 430a23, where intellect is said to be undying (athanaton). 
Ultimately, Gerson reads DA III 5 as the culmination of a number of discussions 
that Aristotle has pursued throughout the whole of the treatise. It is only at this point 
that Gerson's Aristotle is prepared to conclude that thinking is possible and intelligible 
to itself because intellect is singular; no mechanism of efficiency need be posited 
because intellect initiates its own activity (in other words, an infinite regress of intellects 
10 
is not necessary to account for thought). Nous for Gerson's Aristotle is one of the 
necessary conditions for intellectual activity. Understood in this way intellect must be 
unmixed, unaffected, and immortal (athanaton). To suggest anything less, insists 
Gerson, is to deny the possibility of thought. This is what Aristotle means when he 
articulates the penultimate conclusion of DA III 5: that without the continuous activity of 
the intellect, nothing thinks.24 
§3. Intentionality and Intellect 
The commonalties between Brentano's theory of intentionality and Aristotle's theory of 
the intellect, as read by Gerson, fall into three categories: (1) commonalties with respect 
to the relationship of intentionality to consciousness and the relationship of intellect to 
soul, (2) commonalties with respect to the role of intentionality and the role of the 
intellect, and (3) commonalties with respect to the character of intentionality and the 
character of the intellect. 
§ 3.1. THE RELATIONSHIP OF INTENTIONALITY TO CONSCIOUSNESS IN COMPARISON 
TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF INTELLECT TO SOUL 
Recall that Gerson reads Aristotle's description of the soul as the first actuality of a 
natural body {DA 412a 19-21) as stipulating that the body constituted as the composite of 
form and matter is subject to the efficacy of the soul. In an analogous fashion the soul is 
the subject of thought, and so is instantiated in its possession of intellect.25 In Brentano's 
Psychology the relationship of intentionality to consciousness is analogous to the 
relationship of intellect to the soul. This is clear when Brentano tells us that 
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consciousness arises with mental phenomena. He writes, "the term 'consciousness,' 
since it refers to an object which consciousness [Bewusstsein] is consciousness of, 
seems to be appropriate to characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its 
distinguishing characteristic, i.e., the property of intentional inexistence of an object." 
Brentano continues, "[a]ll mental phenomena are states of consciousness".28 These 
comments have the effect of attributing a causal efficacy to intentionality not unlike that 
attributed to intellect by Aristotle. DA 408b26-27 stipulates that the relationship between 
soul and intellect, being analogous to the relationship between soul and the composite 
body, implies a certain efficacy on the part of intellect to effect the actualization of soul. 
So too, it would seem, does intentionality exhibit a certain efficacy in its capacity to 
effect the actualization of consciousness. The actualization of soul in Aristotle through 
its possession of intellect is parallel to the instantiation of consciousness through 
intentionality. This is true in so far as consciousness is, as Brentano says, "appropriate to 
characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing characteristic, i.e., 
the property of intentional inexistence of an object."29 
§ 3.2. THE ROLE OF INTENTIONALITY COMPARED TO THE ROLE OF INTELLECT 
The commonalties with respect to the relationship of intellect to soul and that of 
intentionality to consciousness are a function of their conceptual role in the respective 
psychologies of their authors. Again, based on the distinction between the "part of the 
soul that is called intellect" and the "intellect itself Gerson establishes two things: (1) 
that intellect is that in which the content of thought resides, and (2) that intellect is self-
aware. The first role of intellect is wholly bound up with the identity postulated by 
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Aristotle between the knower and the known. The "intellect i tself , Gerson reads, is 
unlimited in its potency so that when it comes to exist as the "part of the soul that is 
called intellect" it can actualize the intelligible forms of its object in such a way that it 
becomes, in a literal sense, its object. This is parallel to Brentano's statement that mental 
phenomenon (the analogue of thought in Aristotle) is characterized by the intentional 
inexistence of its object. In other words, the intentional inexistence of the object is 
analogous to the actualization of intelligible forms in the intellect. This is the sort of 
actualization that Brentano refers to in the footnote that is often cited by those who 
identify Aristotle's theory of sensation as the originary concept of intentionality. The 
receiving of form without the matter is not, however, analogous to the sort of 
actualization that Brentano refers to by the phrase intentional inexistence. Brentano 
refers to the sensory sort of actualization only as part of his serial account of the events 
that occur in thought, thought (i.e. intentional inexistence) being the culmination of the 
cognitive event. Thoughts in Aristotle, like mental phenomena in Brentano, do more 
than put the object before the subject—they present the object as an object accompanied 
by significance of some sort. 
Indeed, Brentano goes even further than Aristotle with respect to the identity of 
the object of thought in that Brentano concedes nothing more than the intentional 
inexistence of physical phenomena. As he states: "We have no right, therefore, to 
believe that the objects of so-called external perception really exist as they appear to us. 
Indeed, they demonstrably do not exist outside of us."30 Brentano is, however, readily 
willing to attribute "real existence" to mental phenomena. He writes: 
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are 
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as 
13 
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire 
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a 
phenomenal and intentional existence. 
Presumably, "real existence" refers to some sort of self-sufficiency, however, Brentano 
never offers a lucid account of the term. Ultimately, Brentano concludes that "we will 
nevertheless make no mistake if in general we deny to physical phenomena any existence 
other than intentional existence."32 Such a conclusion suggests that, for Brentano, real 
existence is subordinate to intentional inexistence to the extent that the real is found in 
the intentional. Nevertheless, it is clear that Brentano accounts for the content-fullness of 
mental phenomena through his postulation of the intentional inexistence of the object. 
Intentionality, like intellect in Aristotle, affects the contentfulness of mental 
phenomena. 
The second role Aristotle attributes to intellect is bound up with the problem of 
intellect's awareness of itself. Aristotle addresses this problem by positing, contrary to 
his predecessors, a unified intellect endowed with self-awareness and maintains that self-
awareness is a function of the unity of its passive and active aspects. The unity of 
intellect prevents Aristotle from having to posit an infinite regression of intellects in 
order to account for self-awareness. Such is the case in Brentano's Psychology as well. 
Brentano calls this sort of self-awareness "inner perception", and the substantiation of the 
possibility of such perception, contra Comte, is one of Brentano's prime motivations for 
writing his Psychology. It is because of the possibility of inner perception that 
psychology from an empirical standpoint is possible. Brentano tells us that "[w]e would 
never know what a thought is, or a judgement, pleasure or pain, desires or aversions, 
hopes or fears, courage or despair, decisions and voluntary intentions if we did not learn 
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what they are through inner perception of our own phenomena." What Brentano is 
saying here is that, like intellect in Aristotle, inner perception not only puts before us the 
immediate object of our thought, it also puts before us the very mode in which the object 
is being presented. In other words, our capacity for inner perception enables us to be 
aware of our awareness, and the nature of that awareness.35 This "nature of that 
awareness" is what I will later refer to as the "meta-character" of the conscious act. 
§ 3.3. THE CHARACTER OF INTENTIONALITY COMPARED TO THE CHARACTER OF THE 
INTELLECT 
It is reasonably clear that the intellect in Aristotle's psychology and intentionality in 
Brentano share similar relationships to their respective subjects and similar roles in their 
respective psychologies. Both are responsible for the content-fullness of their respective 
subjects. Consequently the notion of intentionality accounts for those same exigencies of 
thought that are accounted for by intellect in Aristotle. Like Aristotle, who is led to 
conclude that the activity of intellect is an antecedent condition for human intellection, 
Brentano, whose stipulation that every mental phenomenon—which itself implies every 
moment of human consciousness—is characterized by the intentional inexistence of an 
object, seems compelled to conclude that the activity of intentionality is equally the 
antecedent condition of consciousness. And so, Brentano's intentionality is of the same 
character as Aristotle's intellect in that it too is required to be, in some sense, separable, 
unmixed, unaffected, eternal, and immortal to the extent that intentional relatedness, i.e. 
consciousness, remains a real possibility. In this way, the application of Aristotle's 
notion of the intellect is the more likely inspiration for Brentano's comments cited earlier, 
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especially those to the affect that "we will nevertheless make no mistake if in general we 
deny to physical phenomena an existence other than intentional existence."36 
Conclusion: An Outline of the Present Study 
The ultimate purpose of this study is to substantiate thoroughly the analogy between nous 
in Aristotle and intentionality in Brentano with the objective of arriving at a more 
comprehensive and more accurate understanding of this essential aspect of psychological 
states. The study will proceed as a trilogy of parts, the first of which includes this 
introductory chapter and Chapter 2, which will explain in greater detail Brentano's notion 
of intentionality and how it was formulated in response to a crisis within the science of 
psychology. It will elaborate further upon the conventional problems associated with 
intentionality and will proceed more thoroughly to articulate the problem discussed 
briefly in section 1.2 of this chapter, specifically that problem originating in Brentano's 
own articulation of the theory. I will come to refer to this hitherto unnoticed problem as 
"the genetic problem of intentionality" and will explain how it arises out of a petitio 
principii implicit in the dependency relationships that obtain among the various elements 
of Brentano's model of consciousness. 
Part II will demonstrate the deficiencies of the conventional understanding of 
intentionality, and the primary antithesis of the argument of this study, that is, the 
understanding of intentionality as a recapitulation of Aristotle's theory of sensation 
{aisthesis). Chapter 3 will explicate the "first actuality of aisthesis"', which we will come 
to understand as the antecedent conditions for sensual activity. This chapter will explain 
how, according to Aristotle, in order for sensation to occur the following conditions must 
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be met: (i) there must be present an appropriate mediating element, one that represents a 
state of qualitative neutrality with respect to the range of qualities that might be sensed, 
(ii) the organism must possess an organ that is composed, in part, of elemental 
constituents that are homogeneous with the mediating element and, in so being, is itself 
qualitatively neutral with respect to the range of qualities that it is meant to sense. 
Chapter 4 will discuss Aristotle's account of actual sensation, or, as we will come to 
understand it, as "the second actuality of aisthesis". This discussion will reveal that 
Aristotle's treatment of aisthesis is, in fact, an account of the presence of sense data in the 
subject and not, as is commonly understood, an account of the actualization, in some 
way, of sensed qualities in the sense organ. Chapter 5 will explore the relevant 
extensions of Aristotle's theory of sensation including the sense that we are sensing, the 
common sensibles, and the imagination. Part II will conclude with Chapter 6, in which I 
will illustrate the disanalogy between aisthesis and intentionality based upon two integral 
dissimilarities between the two: (1) the essential difference in their functioning with 
respect to the object of thought, and (2) the essential difference with respect to the 
character of their activity. These important differences will lead us to conclude that an 
understanding of intentionality that is limited to a recapitulation of Aristotle's notion of 
aisthesis must remain essentially incomplete. 
Part III will represent the constructive part of the study. Its structure will parallel 
that of Part II and accordingly, Chapter 7 will explicate the "first actuality of nous". The 
first actuality of nous will be understood as an activity that itself represents the 
antecedent condition for thinking. This activity will be explicitly distinguished from 
thinking itself and will come to be understood as a primitive component of Aristotle's 
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ontology. Chapter 8 will explicate "the second actuality of nous", which we will come to 
understand as thinking proper. Given the similarities between nous and intentionality 
that will emerge from chapters 7 and 8,1 will conclude that nous in Aristotle is the proper 
analogue to intentionality in Brentano. The study will then conclude with some 
reflections upon the practical import of this conclusion, including the revisions to our 
understanding of intentionality that it entails and how such revisions allow us to escape 
the problems of intentionality that we will now turn to in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2. BRENTANO AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
INTENTIONALITY 
Introduction 
In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) Brentano reintroduces the notion 
of intentionality in answer to what is sometimes referred to in the contemporary literature 
as the "hard problem" of consciousness or, simply, the "problem of experience."37 In 
Brentano's own time the problem might have been branded the "problem of 
introspection", but we must be cautious not to interpret the problem too narrowly so that 
we can understand that what is referred to is a set of problems generally associated with 
the scientific credentials of psychology: What is the proper language for explaining what 
it is like to be conscious? Can states of consciousness be described objectively? And 
last, but not least, what constitutes an adequate account of the instantiation of 
consciousness? Intentionality or, rather, the intentional inexistence of the object of 
consciousness is a key component to Brentano's answer to these questions. It is the 
analysis of mental phenomena, characterized by the intentional inexistence of an object, 
that reveals the felt qualities of experience. These problems persist even today, as does 
the relevance of Brentano's analysis of them, for intentionality has come to represent a 
set of fundamental problems in contemporary philosophy of mind38 and has served as a 
foundational concept in the development of the cognitive sciences.39 
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Following this introduction, I shall review the problems in response to which 
Brentano revived the notion of intentionality, the notion of intentional inexistence as it is 
articulated by Brentano, and the problems that the notion of intentional inexistence has 
itself given rise to. These problems, which I will refer to as the "conventional problems 
of intentionality", concern the sorts of entailment operative in mental/intentional 
phenomena and are understood as epistemological in nature. I shall then elaborate upon a 
problem that has yet to be articulated in the literature and which arises out of careful 
analysis of Brentano's formulation (or re-formulation) of intentional inexistence. The 
articulation of this problem is the central objective of this chapter; it arises out of 
Brentano's insistence that one of the necessary conditions of consciousness is the 
intentional inexistence of its object. As we shall see, this stipulation entails a radical 
interdependence of the elements belonging to Brentano's model of consciousness, and it 
precludes the possibility of an account of the emergence of consciousness in its 
particularity. I will refer to this problem as the "genetic problem of intentionality", and, 
as I will suggest, it represents the ontological basis of the conventional epistemological 
problems. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the ramifications of the genetic 
problem of intentionality. 
§ 1. The Problems of Psychology 
Contemporary with Comte, and later still with Brentano, was a concern for the legitimacy 
of the various sciences and the criteria according to which a mode of inquiry might truly 
be called a science. This was Comte's concern when he wrote his Systeme de Politique 
Positive (1851-54). In the four volumes that comprise the Positive Polity (as it has come 
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to be known in English) Comte elaborates upon what he sees as the three phases of the 
evolution of a science—(1) the theological, (2) the metaphysical, and (3) the positive— 
and sets out to rank what are, in his opinion, the six fundamental sciences—(i) 
Mathematics, (ii) Astronomy, (iii) Physics, (iv) Chemistry, (v) Physiology, and (vi) 
Social Physics (in that order). Comte's precise and elaborate criteria for this ranking and 
his justification for the exclusivity of this list of so-called "fundamental sciences" are not 
central to our present concerns.40 For our purposes, what is relevant is the conspicuous 
absence in this list of the science of psychology. Comte's claim is that the psychology of 
his day has stagnated in the metaphysical phase of its development. This criticism is 
twofold: Comte is critical of (1) the object, and (2) the method of psychology. 
In his "Comte and Psychology" (1922)42 Bodenhafer explains Comte's 
dissatisfaction with any science whose object is not delimited independently of its 
practitioner. Bodenhafer quotes Comte as saying: 
However, some misconceiving in this respect the actual and 
unalterable direction of the human mind, have endeavored 
during the last ten years to transplant among us German 
metaphysics and to found under the name of psychology a 
pretended science completely independent of Physiology, 
superior to it, and exclusively the study of the phenomena 
termed moral.43 
This passage, along with his later characterizations of psychology as "the vague and 
chimerical pursuit"44 and as the "illusory science of personified abstractions",45 is 
revealing. Comte's concern seems to be that the object of psychology is obfuscated by its 
non-ostensible and therefore abstract nature, i.e., it is speculative in so far as it objectifies 
non-physical entities and, in so doing, indulges in abstractions. The conclusion we are 
led to, if we follow Comte, is that only ostensible physical objects exhibit the sort of 
21 
concretization that conditions the possibility of a science proper. For this reason, Comte 
does not reject the possibility of a psychological science outright. Rather, he promotes a 
physics of the mental, a science based upon what he perceived to be the potential to 
analyze mental phenomena solely with regard to their ostensible physical instantiations.46 
Comte's critique of the methods by which the psychology of his day was 
practiced is intimately related to his criticisms of its object. Specifically, Comte is 
critical of introspection, or what he calls "internal observation". Comte argues: 
Man can observe what is external to him and also certain 
functions of his organs, other than the thinking organ. To a 
certain extent he can even observe himself as regards the 
passions he feels, because the cerebral organs on which 
these depend are distinct from the observing organ properly 
so called. It is, however, evidently impossible for him to 
observe his own intellectual acts, for the organ observed 
and the observing organ being in this case identical, by 
whom could the observation be made? . . . . To render this 
possible the individual would have to divide himself into 
two persons, one thinking, the other observing the thoughts. 
Thus man cannot directly observe his intellectual 
operations; he can only observe his organs and their results. 
.. .There is therefore no place for psychology, or the direct 
study of the soul independently of any external 
considerations.47 
Here Comte suggests that the speculative and abstract nature of the methodology of 
psychology entails a certain identity between the object and the observer because of the 
latent subjectivity involved in the delineation of the object. Interestingly enough, 
Comte's criticism of the psychological method alludes to, albeit implicitly,48 an 
adaptation of the Aristotelian principle of sensation—namely, the identity between the 
senser and the sensed—that, as we shall see, Brentano later uses to rehabilitate empirical 
psychology. Comte cites the identity between the perceiver and the perceived as a 
further deficiency of the object of psychology. Here again we see his underlying concern 
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with the clear differentiation and delimitation of the special object of the given science. 
In this context, however, the deficiency is a function of the method of introspection. 
§ 2. Intentional Inexistence as a Response to the Problems of Psychology 
Brentano sets out to rehabilitate the science of psychology, largely in response to these 
criticisms leveled by Comte. His point of departure is to delineate the domain of 
psychology, then narrow the focus of the science to a specific object. Psychology, says 
Brentano, is an empirical science distinguishable from the rest by the private nature of its 
object: 
the natural sciences study the properties and laws of 
physical bodies, which are the objects of our external 
perception, psychology is the science which studies the 
properties and laws of the soul, which we discover within 
ourselves directly by means of inner perception.. .49 
The phrases "external perception" and "inner perception" are here meant to be 
understood in subtle contrast to Comte's phrase "internal observation". I shall elaborate 
upon them in the discussion that follows. For now, however, it is sufficient that we 
understand that, along with metaphysics (the objects of which are the rules that are 
common to the empirical sciences); the natural sciences (the objects of which are external 
bodies); and psychology (the objects of which are the "properties and laws of the soul"), 
these three domains of science exhaust knowledge in its totality. 
Having delineated the domain of psychology in this way, Brentano proceeds 
further to articulate his basic conceptual framework as a further qualification of the 
proper object of psychology. He proceeds by making the fundamental distinction 
between physical and mental phenomenon. According to Brentano, "All the data of our 
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consciousness are divided into two great classes—the class of physical and the class of 
mental phenomena."50 It is important to notice that this distinction is explicitly a 
distinction between two sorts of "data of our consciousness" that emphasizes the internal 
nature of both physical and mental phenomena. The facts with respect to the internal 
quality of both sorts of phenomena are complicated by Brentano's claim that physical 
phenomena are revealed through external perception. What must be remembered is that 
physical phenomena include "color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I 
hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the 
imagination."51 In other words, physical phenomena are not concrete individual 
substances (in the Aristotelian sense) as one might surmise from the use of the phrase 
"external perception". Physical phenomena are to be understood, rather, like Lockean 
secondary qualities.52 That this is indeed the proper construal of physical phenomena is 
confirmed when, shortly after defining them, he makes reference to Locke's famous 
experiment in which he submersed his hands, one having been warmed, the other having 
been cooled, in the same pool of water and experienced it to be simultaneously two 
different temperatures.5 
The defining characteristic of mental phenomena is their possession of intentional 
content, or, rather, an inexisting object: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or 
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, 
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood 
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way.54 
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As we have already seen, in this passage Brentano identifies the distinguishing 
characteristic of mental phenomena—namely, their content-fullness. Brentano uses the 
phrases "intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object," "immanent objectivity," and 
"includes something as object within itself to encapsulate the content-fullness of mental 
phenomena.55 And again, this is the passage referred to when Brentano is credited with 
the reintroduction of intentionality to modern philosophy. Although he does not himself 
use the noun "intentionality" as it is used in the contemporary philosophical vernacular, 
he does employ the adjective term "intentional" {intentional)56 from which the noun form 
is derived. In Brentano then, intentionality can be understood as the ontic basis of mental 
contents: the object of any specific mental phenomenon exists in the intention of the 
psychic event. We shall elaborate upon this further in section 4 of this chapter and even 
more in Chapter 9. 
Brentano's response to the problems of psychology discussed above becomes 
more explicit in his extended analysis of mental phenomena: "Every idea or presentation 
which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a 
mental phenomenon."57 To be clear, the term "presentation" [Vorstellung] in the above 
passage refers not merely to the presence of content in our cognitive activities. The 
examples of mental phenomena Brentano offers include the hearing of a sound, and the 
seeing of a color, the suggestion being that the presentation is identical with (i) the 
content of the presentation, (ii) an awareness of the activity of the sense apparatus 
involved. Brentano adds to this (iii) a certain subjective character. He says that in some 
the object is presented as loved, in others as hated, in others as affirmed, as denied, as 
desired, and so on. The mode of presentation of the mental phenomena is an essential 
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aspect of it and is a function of its intentional character. In what follows, I shall refer to 
this subjective character as the "meta-character" of psychological states. A thorough 
understanding of Brentano's notion of "intentional inexistence" requires an appreciation 
of all three of these aspects: (i) the content, (ii) reflective awareness, and (iii) the meta-
character of psychological states. 
Brentano's response to Comte's concern with the lack of concretization exhibited 
by the object of psychology can now be understood as the claim that the psychologically 
relevant part of experience, i.e., its intentional character, is fixed to, and always given as, 
concomitant with the presentation of the real physically delimited and external object. 
This is significant not only for Brentano's response to Comte, but also for our current 
investigation and our later comparisons of Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence 
with aisthesis in Aristotle, on the one hand, and nous in Aristotle, on the other. 
Brentano's use of the German "Vorstellung" connotes a certain cognitive maturity with 
respect to its substantive content. By this I mean that the substantive content of that 
which is presented (again "Vorstellung") in mental phenomena is already something 
conceived of as an object, it is conceptualized to an extent that might support subjective 
valuations of the sort Brentano exemplifies: "something is affirmed or denied, in love 
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired."5 Ultimately, we must understand that the variety 
of our mental phenomena, our thoughts, emotions, desires, and, in short, all of the things 
we want to talk about when we engage in psychology, is accounted for by the three 
aspects of mental phenomena identified above. 
It is not yet clear how we are to analyze mental phenomena scientifically if not 
through introspection. Brentano answers this question with what he, with Kant, calls 
26 
"inner perception" (innere Wahrnehmung). Through inner perception one engages his 
or her sense or awareness of his or her own presentations and their essential structure. In 
other words, inner perception allows one to attend to the concomitant awareness of 
sensation, presence of content, and the meta-character of the presentations he or she is 
subject to.60 Inner perception is Brentano's fundamental response to Comte's rejection of 
introspection. He writes: "Another characteristic which all mental phenomena have in 
common is the fact that they are only perceived in inner consciousness."61 Whereas 
physical phenomena are seen through external perception, mental phenomena are the 
object of inner perception. Further, 
inner perception possesses another distinguishing 
characteristic: its immediate, infallible self-evidence... 
Moreover, inner perception is not merely the only kind of 
perception which is immediately evident; it is really the 
only perception [Wahrnehmung] in the strict sense of the 
word.62 
Brentano's postulation of the noetic superiority of inner perception seems to represent his 
attempt to come to grips with the Kantian problem concerning our knowledge of things in 
themselves. An appreciation of this context helps to understand his later, and repeated, 
statements to the effect that, "the phenomena of so-called external perception [i.e., 
physical phenomena] cannot be proved true and real.. ,".63 
For our present purposes, the significance of Brentano's formulation of inner 
perception is twofold: First, rather than trying to defend the objectivity of introspection or 
attempting to devise some form of sufficiently objective mode of introspection, Brentano 
abandons objectivity as a criterion of science altogether in favour of self-evidence and 
infallibility. Inner perception is, for Brentano, neither objective nor subjective—it is a 
self-evident, or apodictic, method for conducting psychology scientifically. Second, 
27 
Brentano's insistence that inner perception is the only true perception posits, like 
Aristotle before him, an identity of sorts between the subject and the object which 
obfuscates the ontological status of both. This obfuscation is central to the problem that I 
will discuss at length in section 4. Despite the relative ambiguity with respect to its 
implicit ontology, the significance of intentional inexistence, or, rather, intentionality, in 
Brentano's model of consciousness is clear: He employs it to account for the content-
fullness of mental phenomena. It is the bearer of content and the bridge between the 
mental and the physical.64 
§ 3. The Conventional Problem of Intentionality 
Much of the contemporary work addressing the problem of intentionality65 in mainstream 
philosophical circles responds to the problems articulated by Chisholm (1916 - 1999) in 
his 1956 article entitled "Sentences About Believing", or to various expressions of these 
problems offered in more recent works.66 According to Chisholm, the intentional is that 
which takes as its object something that does not exist.67 The capacity to do so, says 
Chisholm, is what Brentano identifies as the "mark of what is psychological."68 We can 
already see certain latent ontological concerns surrounding the definition, and function, 
of intentionality: according to Chisholm intentionality, as the mark of what is 
psychological, is its capacity to take (whatever this taking may involve) as its object 
something that does not exist, i.e., something that, by whatever standard, he is denying 
the being of. Although Chisholm does not, unlike Brentano, qualify being in any explicit 
way in this paper, it is clear from the contrast he draws between intentional and non-
intentional sentences—non-intentional being those that describe the "merely physical"— 
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that what he means when he says that the "object does not exist" is that it is not 
physically instantiated. Chisholm, however, is not here concerned with the ontological 
status of the object. 
The explicit purpose of Chisholm's article is to express his dissatisfaction with 
attempts to "translate" what he calls intentional language into physical language. In 
critiquing these attempts he seeks to illustrate that intentional language is indeed 
unavoidable. He begins by formulating three criteria for determining whether a sentence 
is intentional. A sentence is intentional if (1) "it uses a substantive expression—a name 
or a description—in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies 
either that there is or that there isn't anything to which the substantival expression truly 
applies."69 Chisholm offers the following example of such a sentence: "[A] man is 
thinking of the Dnieper Dam."70 Regardless of the factual existence of the Dnieper Dam, 
we can understand that the sentence is intentional, according to this criterion, because 
neither the affirmation nor the denial of the sentence implies anything with respect to the 
factual existence of the dam. It only speaks to the factual existence of a man who may or 
may not be thinking of it. A sentence is intentional if (2) its principal verb "takes as its 
object a phrase containing a subordinate verb", as, for example, in the sentence, "He is 
contemplating killing himself."71 In this case the sentence is intentional because it 
includes a subordinate verb ("killing") the facticity of which is irrelevant to the facticity 
of the primary verb ("contemplating"). A sentence is intentional if (3) it contains an 
indirect reference to a thing such that "its replacement by a different name (or 
description) of that thing results in a sentence whose truth-value may differ from that of 
the original sentence."72 For example, the truth of the sentence "Kramer knows that 
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Harrison is the father of three children" does not entail the truth of the sentence "Kramer 
knows that Harrison is the father of Sarah, Mary, and Tom." The intentionality of 
sentences of this sort is considerably less obvious than that of the previous sorts. These 
sentences are intentional because their individual meanings are dependent upon the 
substantive value of the descriptions "is the father of three children" and "is the father of 
Sarah, Mary, and Tom" respectively. In other words, although both descriptions refer to 
the same object—namely, Harrison—the meanings of the two sentences are distinct and 
the truth of the one does not imply the truth of the other. 
With reference to these criteria for what constitutes an intentional sentence, 
Chisholm argues that attempts to recast intentional sentences into physical and non-
intentional language have been unsuccessful because they require us to "use a vocabulary 
which we do not need to use when we describe non-psychological, or 'physical', 
phenomena"74 and that this vocabulary amounts to a loosely veiled intentional language. 
For my purposes the attempts at translation that Chisholm critiques and the specifics of 
his analysis are not important. What is important is that Chisholm's criteria define 
obstacles inherent in intentional sentences that preclude (or have precluded) their 
reduction into physicalist terms. Furthermore, it can be observed that all of the criteria 
identified by Chisholm refer to their specific nuances and their expression of what I have 
referred to as the "meta-character" of the intentional act. 
Recall that the term "meta-character" refers to the subjective character of the 
intentional act. Specifically, it refers to the judgemental character, the loving , the hating, 
or the desiring character of the act. 
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object 
within itself, although they do not all do so in the same 
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way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate 
hated, in desire desired and so on.75 
All of the examples offered by Chisholm as he articulates his criteria build upon the 
general list offered by Brentano. Chisholm's first example (of the Dnieper Dam) adds 
the "as thought", his later two examples add the "as contemplated" and "as known" 
respectively. In fact, Chisholm's criteria can be read as a system of classification of the 
varieties of meta-character that psychological states might exhibit. Understood as such, 
Chisholm's analysis of intentional sentences provides us with a deeper understanding of 
the conventional problem of intentionality and specifically its origin in the meta-character 
of psychological states. It is precisely this that eludes translation into physicalist 
language. 
In his "Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality" (1998) Caston characterizes 
the obstacles identified by Chisholm generally as "failures of common patterns of 
entailment."76 What he means by this is that intentional sentences, or sentences about 
psychological phenomena, do not involve the same sorts of entailment that sentences 
describing physical phenomena do. One expects certain things to follow from the later 
sort of sentences that do not follow from the former. According to Caston, 
As failures of common patterns of entailment, they 
[intentional sentences] are at odds with our intuitions about 
the rest of the world and so in need of explanation. The 
struggle to find such explanations, I would suggest, 
constitutes the real problem of intentionality.77 
Caston then proceeds to summarize Chisholm's criteria and to expand upon them with 
reference to Anscombe and Geach but, as we can already see, Caston is even more 
explicit about the epistemological essence of the problem as he sees it. The problems 
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Caston enumerates are failures of understanding. He explains that an adequate analysis 
of intentionality must account for five peculiarities of psychological phenomena: (1) their 
"failure of existential commitment", (2) their "failure of truth-functionality", (3) their 
"failure of intersubjectivity of coextensive expressions salva veritate", (4) their "failure of 
the excluded middle", and (5) their "failure of quantifier exportation."78 (1) represents a 
restatement of Chisholm's first criterion and, to reiterate, means that neither sentences 
about psychological, or intentional, phenomena nor their negation imply a commitment to 
the factual, and by this he means physical, existence of the object. (2) corresponds to 
Chisholm's second criterion: neither sentences about intentional phenomena nor their 
negations entail the truth or falsity of the object predicate. (3) Corresponds to Chisholm's 
third criterion: sentences about intentional phenomena do not entail anything with respect 
to the subject's relation to the object beyond that which is explicitly contained/expressed 
within the sentence. For example, "Sherlock Holmes knows that Jack Stapleton is a 
murderer" does not entail that "Sherlock Holmes knows that Jefferson Hope is a 
murderer", nor does it entail that "Sherlock Holmes knows that Jack Stapleton is the heir 
to the Baskerville fortune." In other words, Sherlock Holmes' knowledge that Jack 
Stapleton is a murderer does not entail that Sherlock Holmes has any additional 
knowledge about Jack Stapleton or about murderers.79 (4) is similar to (3): for any 
specific sentence about an intentional phenomenon the sentence will not entail that its 
object is or is not of a particular sort, e.g., "Sherlock Holmes is thinking about Jack 
Stapleton" does not entail that "Sherlock Holmes is thinking about a man who is a 
murderer" nor does it entail that "Sherlock Holmes is thinking about a man who is not a 
murderer." (5) is similar to (1): for any specific sentence about an intentional 
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phenomenon that involves the quantification of its object the sentence will not entail the 
factual existence of its object qualified in that same way, e.g., "Sherlock Holmes is 
thinking about a murderer" does not entail the factual existence of any particular 
murderer. 
According to Caston the explanation of these five peculiarities with respect to the 
entailment of sentences describing intentional phenomena, compared to that of sentences 
describing physical phenomena, is the crux of the problem of intentionality. In Caston 
too, however, the ambiguity with respect to the epistemological entailments of sentences 
describing intentional phenomena originates in the meta-character of the phenomena. 
Brentano might observe that, with regard to the previous example, that which ambiguates 
the epistemic entailment of the sentence is the fact that the murderer referred to in the 
sentence exists "as thought about". Here again, it is to the meta-character of the act 
depicted that the conventional problem of intentionality can be traced. 
In a more recent description of the problem Simons speaks to the nature of the 
explanation sought. In his "Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theory of Intentionality 
(Natural or Otherwise)" (2001) Simons delineates three sets of conditions for an adequate 
account of intentional phenomena: (1) "Metaphysical Prerequisites", (2) "Internal 
Constraints: the Systematics Requirement", and (3) "External Constraints: the Integration 
Requirement".80 Included under the heading of "Metaphysical Prerequisites" for an 
adequate account of intentional phenomena are the requirements that: (i) it accommodate 
the language of folk psychology; (ii) it "adhere to a robust but critical epistemological 
realism about the world"; and (iii) it "employ an ontology without unbridgeable 
ontological divides such as that between an eternal and a temporal realm or between 
33 
spatial body and non-spatial mind." The "Internal Constraints: the Systematics 
Requirement" include that: (i) the so-called symptoms of intentionality, by which he 
means the failures of entailment as described by Caston,82 be accounted for; (ii) the 
accounts "get the subjective phenomenology of intentionality right";83 and (iii) the 
concept accounts for the many varieties of intentional phenomenon.84 The "External 
Constraints: the Integration Requirement" include that: (i) the account be compatible with 
Darwinism and the predominant notions of evolution and natural selection;85 (ii) the 
account be sufficient to yield an explanation of intentionality displayed by social 
groups;86 and (iii) the account be compatible with "well-corroborated natural science."87 
As we can see, l.iii explicitly denies the adequacy of accounts based in either 
Platonic/Idealistic or dualistic ontologies and seemingly leaves the door open to an array 
of alternate ontologies. However, when considered in tandem with 3.i and 3.iii, those 
requirements that demand compatibility with Darwinism and, more specifically, 
contemporary formulations of it, as well as the natural sciences, it is clear that only 
those accounts that are based upon a physicalist ontology will be considered adequate. 
Given, then, that the problem, as defined by Simons, stipulates that the solution to this 
problem must be compatible with physicalism, he, in effect, sets aside (or predetermines 
the response to) any ontological problems that may surface while addressing the problem, 
and defines the problem as wholly epistemological. 
Even from this brief review it is already evident that contemporary mainstream 
formulations of the problem of intentionality, and concerns for intentionality in general, 
are fundamentally epistemological in nature. The criteria Chisholm and Simons 
articulate and the failures that Caston enumerate are criteria for, and failures of, our 
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understanding of intentional phenomena. This may be truer of Caston and Simons than it 
is for Chisholm. Be that as it may, it is demonstrably the case that the problematic in 
which contemporary mainstream philosophers situate the problem of intentionality is one 
in which a physicalist paradigm is assumed. Ontological considerations are preempted 
because the project, as defined by the problem, is to render intentional phenomena 
compatible with a physicalist ontology free of impurities. And this physicalist ontology, 
as we shall see, is demonstrably not the sort of ontology underlying Brentano's 
Psychology. That said, the problem that I seek to illuminate here is a problem of 
ontological import specifically arising out of the ambiguity of Brentano's own 
ontological commitments. 
§ 4. The Genetic Problem of Intentionality 
In Prior A. II16 Aristotle tells us that the following is a case of circular reasoning: "if A 
should be proved through B, and B through C, though it was natural that C should be 
proved through A; for it turns out that those who reason thus are proving A by means of 
itself." {Prior A. 65al - 4) This is straightforward enough with respect to argumentation. 
Reasoning of the form: 
B D A 
CDB 
A D C 
Or, rather, 
A D C 
C D B 
B D A 
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is circular. This fallacy has gone by a number of names, however, formal treatments of 
the fallacy89 refer to it as the petitio principii (the fallacy of petitioning the principle). 
Such a fallacy, however, is not confined to rhetorical argumentation. Aristotle continues 
by saying, "This is what those persons do who suppose that they are constructing parallel 
lines; for they fail to see that they are assuming facts which it is impossible to 
demonstrate unless parallels exist." {Prior A. 65a4 - 6) In this elaboration Aristotle 
shows us how such a fallacy might also be manifest in theoretical constructions (like the 
model of consciousness Brentano presents in Psychology). As Chisholm explains, 
But how can a construction be a petitio principal We must 
remember that in geometry the construction of a figure is 
equivalent to proving that such figures exist, and depends 
upon the proof of prior theorems. ° 
This explanation of the petitio principii represents Chisholm's summary of the 
interpretation of these passages from Aristotle that were agreed upon by Brentano and 
Vailati in their personal correspondence. This is also the sort of problem that can be 
identified in Bretano's model of consciousness centered upon his postulation of the 
intentional inexistence of its object. 
In the earliest discussions of Brentano's Psychology, where the domain of 
psychology is distinguished from metaphysics on the one hand and the natural sciences 
on the other, Brentano rejects what we might today call a purely physicalist account of 
consciousness.91 He tells us that, 
the facts which the physiologist investigates and those 
which the psychologist investigates are most intimately 
correlated, despite their great differences in character. We 
find physical and mental properties united in one and the 
same group. Not only may physical states be aroused by 
physical states and mental states by mental, but it is also the 
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case that physical states have mental consequences and 
mental states have physical consequences.9 
This affirmative statement colours everything that follows it and must be taken into 
account when interpreting later passages. Where Brentano says things like, "sensations 
are aroused by physical stimuli"93 and "it will definitely be the task of the psychologist to 
ascertain the first mental phenomena which are aroused by a physical stimulus",94 he 
implies the temporal priority of physical stimuli, whereas later analysis suggests a sort of 
ontological priority of mental phenomena over the physical. Such priority is further 
suggested by the portions of text immediately following those cited above, where 
Brentano states: "We have no right, therefore, to believe that the objects of so-called 
external perception really exist as they appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably do not 
exist outside of us."95 It is also suggested in later chapters, as when he states: 
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are 
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as 
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire 
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a 
phenomenal and intentional existence.96 
This passage is not only a radical departure from Aristotle,97 but it represents a significant 
ontological commitment that ultimately leads Brentano to commit the petitio principii. 
This passage, in conjunction with our understanding of physical phenomena from 
section 2 as being comparable to Lockean secondary qualities, leaves us with a number of 
difficult, and perhaps contradictory, postulations all of which involve various modes of 
existence and those entities that participate in them. Thus far we have been confronted 
with no less than four modes of being: (i) intentional, (ii) phenomenal, (iii) real, and, by 
extrapolation, (iv) non-real. As we have just seen, mental phenomena exhibit both real 
and intentional being. Further, by virtue of their title, we must presume that mental 
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phenomena also exhibit phenomenal being. Physical phenomena, on the other hand, 
exhibit only intentional and phenomenal being. However, this stipulation is clearly 
meant to imply that physical phenomena do not exhibit real being and are therefore non-
real. To this taxonomy we must add physical stimuli, to which, it would seem, Brentano 
is compelled (by Anselm's law) to grant real being given their capacity to 'arouse' mental 
phenomena, which, as we've already noted, are themselves real. The resulting taxonomy 
can be illustrated as follows: 
Table 2.4.1 
Intentional 
• Mental 
Phenomena 
• Physical 
Phenomena 
• Physical Stimuli 
qua Physical 
Phenomena 
Phenomenal 
• Mental 
Phenomena 
• Physical 
Phenomena 
• Physical Stimuli 
qua Physical 
Phenomena 
Real 
• Mental 
Phenomena 
• Physical Stimuli 
Non-Real 
• Physical 
Phenomena 
• Physical Stimuli 
qua Physical 
Phenomena 
The perfect congruity between the intentional and phenomenal modes of being suggests 
their synonymity. This taxonomy must be further truncated given Brentano's career-long 
rejection of fictitious objects. In his essay "On Genuine and Fictitious Objects" Brentano 
argues, 
anyone who says that the non-existence of a centaur has 
being, or who answers the question as to whether a centaur 
does not exist by saying, "That is so," only wants to say 
that he denies centaurs in the modus praesens, and, 
consequently, also believes that anyone who denies a 
centaur judges correctly. 98 
Brentano's point is that he finds it to be non-sensical to attribute some sort of thingliness 
to that which is non-real. Arguing explicitly against Meinong, he refuses to include 
negative states of affairs in his ontology. 
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Qualified in such a way, Brentano's taxonomy is reduced to two modes of being, 
(i) the intentional and (ii) the real. The two cannot be understood in opposition to each 
other, especially given that he distinguishes clearly only two classes of objects, (a) the 
mental and (b) the physical. Further, the mental are said to exhibit both modes of being. 
The physical are said to exhibit real being given their potential to 'arouse' mental 
phenomena. Later, however, the physical is said to exhibit only intentional being. And 
so we are left with the following: 
Table 2.4.2 
Intentional/ Phenomenal 
• Mental Phenomena 
• Physical Phenomena 
• Physical Stimuli qua 
Physical Phenomena 
Real 
• Mental Phenomena 
• Physical Stimuli 
These contradictory claims concerning the "physical" suggest very strongly that 
the term is being used in an equivocal or metaphorical way: In some cases Brentano 
seems to use the term "physical" to refer to a category of real (in the common sense of 
the term) external objects, while in others—specifically when he speaks of "physical 
phenomena"—he uses the term "physical" metaphorically to refer to a sense in which an 
inner intentional state can be like an external physical thing. Recognizing this 
equivocation allows us to recognize that the distinction between mental and physical 
phenomena is indeed an ontological one: it is this distinction that fixes the boundary 
between the real and the non-real. This is the only charitable way to read Brentano's 
comments with respect to the efficacy of physical stimuli to cause mental phenomena in a 
manner that is coherent with his comments with respect to the noetic deficiencies of 
physical phenomena?9 The distinction between mental and physical phenomena does 
not, however, fix the boundaries of the causal potency of, and between, the now three 
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distinct genres (i.e., [1] real physical events/stimuli, [2] real mental phenomena, and [3] 
non-real physical phenomena).100 
Read with an eye to this ontological connotation we are left with apetitio 
principii of the second sort described above. The problem is this: According to 
Brentano, certain real physical events are temporally prior to, and a necessary condition 
of, but not sufficient for, the emergence of real mental phenomena. This is because, as 
Brentano says, consciousness is always consciousness of something and that thing is 
some physical phenomenon that exists only intentionally. The circle is completed when 
Brentano stipulates that "intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental 
phenomena."101 Once we divine the correct serial order of Brentano's various 
stipulations it is clear that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of 
(C) consciousness—understood as being identical with (Mx) mental phenomena and their 
immanent physical phenomena (Px)—are some real physical stimulus (Si) and some real 
mental phenomenon (Mi) to provide the immanent objectivity—the specific physical 
phenomenon (Pi)—of which consciousness is conscious. In a more formalized notation 
these stipulations look like this: 
51. (x)(CxDMx) 
52. (x)(Px) = (x)(Mx) 
53. (x)(Cx) = (3x)(Sx & Px) 
We can see from this articulation of the problem that S2 is the stipulation that explicitly 
closes the loop between S1 and S3 and, from our previous discussions, we can understand 
that S2 is derived directly from Brentano's claim that, "Every mental phenomenon is 
characterized by ... the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object". With this in 
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mind the symbolic expression of the interdependency of the various elements of 
Brentano's model can be simplified and the interdependency made more explicit: We can 
understand that the emergence of consciousness is conditional upon the presence of its 
object; the presence of the object is conditioned by its intentional inexistence; further, 
such an intentional inexistence occurs only in consciousness, or: 
Consciousness = Object 
Object = Intentionality 
Intentionality = Consciousness 
In this sense Brentano has assumed the existence of his subject, a fact that is impossible 
to demonstrate unless its existence is given. In so doing he precludes the possibility of an 
account of the genesis of consciousness. To be clear, he does not, strictly speaking, 
preclude the possibility of genetic psychology as a science that "establish[es] the laws of 
their [mental phenomena] succession",103 but the event in which a particular 
consciousness originates remains inextricable. 
We cannot forget Brentano's point of departure—the point with which Brentano 
indicates the proper domain of psychology—namely, that mental phenomena themselves 
are immanent to the conscious organism, a real physical object and individual substance. 
If, we are to reconcile this observation with the claim that "intentional inexistence is 
characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena,"104 according to what sort of being can 
we account for intentional existence? No properly Brentanian response to this question 
can be devised without recalling Brentano's own epistemology (by which I refer to his 
categorization of the sciences discussed at the beginning of section 2) and specifically his 
suggestion that the rules and properties common to the domains of both sorts of empirical 
sciences (those that treat the physical and those that treat the "properties and laws of the 
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soul") are properly pursued under the rubric of metaphysics. Given, then, that the 
property of intentional inexistence is manifest in both mental phenomena and the physical 
organism, we can understand that the genetic problem of intentionality is, properly 
construed, a metaphysical problem. More specifically, it is an ontological problem that 
requires an ontological answer. 
Conclusion: The Repercussions of the Genetic Problem of Intentionality 
It would be at least partially redundant for me to elaborate upon the ramifications of the 
genetic problem of intentionality illustrated above. This is due to the fact that one of its 
major ramifications is, indeed, the conventional problems elaborated in section 3. When 
the ontological significance of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena is 
overlooked—as when we invoke intentionality to address our more immediate 
epistemological concerns—these ambiguities lead us to the sorts of problems expressed 
by Chisholm, Anscombe, Caston, et al. The intentional character of mental phenomena 
cannot be accounted for by the presence of any elaborate physical mechanisms, or 
conglomeration of elaborate mechanisms, so long as the physical substratum is defined 
by what Caston calls "rules of entailment". The definition, indeed the identification, of 
the physicalist ontological scheme with a set of entailment rules can be characterized, in 
the most general of terms, by the Aristotelian language of efficiency and materiality. 
That such a definition is operative in such treatments of intentionality is suggested by 
Chisholm's conclusion that intentional sentences cannot be translated into physical 
language. 
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Finally, there is in fact an even more general epistemological problem resulting 
from the genetic problem of intentionality. Brentano's ontological commitment to the 
primacy of the mental is based, in large part, upon its immediate presence and infallibility 
(recall the discussion of "inner perception" in section 2).105 The ontological and 
epistemological qualifications Brentano places upon that portion of the mental 
phenomenon that represents the immanent object, i.e., the physical phenomenon, have the 
effect of rendering the intentional portion of the mental phenomenon the only constituent 
of Brentano's ontology that is of any noetic value. The intentional character of the 
mental phenomenon becomes the source, the object, and the substrate of knowledge. 
Construed as such, intentionality, or, rather, the intentional character of mental 
phenomena, represents a manifestation of the petitio principii fallacy in and of itself. 
Brentano's resurrection of the notion of the intentional inexistence of the object of 
consciousness is, by most accounts, his most influential contribution to modern 
philosophy. Despite the conventional problems the notion entails and the genetic 
problem I have endeavored to articulate, the notion remains relevant because it is not, at 
its core, a conceptual construct. It is an ostensible aspect of mental states that is 
identified by Brentano through his descriptive exercise. Setting aside Brentano's claims 
with regard to the infallibility of its substance, discussions concerning the intentional 
character of consciousness persist today because it represents such an evident and 
apparently-indubitable aspect of mental states. It is this same apparently indubitable 
character that impresses upon us the urgency to revise properly our understanding of the 
ontological foundations of intentionality because, as we have seen, securing these 
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foundations is the only way we can ensure the profitability of future efforts to address the 
epistemological difficulties it presents. 
In Part III shall turn my attention to those aspects of Aristotle's psychology upon 
which the dominant understanding of intentionality is based. 
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 Similar reading of intentional inexistence in Brentano can be found in Spiegelberg 
(1965): 39-42 and in Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1994): 35. Smith's decidedly more condensed exegesis of 
intentionality, however, sacrifices an understanding of the problematic nuances of 
Brentano's articulation for the sake of a concise statement of the core concept. 
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 It would be imprudent of me not to make explicit the distinction that has so far only 
been implied throughout the present discussions. It is the distinction between practical 
and "extra-practical" intention made by Herbert Spiegelberg in his, "'Intention' and 
'Intentionality' in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl" in The Context of the 
Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: M Nijhoff, 1981). Spiegelberg tells us that 
whereas "intention" is commonly understood in the sense of an intention to do 
something, or a purpose, extra-practical intention denotes "the mere directedness toward 
the willed [or perceived, or thought about] object."(Spiegelberg [1981]: 4) In another 
article that I will scrutinize later, Caston defines intentionality, the extra-practical sort, as 
"that feature of our mental states in virtue of which they can correctly be said to be o/or 
about something or, more generally, possess content."(Caston [1998]: 250) It is 
important that I be clear that this sort of intentionality, the extra-practical sort, is that to 
which I refer when I use the term "intentionality" or any derivative terms. 
This distinction is especially important given the influence of certain works in 
which the two sorts of intentionality are conflated. One such work, Dennett's 
Consciousness Explained (1991), presents an outright rejection of intentionality because, 
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according to the research he cites, the mind's awareness of its object is not fully realized 
until some time (a matter of mere milliseconds) after it has signaled for the execution of a 
response. On the other hand, Dennett suggests that one's expressions are dictated by an 
unknown, and indeed unknowable, number of neurons that perform various interpretive 
and expressive functions and engage in a competition for supremacy. Further, the criteria 
by which this competition is judged are wholly context-based and subject to perpetual 
adaptation. When addressing the problem of just where or what imposes the criteria 
according to which interpretations of physical stimuli earn ascension into consciousness, 
according to which competing expressions are chosen for voicing, Dennett writes: 
What if the word-demons are, in parallel, the 
questioners/contestants, and the content-demons are the 
answerers/judges? Fully fledged and executed 
communicative intentions—Meanings—could emerge from 
a quasi-evolutionary process of speech act design that 
involves the collaboration, partly serial, partly in parallel, 
of various subsystems none of which is capable on its own 
of performing—or ordering—a speech act. (Daniel 
Dennett, Consciousness Explained [Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1991]: 239) 
On these grounds Dennett rejects intentionality outright, in both the practical and the 
extra-practical sense. 
In this context, however, the phrases "word-demons" and "content-demons", 
which refer to two specialized varieties of neurons, suggest the essential intentionality, in 
the extra-practical sense, of their referents. The actual objects of these intentions are 
irrelevant to the intentional character of these neurons. The intentional nature of neurons 
in Dennett's analysis resides not in their actually "having" an object (intentionality in the 
Brentanian sense) but in their being, in a manner of speaking, directed towards such 
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"having" (i.e., intentional in the Husserlian object-directedness sense). In being 
characterized as either "questioners/contestants" or "answerers/judges" the neurons are, 
at the same time, characterized as tending towards having a question, or having an answer 
which will, of course, be content-full. Even if that content is not fixed or concretized 
they remain intentional in their tending. Dennett has not eliminated intentionality; he has 
conflated the two senses of the terms and rejected them both upon grounds relevant to 
only one—namely, intentionality in the practical sense. Intentionality in the extra-
practical sense remains distributed in various forms throughout his model. 
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 See Herbert Spiegelberg, "Phenomenology of Direct Evidence," in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 2 (June 1942): 427^456, who addresses the fallacy with 
respect to the general phenomenological problem of the self-evidence of intuitional 
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Synthese: An InternationalJournal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of 
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 In other words, one that accounts for consciousness by invoking an exclusively 
physical substratum. Popular contemporary accounts of this sort are exemplified by 
Dennett (1991). 
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 Brentano (1995): 6. Brentano also makes specific reference to certain physiological 
advancements of his age: 
It is well known that our perceptions are mediated by the 
so-called afferent nerves. In the past people thought that 
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certain nerves served as conductors of each kind of sensory 
qualities, such as color, sound, etc. (Brentano [1995]: 83) 
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 Brentano (1995): Appendix IX, 292. He offers further support from Aristotle: 
Aristotle is quite correct, therefore, in saying that the "That 
is so," by which we indicate our agreement with a 
judgement means nothing but that the judgement is true, 
and that truth has no being outside of the person judging; in 
other words, it exists only in that loose and improper sense, 
but not strictly in reality. (Brentano [1995]: Appendix IX, 
292.) 
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 To be clear, my suggestion is that we distinguish in Brentano between physical stimuli 
or events and physical phenomena. 
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 Brentano's model might now be understood according to the following analogy: 
Imagine a clear glass beaker full of water. The glass can be understood as analogous to a 
real mental phenomenon existing in the real world (which, of course, it does). The water, 
then, can be understood as the intentional content of the mental phenomenon. Of course, 
looking through the water at an object has the effect of the object appearing in the water. 
To the extent that the seen object is in the water it can be understood as analogous to 
Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence. 
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PART II - AISTHESIS 
Chapter 3. THE FIRST ACTUALITY OF AISTHESIS 
Introduction 
The most intuitive reason for looking to Aristotle's theory of sensation (or "'aisthesis''' as 
it is rendered in the Greek) for the conceptual source of Brentano's notion of the 
intentional inexistence of the object is that it is through sensation that one comes to 
acquire data concerning which we come to have thoughts. Aristotle states this plainly 
when he describes aisthesis as the "the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of 
things without the matter." {DA 424al8-19)1 This passage insinuates that aisthesis 
involves a sort of instantiation of the sensed object comparable to the sort of instantiation 
implied by Brentano's phrase "intentional inexistence". As we already know from Part I 
(especially Chapter 2, section 4), Brentano does not employ the phrase "intentional 
inexistence" to imply any metaphorical, or even diminished, sense of existence. In fact, 
as our explication of Brentano's distinction between mental and physical phenomena 
revealed, Brentano takes that to which he attributes intentional inexistence to be "real" to 
the same extent as any physical object. The causal efficacy Brentano attributes to the 
intentional object is equitable to the efficacy of physical stimuli. The efficacy of the 
inexisting object is, again, bound up with what I previously described as the cognitive 
maturity of the content of mental phenomena: That to which Brentano attributes 
intentional inexistence is already something conceived of as an object, it is already 
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conceptualized as an object of a certain sort, it is already as a thing affirmed, or denied, 
loved or hated, desired or avoided. 
Based upon this synopsis of intentional inexistence, Part II will proceed with an 
exegesis of Aristotle's theory of aisthesis with the specific intention of drawing those 
aspects of the theory that are comparable to Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence. 
Ultimately, and in accordance with the overarching thesis of the present study, I will 
argue that Aristotle's theory of aisthesis fails on a number of fronts to adequately account 
for that which Brentano encapsulates in his notion of intentional inexistence. The above 
synopsis alludes to the criteria upon which this judgement is based: Brentano's notion of 
intentional inexistence cannot be understood as strictly analogous to aisthesis in Aristotle 
because, whereas that to which Brentano attributes intentional inexistence is a thing 
conceptualized to the extent that it stands to its subject as an object of a certain sort and 
of a certain identity, aisthesis in Aristotle is wholly pre-conceptual providing for its 
subject only the raw materials with which the activity of objedification and judgement 
might be carried out by the subject's intellectual faculty proper. The exegesis of aisthesis 
proper will span two chapters. 
§ 1. The Soul and its Powers 
Aisthesis is identified twice in the first book of DA as one of the powers of a living 
organism commonly associated with the soul. {DA 405b5-7 and 410b 16-27) And so, 
because aisthesis is one of the four vital powers of the soul, Aristotle's discussion 
concerning aisthesis begins at DA I I 1 , where the soul is defined as "an actuality of the 
first kind [entelecheia heprote] of a natural body having life potentially in it."(DA 
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412a27-412b 1) Having defined the soul as the "actuality of the first kind of a natural 
body", Aristotle proceeds to elaborate upon the sort of body to which he is here referring. 
He tells us that, 
[t]he body so described is a body which is organized. The 
parts of plants in spite of their extreme simplicity are 
organs.. .If, then, we have to give a general formula 
applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as an 
actuality of the first kind of a natural organized body 
[somatos phusikou organikou]. (DA 412b 1-7) 
Chen (1956) argues that when Aristotle says that "[t]he soul is the first actuality 
[entelechy] of the physical body which is potentially [dunamei] living" (this is Chen's 
translation of DA 412a27) Aristotle is affirming that the relationship of the soul to its 
body is analogous to the relationship of actuality, in the sense of energeia,5 to potentiality 
(dunamis). This leads Chen, along with many before him, to identify the soul with the 
form of the body. Chen then tells us that "In consequence of this conception of the soul 
the strict unity of the living body is being established."6 Chen concludes that the body 
and soul can be understood as one and the same thing "existing] in opposite modes." 
We are prepared for this, says Chen, by Aristotle's analysis of substance in Metaphys. Z.8 
Chen's proposal that "entelecheia" be read as synonomous with "energeia" is 
specific to the instance of "entelecheia" at DA 412a27. That his conflation of 
"entelecheia" with "energeia" is problematic becomes evident when it is applied to the 
instance of "entelecheia" at DA 412b6 where the term is employed in the description of 
the soul as the "actuality of the first kind of a natural organized body [somatos phusikou 
organikou]." (DA 412M-7) This passage has been variously translated by modern 
scholars. What is particularly puzzling to all of them is precisely what Aristotle means 
by "somatos phusikou organikou" Hicks' 1907 translation offers: "a natural body 
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furnished with organs"; Hett (1936) offers: "a natural body possessed of organs"; Van 
den Berg (1953)9: "organic physical body"; Hamlyn (1968): "a natural body which has 
organs" Apostle (1981): "a natural body which has organs"; and Sachs (2001): "natural, 
organized body."10 Considered in relation to any one of these readings, Chen's reading 
of "entelecheia" has the effect of suggesting that it is the soul that represents the efficient 
cause of the presence of organs, the body's possession of organs, and/or the body's 
physical organization. In other words, Chen suggests that it is the soul that makes the 
body constituted in such a way. This is at odds with the characterization of the soul that 
Chen seems to want to affirm, that being, that the soul is the form of the body in a 
schematic sense. 
Bos (1999) offers a reading of DA II1 that avoids this problematic attribution of 
efficient causation to the soul by offering a more generic translation of the term 
"organikon" and, in so doing, suggestiong a subtle distinction between the terms 
"entelecheia" and "energeia". Bos argues that the term "organikon" ought better to be 
translated by the phrase "serving as a tool or instrument," or simply with the term 
"instrumental."11 Bos tells us, "The point of Aristotle's definition is that the soul as the 
guiding principle or entelechy cannot do anything without 'a natural body that serves it as 
an instrument or tool'." Bos' reading of "somatosphusikou organikou" offers four 
benefits that translations with phrases like "with organs" or "organized" do not: (1) Bos' 
reading avoids what might be seen as a redundancy on Aristotle's part; if, as Aristotle 
tells us, even the leaves of a plant are instrumental to its subsistence {DA 412a27-412b4), 
then it would seem that being a natural {phusikou) body is sufficient for having organs 
and the term "organikou", translated as "with organs" would be redundant. (2) Bos' 
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reading of "organikou" accords with the manner in which we refer to the first six books 
of the Aristotelian corpus as the Organon, i.e., the Tool. (3) Bos' reading of 412b6-7 and 
specifically his translation of the term "organikon", is more consistent with a literal 
translation of the term "aisthaitikon" as "instrument of sense". (4) Bos' reading suggests 
a distinction between actualization qua "entelecheia" and actualization qua "energeia" in 
a way that Chen's and other readings do not and in a way that accords with the 
etymology of the two terms. 
Although the precise etymology of the term is a hotly debated topic,13 an analysis 
of the term "entelecheia" that treats it as the conjunction of the particle "en" meaning 
"in" and a derivation of the term "telos" meaning "end" or "purpose" suggests a process 
through which its subject becomes purposive in the active sense of being goal-oriented. 
The term "energeia", on the other hand, is derived from "energazomai" which is 
construced out of the particle "en" and the verb "ergazomai" meaning work or labour. 
Liddel and Scott further elaborate that "ergazomai" refers to the manual labour of slaves, 
this suggests that the term "energeia" is best applied to the sort of actualization that 
comes about by means of some techne or physical mode of construction. The salient 
point being that "energeia" can justifiably be associated with actualization of the sort 
brought about through efficient causation, or resulting from some kinesis. This is the 
sense of the term we find throughout the corpus and throughout DA. "Entelecheia", on 
the other hand, can be identified with a mode of actualization related to telotic causation. 
It is related in that actualization of this sort does not necessarily represent the imposition 
of physical form, rather it represents the imposition of purposiveness. Distinguishing in 
this way between "energeia" and "entelecheia" accords with what Aristotle tells us 
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earlier in DA I: there he tells us that the definition of each affection of the soul "ought to 
correspond, e.g. anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement [kinesis] of such 
and such a body (or part or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that 
end."" {DA 403a26-28; emphasis added)14 Subtle as it may be, Aristotle here alludes to 
both the energeia mode of actualization and the entelecheia mode, an account of both, it 
would seem, is necessary for a thorough account of anger. With respect to aisthesis, the 
inference that can be drawn from this analysis is that, just like the other vital powers of 
which the soul is the first actuality, aisthesis is a purposive power that is manifest in the 
soul (understood as form)/body (as matter) composite. 
§ 2. Aisthesis and the Distinction between 1st and 2n Actualites 
Aristotle's discussion of aisthesis proper begins at DA II 5 where he defines the term 
aisthesis in the widest possible sense. He writes: "sensation [aisthesis] consists in 
[sumbaineif5 a movement [kineisthai] or an affection [paschein] for it is thought to be an 
alteration [alloiosis] of quality." {DA 416b33-35) Concerning affections, Aristotle says: 
Now some thinkers assert that like is affected [paschein] 
only by like; in what sense this is possible and in what 
sense impossible, we have explained in our general 
discussion of acting and being acted upon. {DA 416b35-
417a2)16 
In his translation Smith notes that this passage makes reference to GCI 7 where Aristotle 
tells us what it means to act (poiein) and what it means to be acted upon (paschein). 
According to Aristotle, aisthesis seems to involve one thing acting upon another. 
Aristotle proceeds by pointing out an ambiguity with respect to terms related to 
aisthesis. He says, "It is clear that what is sensitive [to aisthetikon] is so only 
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potentially, not actually." (DA 417a6-7)17 The support for this inference lies in the fact 
that the sense organs are not self-activating. The eye does not see without some 
stimulation to do so. Aristotle then points out that "to ais thanes thai" (the present 
infinitive middle form of "aisthanomaf', translated by Smith as "perceive") meaning 
"apprehension by the senses", "he aisthesis" (translated by Smith as "sense"), and "to 
aistheton" (translated by Smith as "to be a sentient"), meaning the sensing thing, are each 
used in two senses: the sense of being potential and the sense of being actual.18 In a 
common sense of actuality ("energein," literally "to act")—one that conflates being 
"moved" (kineisthai) and being "affected" (pascheiri)—that which is acted upon and that 
which acts are, in a way, like, and in another way, unlike. (DA 417a 14-20) 
This common-sense understanding of actuality must be set aside, says Aristotle, 
for the sake of precision. Aristotle tells us that "we must now distinguish different senses 
in which things can be said to be potential or actual: at the moment we are speaking as if 
each of these phrases had only one sense." (DA 417a21-22)19 This, as it turns out, is a 
prelude to a distinction that is very significant with respect to Aristotle's theory of 
aisthesis and with respect to the vital functions of organisms in general—that is, the 
distinction between first and second actualities. 
Although traces of this distinction can be found throughout the corpus, in DA 
Aristotle presents the distinction between first and second actuality by means of an 
analogy with knowledge. Aristotle identifies two senses in which one might be called a 
potential knower: (a) One can be a potential knower in the sense that he belongs to a 
species that possesses the potential for knowledge. Or (b) one can be a potential knower 
in the sense that he possesses a certain body of knowledge (like grammar) that can be 
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exercised when called upon. (DA 417a22-25) Aristotle tells us that both cases represent 
different sorts of actuality: (a) represents the sort that is actualized through a "change of 
quality" (alloiotheis) and/or "repeated transition from one state to its opposite."20 The 
other (b) represents the sort of potential that is actualized "by the transition from the 
inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise." (DA 417a32-417bl)21 
In other words, a change of the first sort occurs when a man, once ignorant of grammar, 
becomes knowledgeable of grammar. A change of the second sort occurs when the 
grammarian exercises her knowledge of grammar in order to solve some grammar-related 
problem. It is through a change (or changes) of the first sort that the sensuous powers are 
actualized in the body. This mode of actualization, as we already know, has been 
identified by Aristotle with the soul understood as the first actuality of the natural body 
having life potentially. (DA 412a27-412bl) It is through a change (or changes) of the 
second sort that the sensuous powers are activated and the activity of sensation is 
actualized. (DA 417b 16-18) Actualizations of this sort are "second actualities". 
Burnyeat's (2002) article is indispensable for the insights it provides into DA II 5 
(DA II 5 being, for all intents and purposes, the preface to Aristotle's discussion of 
aisthesis). Here Burnyeat begins by enumerating the varieties of alteration (alloioseos) 
set out in Phys. V 2 and GCI 7. According to Burnyeat these sorts of alteration amount 
to the "loss of a quality and its replacement by another (opposite or intermediate) quality 
from the same range."22 Aisthesis, we are told, is not any of these sorts of alteration. (DA 
417b2-7) The remainder of DA II 5, says Burnyeat, is devoted to explaining to us just 
what sort of alteration aisthesis is. Further, this involves the introduction of a sort of 
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alteration that has hitherto never been seen in the corpus. Burnyeat's exegesis uncovers 
three sorts of alteration: 
(Altl) ordinary alteration is the replacement of one quality 
by a contrary quality from the same range; 
(Alt2) unordinary alteration is the development of the 
disposition which perfects a thing's nature; 
(Alt3) extraordinary alteration is one of these dispositions 
passing from inactivity to exercise.23 
Burnyeat then proceeds to correlate alteration of the second and third sort to the modes of 
actualization discussed in his "Is An Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible (a 
draft)?" (1992). Alteration of the first sort is common, the sort of change that wood is 
subject to through carpentry. Alteration of the second sort is the sort of alteration that 
occurs when a man with the potential to learn grammar actually comes to know grammar. 
This we now understand as a first actuality. The third sort of alteration identified by 
Burnyeat is equitable to what we are presently calling second actualities. According to 
Burnyeat, in this third sort of actualization/alteration the potential is preserved (and 
indeed reinforced).24 
Our discussions concerning the comparative etymology of the two terms 
translated into English as "actuality"—namely, "entelecheia" and "energeia"—has 
already revealed two senses of actuality. Although it might be inappropriate in certain 
contexts to interpret either "entelecheia" or "energeia" as definitively correlated with 
first or second actualities respectively, the following passage suggests that in the present 
context such a correlation is valid: 
What in the case of thinking or understanding leads 
from potentiality to actuality [entelecheian] ought not to be 
called teaching but something else. That which starting 
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with the power to know learns or acquires knowledge 
through the agency of one who actually [entelecheia] 
knows and has the power of teaching either ought not to be 
said 'to be acted upon' at all—or else we must recognize 
two senses of alteration, viz. the change to conditions of 
privation, and the change to a thing's disposition [hexeis] 
and to its nature. 
In the case of what is to possess sense, the first 
transition is due to the action of the male parent and takes 
place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in 
respect of sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the 
possession of knowledge. Actual [energeian] sensation 
corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge. But 
between the two cases compared there is a difference; the 
objects that excite the sensory powers to activity 
[energeias], the seen, the heard, &c , are outside. (DA 
417b9-21)25 
This passage is, in fact, preceded by three additional instances of "entelech-" in his 
elaboration upon the nature of first actualities and the sorts of states that correspond to 
first actualities. The initial portions of this passage speaks directly to the sort of actuality 
that Aristotle characterizes as a first actuality, namely the acquisition of knowledge, by 
means of the term "entelecheia". In contrast, the later portions of the text speak to an 
actuality of the second sort by means of the term "energeia". 
It is also significant that Aristotle's claim that, "the first transition is due to the 
action of the male parent and takes place before birth" (DA 417b 16-17) provides further 
clarification concerning our understanding of "entelecheia". This claim identifies a 
physical activity (I hesitate to use the term "labour") of the sort that one might associate, 
in accordance with our previous etymological analysis, with "energeia". In this case, 
however, the activity is identified as the origin of a first actuality ("entelecheia"). It is 
important, therefore, to understand that what distinguishes the activity that results in a 
first actuality from the activity that results in a second actuality is that the first sort of 
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activity results in the manifestation of a self-propelled purposiveness. The practical 
import of the qualification to the present discussion is that when we speak to the first 
actuality of a vital power we are, in effect, describing the preconditions for the purposive 
activity, that is, the activity that is identifiable with second actualities. 
The consistent use of "energeia" in the context of second actualities can be seen 
in Aristotle's exemplification of the change from ignorance of grammar to knowledge of 
grammar, and the later change from the possession to the exercise of grammatical 
knowledge, that it is only in discussions of the second sort of change that Aristotle 
employs forms of "energeia": "by the transition from the inactive [me energein] 
possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise [eis to energein]." (DA 417a32-
417M)26 
DA II Chapters 6 through 11 elaborate upon both the material preconditions (the 
first actuality) and the functioning (the second actuality) of the senses. Although 
Aristotle's discussions of the two issues are intermingled, it is beneficial for our purposes 
to treat each actuality of sensation separately. 
§ 3. The Necessity for a Medium that is Continuous with the Organ 
Although the secondary literature focuses almost entirely on the functioning of the 
senses, and in so doing, focuses predominantly upon the second actuality of aisthesis, 
Aristotle does offer significant elaboration upon what he takes the first actuality of 
aisthesis to entail. He does so when he speaks to the material preconditions of sensation, 
that is, those material/elemental conditions that must be in place before aisthesis is 
possible. Primary among those is the medium through which aisthesis occurs. Sight, for 
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example, is the faculty through which colour is sensed. Concerning colour Aristotle tells 
us that, "Every colour has in it the power to set in movement what is actually transparent; 
that power constitutes its very nature." (DA 418a31-418b2)27 Furthermore, 
Now there clearly is something which is transparent, and by 
'transparent' I mean what is visible, and yet not visible in 
itself, but rather owing its visibility to the colour of 
something else; of this character are air, water, and many 
solid bodies. (DA 418b4-6) 
According to Apostle, "one does not see the transparent medium; what he sees is color 
through a lighted medium," and further, "[transparency as a nature is a certain quality 
present in air, water, glass, ether, and other such objects, and it is a necessary attribute of 
a medium through which, when lighted, colors are seen."28 Air and/or water—that is, 
some transparent medium—is necessary for sight because, as Aristotle explains: 
If what has colour is placed in immediate contact with the 
eye, it cannot be seen. Colour sets in movement not the 
sense organ but what is transparent, e.g. the air, and that, 
extending continuously from the object to the organ, sets 
the latter in movement. Democritus misrepresents the facts 
when he expresses the opinion that if the interspace were 
empty one could distinctly see an ant on the vault of the 
sky; that is an impossibility. Seeing is due to an affection or 
change of what has the perceptive faculty, and it cannot be 
affected by the seen colour itself; it remains that it must be 
affected by what comes between. Hence it is indispensable 
that there be something in between—if there were nothing, 
so far from seeing with greater distinctness, we should see 
nothing at all. (DA 419al 1-21)29 
Here Aristotle provides an empirical argument that aisthesis requires some sort of 
medium or conduit. Apostle's explanation concerns the definition of colour as that which 
has the power to set a transparent medium in motion, claiming: 
If a color is to act on the eye (i.e., to be seen) and hence on 
vision, it has to do so in accordance with its definition. But 
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if a colored object is in contact with the eyes, its color 
cannot act on a transparent medium; hence it cannot be 
seen.30 
Put more simply, Aristotle tells us at 419a 11-21 that the sensation of colour is not the 
function of direct contact between the organs of sense and their object (the organ, in this 
case, being the eye and the object being the colour). Rather, as we are told, the sensation 
of colour requires the presence of some element that possesses the same susceptibilities 
to colour as does the organ acting as a conduit through which the activity of the colour 
extends. This necessity, says Aristotle, is demonstrated by our inability to see that which 
is in immediate contact with the eye. 
The same is true for hearing, smell, and taste. With regard to hearing, in DA II 8 
we are told that sound "is heard both in air and in water" (DA 419b 18) and that it occurs 
when "the air impinged upon does not retreat before the blow, i.e. is not dissipated by it." 
(DA 419M8-22)32 As is the case with colour, sound inheres in air. Further, 
What has the power of producing sound is what has 
the power of setting in movement a single mass of air 
which is continuous from the impinging body up to the 
organ of hearing. The organ of hearing is physically united 
with air, and because it is in air, the air inside is moved 
concurrently with the air outside. (DA 420a3-5)33 
In hearing too, the essential movement occurs in the air. The 'physical' unity of the 
organ of hearing with air, however, must be qualified: the clause here translated "The 
organ of hearing is physically united with air [akoe de sumphues <estin> aeri]" 
expresses continuity between the air within and the air without the ear. The movement 
that constitutes the hearing is not, as the translation suggests, a serialized set of 
movements traversing one mass of air outside to a second or separate mass of air within 
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the ear, it is a single movement in a continuous mass of air. "Smelling too takes place 
through a medium, i.e. through air or water." (DA 421b9)34 
What I mean to suggest by this reading is not that the media are themselves 
sensitive. Rather, the media must be understood as representing versatile conductors of 
the activity of the sense object. This is because, as Aristotle has already told us, the 
stimulation of the senses originates from outside (DA 420a3-5), but, at least in the case of 
vision and hearing, the sense organ is not stimulated by means of immediate contact with 
the object (DA 419al 1). The gap between the object and the sense organ is filled by the 
media. (DA 418a31-418b2; 419all-21; 420a3-5; 421b9; and423al5-17) What makes 
this conductivity possible is the continuity between the media and the organ. Aristotle 
speaks to the elemental composition of each sense organ and explains that each organ is 
composed in part of the element, or elements, that mediate the sensation of its object: At 
420a3-5 the ear is described as a pocket of air; concerning the organ of smell, Aristotle 
writes, "Smells are of what is dry as flavours of what is moist. Consequently the organ of 
smell is potentially dry." (DA 422a6-7) Concerning taste, Aristotle writes, "Since what 
can be tasted is liquid, the organ for its perception cannot be either actually liquid or 
incapable of becoming liquid." (DA 422a33-422b2)35 Finally, of the body more 
generally, Aristotle writes, "no living body could be constructed of air or water; it must 
be something solid. Consequently it must be composed of earth along with these, which 
is just what flesh and its analogue in animals which have no true flesh tend to be." (DA 
423al2-13 emphasis added) Generally speaking, the composition of the body includes 
the same elements that mediate sensation, the continuity between the various parts of the 
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body and the external media varies in accordance with the proportion of those media that 
make up the organs. 
Aristotle himself contrasts his views concerning the mediation of the senses with 
that of Democritus. Aristotle tells us that whereas Democritus posits a void between the 
sensed object and the sense organ, Aristotle accounts for the 'interspaces' by 
demonstrating the continuity between the sense organ and the sense object that aisthesis 
requires. {DA 419al5-24) This continuity is maintained by the medium—not, however, 
as we tend to understand it, qua the conductor of sensuous data, but rather as an extension 
of the organ in which sensuous activity is extended throughout. In sight, sound, smell, 
and taste, that conduit is air and water. Finally, concerning touch, "the body must be the 
medium for the faculty of touch, naturally attached to us, through which the several 
perceptions are transmitted." {DA 423al5-17)37 Accordingly, sensitivity to the tangible 
does not extend beyond the flesh. 
§ 4. The Material Condition of the Sense Organs 
The body, not being transparent like water and air, is a different sort of medium, 
concerning which we are told, "no living body could be constructed of air or water; it 
must be something solid. Consequently it must be composed of earth along with these, 
which is just what flesh and its analogue in animals which have no true flesh tend to be." 
{DA 423al2-13)38 What Aristotle tells us is that we sense the tangible—namely, what is 
hot or cold, what is hard or soft, wet or dry—because "the sense [of touch] itself being a 
sort of mean [mesotes] between the opposites that characterize the objects of perception." 
{DA 424a4-5)39 And so, in these passages scattered throughout DA II Aristotle tells us in 
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what the first actuality of aisthesis consists—namely, "a sort of mean between the 
opposites that characterize the objects of perception." 
Slakey's interpretation of this passage is perhaps the most influential in recent 
times because it is this reading that Sorabji (1974) defends in the formulation of his own 
reading of aisthesis. Slakey interprets this passage as stating that one's sensitivity to the 
tangible qualities is due to the actualization of some moderate state (mesotes)—for 
example, not hot nor cold but warm, not wet nor dry but damp, not hard nor soft but 
firm—in the material constituents of the organ.40 What is most problematic with 
Slakey's understanding of mesotes with regard to the first actuality of aisthesis is that the 
precondition for aisthesis it describes is one that is a quality of the sense organ qua 
substance, in other words, the receptivity is itself a quality bestowed upon the organ 
through the actualization of a certain form in its matter. Slakey's suggestion that the term 
'mesotes' refers to a mean state of the sense organ would require that the second actuality 
of aisthesis involves a change to that mean state and, as such, the actualization of the 
sensible form in the material substratum of the sense organ. Such a change would, 
according to the principle underlying the interpretation, render the organ insensitive, or at 
least its sensitivity would be diminished when sensation occurred. For Slakey's Aristotle, 
then, the first and second actualities of aisthesis involve changes of the same sort, both 
corresponding to the acquisition of knowledge and neither of the two corresponding to its 
exercise. (DA 417b2-7) 
The key to avoiding this problem, that is the problem of insensitivity due to the 
second actualization of aisthesis, is suggested by Aristotle's discussion of media, 
specifically what is said about the mediation of the sensation of colour: It is the 
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transparency of air and water that enable them to conduct the activity of the sensible 
object to the sense organ. (DA 418a31-418b2; 419all-21; 420a3-5; 421b9; and423al5-
17) The state of transparency represents a lack (or privation) of a certain quality— 
namely, colour—and not the actual possession of a quality that is the mean of two 
extremes. Transparency is neutral to any given colour and not the mean between any two 
colours. Furthermore, we saw that the continuity that exists between the medium and the 
sense organ that enables the activity of the sense object to pass from the outside in, 
results from the sense organ being composed, in part, of the mediating element itself. (DA 
420a3-5; 422a6-7; 422a33-422b2; and 423al5-17) We can extrapolate from this that it is 
the transparency of a certain portion of the eye that accounts for its sensitivity. For this 
reason, it is better to understand mesotes as a neutral state (as transparency is with respect 
to colour). Further, as the analogy from DA II 5 requires, the neutral state must remain 
relatively stable in order to maintain the sensitivity of the organ. (DA 417a22-25) The 
stability of the state is as much an antecedent condition for the sensitivity of the organ as 
the neutral state itself. Mesotes as a neutral state describes the form that is actualized in 
the first sense and not as one that fluctuates through the actualization of aisthesis in the 
second sense. For this reason, when Aristotle writes, "Since what can be tasted is liquid, 
the organ for its perception cannot be either actually [entelecheia] liquid or incapable of 
becoming liquid," (DA 422a33-422b2)41 he employs the term "entelecheia" which, as we 
have seen, is indicative in this context of a first actuality and, as such, a relatively stable 
state. 
Such a reading of mesotes42 is also supported by Aristotle's earlier claim that "if 
the old man could recover the proper kind of eye, he would see just as well as the young 
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man. The incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of its vehicle." 
(DA 408M8-23) Here Aristotle is explicit about what age deteriorates: it is the form of 
the sense organ, in other words, it depletes its receptivity to sensible forms by depleting 
its neutrality with respect to its sense object. Furthermore, Aristotle's comments at 
421b25-29 concerning the differences in the eyes possessed by members of various 
species, where we are told that some animals possess firm eyes and so their visual acuity 
is lesser than our own, reinforces such a reading of mesotes. We can observe that the 
firmness or softness of the sense organ is an aspect of its form. Specifically, it is that 
aspect of its form that dictates its sensitivity to its intended sense object. 
Conclusion: The First Actuality o/Aisthesis 
Ultimately Aristotle articulates two conditions that represent the first actuality 
(entelecheid) of aisthesis: (1) the presence of a mediating element that is qualitatively 
neutral with respect to the quality that it mediates the sensation of, and (2) that the sense 
organs themselves be partially composed of the element that mediate the sensation of 
their respective objects. In this way continuity is maintained between the outer 
environment of the subject and the sense organs themselves. With regard to the 
aisthetikon specifically, the relevant aspect of the organ rendered through the 
actualization of its form is its qualitative neutrality with respect to a certain range of 
sensible qualities that the actualization of the form manifests. (DA 424a4-5) It is this 
range of sensible qualities that, generally speaking, constitute the special object of the 
given sense; in sight colour, in smell scent, etc. We will now turn our attention to what 
Aristotle says about the activity of the senses, that is, the second actuality of aisthesis. 
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Chapter 4. THE SECOND ACTUALITY OF AISTHESIS 
Introduction 
Modern commentators tend to offer two basic sorts of interpretations of the second 
actuality of aisthesis: (1) one emphasizes Aristotle's claim at DA 417b2-7 that sensation 
involves "an alteration in a quite different sense."43 The second (2) tends to emphasize 
Aristotle's claim at DA 424al8-19 that "By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of 
receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter." (DA 424al8-19)44 
The first of these passages is found in DA II 5. 
§ 1. Aisthesis as "an alteration in a quite different sense. " 
Aristotle's apparent conclusion that the activity of aisthesis involves an alteration of a 
quite different sort (than the sorts explicated in GC) is based upon a further clarification 
of the distinction discussed earlier concerning the two sorts of actuality. (DA 417a32-
417b 1) This analysis leads Aristotle to the following disjunction. He says that the 
transition that actualizes the sort of potential represented in the exercise of knowledge 
after it has been acquired (i.e., the second actuality) is either (i) not an alteration at all, or 
(ii) "an alteration in a quite different sense." (DA 417b7) 
Aristotle then tells us that one important difference between the potentiality that 
aisthesis involves—in other words, the second potentiality that is concomitant with the 
79 
first actuality of aisthesis—and the sort of potentiality actualized through the exercise of 
knowledge—which is, again, a second potentiality—is that 
the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the 
seen, the heard, &c, are outside. The ground of this 
difference is that what actual sensation apprehends is 
individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is 
universals, and these are in a sense within the soul. (DA 
417M9-24)46 
This suggests that the activity of the senses is initiated by an external force. This is 
further suggested by Aristotle's comment that "man can exercise his knowledge when he 
wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon himself—a sensible object must be 
there." (DA 417b24-26)47 
DA II 5 concludes with a brief descriptive account of the process of aisthesis. 
Aristotle says, 
what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the 
perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning 
of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting 
factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is 
assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it. 
(DA 418a3-6)48 
This passage provides the key piece of evidence in support of Slakey's interpretation, 
introduced in the previous chapter, and the 'literalist' interpretation that results from 
Sorabji's appropriation of it.49 
Slakey's is a thoroughly materialistic interpretation. Slakey begins by 
establishing what he believes to be the nature of the change that aisthesis involves: 
"Aristotle here [referring to DA 417b7] seems to speak interchangeably of perception and 
of the action by the object of touch on the organ."50 By this Slakey means to establish 
that aisthesis is a function of the sort of efficient causation that effects change through the 
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immediate contact of one thing with another. Slakey continues by considering what 
Aristotle means when he describes aisthesis as a process whereby the sense organ 
becomes like its object (DA 417al4-20, 418a3-6, and 423b31). He claims that the key to 
this passage is provided in what follows when Aristotle tells us that one cannot sense the 
temperature of an object when that temperature is equal to the temperature of the flesh. 
By extrapolating these comments to encompass all of the five senses Slakey concludes 
the following: 
Just as the organ of touch must not be equal in temperature 
to the thing perceived as hot so that it can change to hot, so 
the organ of sight must be neither white nor black so that it 
can change to white or black. Aristotle's reasoning can 
only be that perception of white is a process in which the 
organ of sight becomes white, and so on for the perception 
of the other colours. The same conclusion is extended 
mutatis mutandis to the other sense organs.51 
According to Slakey, this reading conforms with Aristotle's comments at 425M8-19 that, 
in order for one to come to an awareness of his own sensual behaviour, the sense organ 
must itself exhibit the sensible qualities of its object. And so Slakey's reading describes 
aisthesis as an activity whereby the sensible quality is actualized in the sense organ, the 
original state of which is, as we already know, what he describes as a mean state relative 
to a range of sensible qualities. 
Slakey's interpretation is repeated almost verbatim in Robinson's 1989 
monograph: 
The power of perceptual discrimination arises from the 
differences between the imposed attributes and the 
perceptual system's own average value.... Their effective 
stimuli are conditions that fall above or below the sense's 
own average state. Stimuli that perfectly match the 
system's own condition or state are not perceived.52 
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Despite its initial suggestion that Robinson is adopting the principle of Slakey's 
interpretation to account for sense discrimination, as opposed to sensation, it is clear 
when Robinson writes, "[s]timuli that perfectly match the system's own condition or state 
are not perceived"53 that he is using the phrases "sense discrimination" and "perception" 
interchangeably. If this were not the case, then Robinson might say that stimuli that 
perfectly match the system's own condition are indeed perceived, although perhaps 
inaccurately, but not clearly discriminated from other conditions of states. Slakey's 
interpretation is also very influential for Sorabji. 
In "Body and Soul in Aristotle" (1974), Sorabji provides summaries of a number 
of historically significant interpretations of Aristotle's theory of aisthesis. He critically 
examines the views of Barnes, G.R.T. Ross, W.D. Ross, Brentano, and Slakey, providing 
his own interpretations throughout his examination. Sorabji defends Slakey's basic 
position claiming that "we ought to take his [Slakey's] suggestion seriously. For we 
could well expect Aristotle to be a materialist, seeing that so many of his predecessors 
were preoccupied with the physiology of mental acts."54 For Sorabji's Aristotle, aisthesis 
and the affections of the soul in general are, without exception, manifest in physical 
matter. Accordingly, Sorabji interprets aisthesis as an entirely physical occurrence. This 
claim is bolstered by his reading of Meteor. IV 4 where Aristotle tells us that we become 
aware of a given quality when we, being in some contrastable state, become, or take on, a 
state similar to that which defines the given quality. (Meteor. 3 82a 17) And so, aisthesis 
is one and the same with the physical changes undergone by the sense organ. Similarly 
materialist interpretations have been offered by Webb (1982), Bynum (1987), and 
Everson(1997).55 
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More recently, in his "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's 
Theory of Sense-Perception" (1992), Sorabji offers an explicit rehearsal of what has 
come to be known as his "literalist" interpretation: "In vision, for example, the eye-jelly 
(kore) does not receive particles or other bits of matter from the scene observed. It 
simply takes on colour patches (perceptible/orms) to match it."56 In his "Aristotle and 
the Problem of Intentionality" Caston (1998) defends a reading similar to that of his 
teacher, Sorabji.57 
J. L. Ackrill's Aristotle the Philosopher (1981) also employs the language of 
physiology when interpreting aisthesis in Aristotle's DA. According to Ackrill, "The 
changes inside the body are sometimes spoken of as if they were movements of blood, 
and sometimes as if they were movements carried in the blood, and sometimes as if they 
were qualitative changes."58 More than this, however, Ackrill does not offer. Rather, 
Ackrill concludes that 
The two crucial points he is making are that in sense-
perception there must be a physical and physiological 
causal chain from object to primary sense-organ, and that 
the change at the end of the chain must be like, or in some 
way correspond to, the changes at the earlier stages and at 
the beginning.59 
Ackrill extends this physiological motif to explain imagination. Imagination, or, rather, 
imaginings, are the degraded remnants, or "traces", of sensations that, says Ackrill, are 
reactivated by some unspecified stimulus.60 Here again, Ackrill's interpretation is some-
what under-defined. Ackrill says that it is not clear whether such stimuli are electrical or 
chemical in nature. Nor is it clear what constitutes a "trace" of a sensation. 
Nevertheless, Ackrill tells us that "For the philosopher the first and essential thing is that 
there must be some such traces, capable of reactivation."61 The evident assumption is 
83 
that these traces and the stimuli that triggers such reactivations indeed correspond to 
some aspect of the creature's physiology. The interpretation we are given by Ackrill is a 
precursor to the functionalist reading we find in Putnam and Nussbaum. 
Putnam and Nussbaum begin by differentiating between two positions: "it is one 
thing to hold that [a] perception cannot be explained 'from the bottom up', quite another 
to hold that [b] it is not accompanied by or realized in any material transition." In other 
words, there is, on the one hand, the position that (a) one cannot account for sensation 
strictly by appealing to its physical basis. On the other hand, there is the position that (b) 
there is no physical basis for sensation. The position they attribute to Aristotle is (a). 
According to Putnam and Nussbaum "perception is not the type of change that Aristotle 
(strictly speaking) calls kinesis; it is, rather, the actualization of a potential."63 In other 
words, Putnam and Nussbaum acknowledge Aristotle's distinction between first and 
second actualities. Of course, in Aristotle every change, kinesis or otherwise, involves 
the actualization of a potential in some sense. However, in choosing the word 'transition' 
to characterize this change they, contra Slakey, seem to imply that the sort of change 
involved in aisthesis is that which actualizes a certain power and not one that physically 
manifests some form (or quality) in matter. They claim: 
Still, the point is: it does not follow that this transition is 
not at every point of necessity accompanied by some 
material transition. (Matter has potentialities too, clearly; 
and these too can be actualized.) We shall argue that it is; 
indeed, with Sorabji, we believe that the most precise way 
of characterizing the relationship is that it is a transition 
realized in the matter. The psuche does nothing alone; its 
doings are the doings of the organic body. Perceiving is an 
activity in matter.65 
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In Putnam and Nussbaum we are confronted with a thoroughly functionalist reading of 
aisthesis according to which the sensible qualities are not actualized in the sense organ 
per se. Only the potential for aisthesis is actualized. In other words, according to 
Putnam and Nussbaum's Aristotle, aisthesis involves the activation of a capacity that 
remains dormant until it is triggered by the proper sensible object. (Putnam and 
Nussbaum make the first and second actuality distinction central to their interpretation.) 
To be clear, however, like Sorabji, Putnam and Nussbaum take this change to be one that 
is realized in the material constituents of the sense organ. However, contra Sorabji, 
Putnam and Nussbaum take this change to be a physiological change that is not like, in 
any straightforward way, the sort of change discussed in GCI 7. Similar readings can be 
found in Irwin (1991) and Cohen (1992).66 
In his, "De Anima II 5" (2002), Burnyeat argues that the superficial appeal of the 
Slakey and Sorabji reading is that it accounts for aisthesis by appealing to the sort of 
change one is accustomed to finding in Aristotle's physical treatises. Such a reading, 
however, diminishes the significance of the analogy Aristotle articulates between 
knowledge and sensation and the two sorts of change relevant to both: (a) the sort of 
change that corresponds to the acquisition of knowledge, and (b) the sort of change 
corresponding to the exercise of knowledge. Slakey and Sorabji would have us believe 
that both the manifestation of the sensual powers and the activity of the senses involve 
changes of the sort that corresponds to (a). On the contrary, Aristotle tells us that, with 
respect to aisthesis, the potential represented in (a) is actualized "due to the action of the 
male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of 
sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge." (DA 417M6-
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18) In other words, the powers of aisthesis are bestowed upon the organism through a 
material change that begins at conception. This, it should be added, is the sort of change 
Aristotle refers to at 417al-2 and 417al4-20 and is one of the primary subjects of GC 
On the other hand, Aristotle concludes to the affirmative that "sensation corresponds to 
the stage of the exercise of knowledge," {DA 417M9)68 or, rather, aisthesis corresponds 
to the potential represented in (b) and which we know from 417a32-417bl is actualized 
through the transition from the inactive possession of a power to its active exercise. 
The physiological readings offered by Ackrill, Putnam and Nussbaum, on the 
other hand, admit of sufficient ambiguity with regard to the precise nature of the change 
corresponding to the second actualization of aisthesis that they avoid explicitly 
contradicting Aristotle's text. 
§ 2. Aisthesis as "the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of 
things without the matter. " 
Following his account of the individual senses Aristotle characterizes the powers of 
aisthesis generally as follows: "By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving 
into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter." {DA 424al8-19)69 Aristotle 
elaborates this point by means of an analogy with a signet ring impressed into wax. He 
tells us that the sense organ receives the form of its object in the same way as "[a] piece 
of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the 
impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or gold: in a similar way the 
sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what 
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it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort and according to its form." (DA 424a19-
24) 
Brentano's point of departure is Aristotle's distinction between two types of 
affection (DA 417b2): the first type involves the corruption of one contrary in the 
actualization of another, as when a green apple ripens in to red: the greenness of the apple 
ceases to be when the red takes its place. The second type of affection occurs "without 
any loss of form on the part of the affected subject; this affection merely makes actual 
what lay in the subject potentially, it brings to a state of completion what was 
unfinished."71 We can begin by observing that the first sort of affection identified by 
Brentano does correspond to one of the sorts of actualization distinguished by Aristotle at 
DA II5—namely, a second actualization (energeia). An apple being the fruit of a living 
organism, its ripening is indeed preceded by a first actualization (entelecheia), the first 
actualization of the soul of the apple tree. The second sort of affection Brentano 
identifies is similar to the sort of affection Burnyeat later identifies when he writes, 
"unordinary alteration is the development of the disposition which perfects a thing's 
nature." As is the case in Burnyeat's analysis, Brentano interprets this second sort of 
affection as an actualization of the second sort as well. Brentano specifies that sensation 
is entirely a function of the second sort of affection or change and, as such, is a second 
actualization. Brentano does note that sensation may be accompanied by an ordinary sort 
of actualization of the sort Slakey identifies with the second actuality of sensation. It is 
clear, however, that for Brentano this concomitant affection of the ordinary sort 
superfluous to the activity of sensation, i.e., it does not represent the second actuality of 
aisthesis conditioned by a "first actualization" of the entelecheia sort.73 
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Clarence Shute's The Psychology of Aristotle: An Analysis of the Living Being 
(1964) characterizes the senses as pure potentialities. He differentiates between the sense 
organs, which are physical components of the living organism, and the powers of 
perception, which possess "only potential and not actual existence."75 Here again the 
distinction between first and second actualities from DA II 5 is relevant. This is the 
distinction Shute seems to be relying upon here: Shute understands the first actuality of 
aisthesis strictly in terms of the potentiality it manifests, i.e., the second potentiality that 
precedes the second actuality of the exercise of aisthesis. According to Shute: "The 
senses themselves do not give rise to sensation. They are powers of the organism to be 
stimulated in certain ways, and this stimulation must be present to produce actual 
sensing."76 Indeed, Shute removes both the power and the sensation itself from the 
organ. According to this reading the sense organs are a means to the exercise of a power 
properly attributed to the soul.77 As for our present concern, specifically the second 
actuality of aisthesis, Shute's accounts of the mechanisms through which sense objects 
enter into relations with their proper sense organs suggests that actual sensation is 
instantiated in the relationship between the sense object and the sense organ. Shute's 
interpretation shares certain affinities with that of Barnes, especially with respect to their 
characterization of the movements involved in sensual behaviour. 
Barnes devotes a significant section of his "Aristotle's Concept of Mind" (1972) 
to the interpretation of Aristotle's definition of aisthesis. Barnes offers the following 
description: 
The position appears to be this: when I gaze at a glass of 
green Chartreuse, my eyes, or some parts of them, become 
green - the perceptible form of Chartreuse - even though 
none of the physical parts of the liqueur actually enters my 
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eyes. To see something green just is for my eyes to 
become green by the action of the green object; and so for 
other sense objects and other senses. Thus we have a 
purely physiological, and hence strongly physicalist, 
analysis of perception. 
Barnes attributes this interpretation to Slakey, then states his disagreement with what he 
calls the "strongly physicalist" conclusion. Barnes observes that the presence of matter in 
a psychic part need not entail the physicality of that part. With reference to the 
reception of the form of an object without its matter, Barnes argues, contrary to the 
'literal' readings, that it would be an assumption to hold that the actualization of form in 
a sense organ entails the physical actualization of that form. In other words, the receiving 
of form without the matter does not necessarily mean that the sense organ becomes 
physically like its object. Barnes presents three more arguments against the strongly 
physicalist interpretation: (1) such an interpretation is inconsistent with Aristotle's 
assertion that aisthesis is carried out through the composite of body and soul, (2) such an 
interpretation would allow plants to perceive, and (3) it does not explain in what way the 
change (alloidsis) that Aristotle says aisthesis involves is somehow special or obscure. 
This said, the constructive part of Barnes' interpretation comes to an end when he states 
that, "I doubt if anything more positive than this can be elicited from Aristotle's text; but 
the negative point, that aisthesis is not a purely physiological change, seems 
on 
established." And so, like Shute, Barnes' interpretation is minimal. 
Esfeld takes a similar line when speaking of the states organisms enter when they 
are actually sensing. He interprets Aristotle as saying that "The received form is 
instantiated in the act of perception." And further that "In ordinary perception, it [the 
sensible form] does not exist in distinction from that act."81 With regard to the 
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ontological matters that Barnes and Shute refrain from addressing explicitly, Esfeld tells 
us that the crucial point is that the form/matter schema of the external world is mirrored 
in sensation and that "the structure of the thinking and perceiving mind is identical with 
the structure of the world."82 Esfeld, evidently, is still reluctant to address the physiology 
of sensation. Apostle, on the other hand, takes steps towards filling in these blanks. 
Apostle's 1981 commentary on DA presents a reading that is firmly entrenched in 
the tradition that interprets sensation in Aristotle as a mode of alteration rather than the 
physical instantiation of the sensed object in the sense organ. Apostle employs somewhat 
modern language to explicate sensation in Aristotle: "The sentient soul, then, while being 
acted upon by the sensible object, is in the process of receiving the sense impression of 
the form of that object (without the matter)."83 Apostle elaborates upon the two types of 
alteration that he believes Aristotle distinguishes at 417b4-7. Alteration of the first sort 
involves the sort of physical change that underlies the interpretations of Slakey, Sorabji 
and their like, that is, the physical instantiation of the form of one contrary at the expense 
of another. Alteration of the other sort involves the activation of a certain capacity in a 
subject, like "when a man with knowledge already acquired begins to use that knowledge, 
that knowledge is not destroyed by the contrary but is rather reinforced or becomes more 
stable."84 Sensation turns out to be an alteration of the second sort. When Apostle 
explicates 424al8-22 with reference to this sort of alteration he is led to connect the 
action of the signet ring impressed upon wax, that is the impression itself, to sensation. 
In this analogy the wax is most often read as the analogue to the sense organ. For 
Apostle, the ring and the wax are not the relevant analogues; it is the action that activates 
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a certain power in the wax without destroying it—namely, its ability to receive 
impressions—that is most relevant: 
The impression of this surface in the wax is not quite the 
form of the original surface, for it is concave and not 
convex; but there is one-to-one correspondence, so to 
say.... Similarly, there is an analogous correspondence 
between the form of the sensible object as received in sense 
and the same form as existing in that object. 5 
Apostle's ingenuity in reading this analogy is the undoing of the interpretation. This is so 
because it implies a certain margin of error that, strictly speaking, Aristotle is not willing 
to permit. Apostle might respond to this criticism by citing the passage that opens DA, 
which explains that the study of psychology is one that may lead to a more 
comprehensive body of knowledge in its ability to expose the mechanisms through which 
knowledge is acquired. Unfortunately, rather than uncovering the foundations of human 
knowledge, the margin of error Apostle proposes may instead serve as the foundations of 
skepticism. If one can not know the object of sense as it is in reality, then, strictly 
speaking, one cannot know the object. The influence of Apostle's interpretation can be 
seen in articles by Andriopoulos (1993), and Dogan (2004).86 
In his "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft)" (1992) 
Burnyeat presents a twofold argument. He argues that, on the one hand, aisthesis is not 
equivalent to the sense object's physical affect upon the sense organ (as is suggested by 
Slakey, Sorabji, and, again, by Putnam and Nussbaum). On the other hand, Aristotle's 
theory of aisthesis is based upon a conception of matter that would not be taken seriously 
by contemporary scholars. 
Burnyeat too rehearses the distinction between the two sorts of actuality that 
Aristotle sets out at 417a22-417bl. According to Burnyeat, Sorabji's reading of aisthesis 
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construes it as a change of the first sort, however, Burnyeat is adamant that aisthesis is a 
change of the second. This interpretation leads him to conclude that "the physical 
material of which Aristotelian sense-organs are made does not need to undergo any 
ordinary physical change to become aware of colour or a smell." This interpretation is 
reiterated later when Burnyeat claims that" 
The opening of 2. 12 confirms for us, as it seems to me, 
that no physiological change is needed for the eye of the 
organ of touch to become aware of the appropriate 
perceptual objects. The effect on the organ is the 
awareness, no more and no less.88 
It is the phraseology with which Burnyeat articulates his interpretation that is indicative 
of its greatest deficiency. Specifically, I refer here to Burnyeat's talk of aisthesis in terms 
of "awareness" and "becoming] aware" bear conotations that are not necessarily 
interpolated into the text. Burnyeat goes as far as to write, "One might say that the 
physical material of animal bodies in Aristotle's world is already pregnant with 
consciousness, needing only to be awakened to red or warmth." Burnyeat exagerates 
Aristotle's anamism with respect to the material constituents of animal bodies to an 
extent that puts his reading of aisthesis at odds with what Aristotle says about living 
beings and souls in general at DA 12 concerning the difficulties associated with 
identifying the soul with one of the elemental constituents of the body and with what is 
said in DA I 4, specifically where he writes, 
That the soul is a harmony in the sense of the composition 
of the parts of the body is a view easily refutable; for there 
are many and various compoundings of the parts; of what is 
thought or the sensitive or the appetitive faculty the 
composition? And what is the composition which 
constitutes each of them? It is equally absurd to identify 
the soul with the ratio of the mixture; for the mixture of the 
elements which makes flesh has a different ratio from that 
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which makes bone. The consequence of this view will 
therefore be that distributed throughout the whole body 
there will be many souls... (DA 408a 11 -18)90 
Burnyeat's suggestion that the body is saturated through with a potential awareness is 
precisely the sort of view that Aristotle aims at refuting in these early chapters of DA. 
Furthermore, it is an overstatement to suggest that Aristotle implies anywhere in 
his treatment of sensation that the sense organs themselves possess a certain awareness of 
their object. Aristotle speaks of the movement (kinei) stimulated by colour, transmitted 
through air or water, making contact with the eye (ep' auten ten opsin) (DA 419al2-15); 
Aristotle speaks of movements stimulated by sound and transmitted through a body in air 
that is united (sumphues) with the ear (DA 420a3-4); Aristotle speaks of flavours acting 
upon (poiei) the sense of taste (DA 422al7); and so on, but never does Aristotle attribute 
to the sense organ a sort of consciousness unto itself. In place of Burnyeat's "awareness" 
phraseology it is more appropriate, in the context of Aristotle's theory of aisthesis, to 
speak of the presence of sense data which is accounted for by Aristotle through the 
faculty of aisthesis. The distinction is subtle but integral to a proper understanding of 
aisthesis in Aristotle. 
The theory of aisthesis that Aristotle lays out for us is fundamentally based upon a 
physics of the sensible: Aristotle begins by telling us about the necessary conditions that 
must be met before sensation of any sort is possible. This, as we have seen, involves the 
presence of a mediating element, on the one hand (DA 418a31-418b2; 419al 1-21; 420a3-
5; 421b9; and 423al5-17), and a properly formed organ, a portion which is partially 
composed of the mediating element (DA 420a3-5; 422a6-7; 422a33-422b2; and 423al5-
17). Actual sensation, we are told, involves an affection of the organ by means of some 
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movement (kinesis) that is instigated by the sensible qualities of the object and conducted 
to the sense organ via the medium (DA 417M9-24; 419al7-19; 419a25-31; and 419M8-
22). Nowhere is the continuity, or homogeneity, between the sense organ and the 
medium more clear than when Aristotle speaks to the possibility of a sixth sense in DA III 
when he writes, 
Now this is so arranged that if more than one kind of 
sensible object is perceivable through a single medium, the 
possessor of a sense-organ homogeneous with that medium 
has the power of perceiving both kinds of objects (for 
example, if the sense-organ is made of air, and air is a 
medium both of sound and for colour); and if more than 
one medium can transmit the same kind of sensible objects, 
as e.g. water as well as air can transmit colour, both being 
transparent, then the possessor of either alone will be able 
to perceive the kind of objects transmissible through both. 
(DA 424b22-425a3)91 
Here again Aristotle isolates that elemental constituent of the organ that is continuous, or 
"homogeneous", with the mediating element that is instrumental to the sensitivities of the 
organ. 
The most debated aspect of Aristotle's theory of aisthesis in the recent literature (I 
refer here to the debates between Burnyeat and his supporters, with Sorabji and his 
supporters) is how to properly understand the moment(s) of aisthesis at which point the 
activity conducted via the medium meets with the sense organ itself. The key question 
for these scholars is this: "how do we properly understand the change that occurs at this 
point?" This approach is wrongheaded. Aristotle goes to great pains to elaborate upon 
the mechanisms through which the movements stimulated by the sense objects are 
conducted to the sense organ, but the assumption up to now has been that once it reaches 
the sense organ, the movements originating in the sense object terminate. This 
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presumption, however, obviates Aristotle's stipulation that the organs of sense are 
themselves partially composed of the mediating element. Contrary to the current 
standard view that is explicit in the Slakey/Sorabji interpretation and implied in 
Burnyeat's, the continuity that obtains between the medium and the organ of sense allows 
us to understand aisthesis as the continuation of the activity stimulated by the sensible 
quailities of the sense object literally into the subject. In this way we can understand that, 
"a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without 
the matter." {DA 424al8-19)92 Passages such as the one found at DA 419al8-20, where 
Aristotle critiques the Democritean theory of sensation, emphasize the role of continuity 
between the sense organ and the medium in sensation. He tells us that sensation "cannot 
be affected by the seen colour itself; it remains that it [the sense] must be affected by 
what comes between." {DA 419al8-20)93 Here Aristotle makes it clear that because the 
colour is not itself continuous with the sense organ, sensation of the colour is not possible 
when it is in immediate contact with the organ. Furthermore, this passage, and those like 
it—namely, DA 419M0; 419b20-21; 419b34-420a2; 420a3-5; 421b9-13; 422all-14; 
423al0-12; and 424b30-425a3—reveal that it is the movement stimulated by the sense 
object and not the sensible quality that is transmitted to the organ. For this reason I 
propose that we understand Aristotle's theory of aisthesis as an account of the presence 
of sense data in the sensing subject and not, as convention now dictates, as an account of 
the reconstitution of the sensed object in the subject.94 
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Conclusion: The Second Actuality 0/Aisthesis 
Although supporters of the Slakey/Sorabji interpretation may find support in our previous 
analysis of the comparative etymologies of the terms "entelecheia" and "energeia" and 
the later suggestion that the two terms can be, at least loosely, correlated with the first 
and second sorts of actualities respectively; the truth of the matter is that, for our present 
purposes, the precise nature of the physiology of sensation is irrelevant. It is irrelevant 
for two reasons: The first is that the physiology of aisthesis is irrelevant because none of 
the activity properly associated with either the first or the second actualities of 
aisthesis—be they physiological in nature or otherwise—involve concept formation nor 
does it directly affect the maturation of concepts already held by the subject in a way 
comparable to what we see in Brentano's discussions of presentation ("Vorstellung") and 
intentional inexistence. Aisthesis is not genetic in the sense that it involves concept 
formation per se. As we have seen, Aristotle's theory of aisthesis accounts for nothing 
more than the presence of sense data, indeed aisthesis in Aristotle involves nothing more 
than the passive reception of sense data. Concerning this the commentators agree: 
aisthesis is stimulated by the sensible qualities of substances external to the sensing 
subject. Aristotle makes this explicit when he writes: 
the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the 
seen, the heard, &c, are outside. The ground of this 
difference is that what actual sensation apprehends is 
individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is 
universals, and these are in a sense within the soul. (DA 
417M9-24)95 
Given that this is the case—namely, that the 'activity' of the senses is initiated by an 
external force—"man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does 
not depend upon himself—a sensible object must be there." (DA 417b24-26)96 In other 
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words, the transition between the 'activity' and 'inactivity' of the senses is entirely 
beyond the control of the sensing subject. Indeed the term "activity" is, in the context of 
aisthesis, a misnomer when predicated of the faculty of sense and that in which it is 
manifest. 
The second reason that the physiology of aisthesis is irrelevant is wholly related 
to the nature of the process described by Aristotle. In defining the second actuality of 
aisthesis as the transmission of the activity stimulated by the object into the sense organ, 
and stipulating that this transmission takes place by means of a medium that is (a) 
appropriate to the nature of the quality being sensed, and (b) continuous with the 
elemental components of the sense organ, the physiology of aisthesis—understood as a 
bodily response to sense data—is rendered irrelevant because the activity that we 
associate with sensation is not isolated within the organ. The relevant activity is not one 
that originates with the object, terminates at the organ, at which point it stimulates new 
activity. Rather the activity is understood as continuing into the sense organ given its 
elemental continuity with the medium. This nuance is missed when commentators 
presume that aisthesis entails a certain change to the sense organ97 as opposed to 
involving, as we have seen, a movement originating in the object and is continuous 
through the medium and the like elemental constituents of the sense organ. Such a 
reading negates the requirement for an account of change or movement in the sense organ 
distinct from an account of the same movement in the sense organ. For this reason, 
efforts to translate Aristotle's account of the second actuality of aisthesis into modern 
physiological language results in confusion and, ultimately, misrepresents Aristotle's 
theory of aisthesis. 
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Chapter 5. THE EXTENSIONS OF AISTHESIS: THE SENSE THAT 
W E ARE SENSING, THE COMMON SENSIBLES, & 
PHANTASIA 
Introduction 
According to Aristotle the susceptibility of aisthesis is not limited to what he calls the 
special objects of sense—the colour, sound, scent, taste, and the tangible. It is through 
this same faculty that one comes to sense that he is sensing, as well as what Aristotle 
refers to as the "common sensibles", which include movement (kinesis), rest (eremia), 
number (arithmos), figure (schema), and magnitude (megethos). Also associated with 
aisthesis, says Aristotle, is the capacity of phantasia, often translated "imagination". 
These extensions of our sensual capacities—(1) the capacity to sense that we are sensing, 
(2) the capacity to sense the so-called common sensibles, and (3) the capacity for 
phantasia—are also relevant to our investigation into the proper understanding of 
intentionality because all three have been implicated in discussions concerning 
intentionality among prominent commentators—namely, Brentano, Sorabji, and Caston. 
For this reason this chapter will offer an exegesis of these three additional aspects of 
Aristotle's theory of aisthesis. 
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§ 1. The Sense That We Are Sensing 
In the first few chapters of DA III Aristotle offers arguments for the comprehensiveness 
of his account of the senses. Chapter 1 begins by saying, "That there is no sixth sense in 
addition to the five enumerated—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—may be established 
by the following considerations...." {DA 424b22-24)98 Introduced thus, Aristotle's first 
argument is based upon an implied universal disjunction: that all sensible things are 
sensed either through direct contact or at a distance through some medium. Once this is 
understood the remainder of Aristotle's argument runs as follows: We have sensation of 
all things tangible directly through our sense of touch, and touch is a sense we actually 
possess. {DA 424b24-28) On the other hand, all things that are sensed at a distance are 
sensed through one of the simple elements qua medium. {DA 424b28-30) We are then 
told, "Now this is so arranged that if more than one kind of sensible object [toiouton] is 
perceivable through a single medium, the possessor of a sense-organ homogeneous 
[allelon te genei] with that medium has the power of perceiving both kinds of objects". 
(J04 424b31-33)99 Further: 
And if more than one medium can transmit the same kind 
of sensible objects, as e.g. water as well as air can transmit 
colour, both being transparent, then the possessor of either 
alone will be able to perceive the kind of objects 
transmissible through both. {DA 424b34-425a3)100 
Aristotle's argument here is this: because we indeed possess sense organs that are 
homogeneous with the simple elements—air and water—and, given that there are no 
other simple elements, we can be sure that there is no sense other than the five special 
senses accounted for in DA II 7 through II11. {DA 425a3-13) 
99 
Given that there is no sense in addition to these five, Aristotle is led to the 
following aporia: "Since it is through sense that we are aware that we are sensing or 
hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing, or by some sense other 
than sight." {DA 412M2-13)101 This aporia is one of Brentano's central concerns when 
reading DA.102 To be clear, the question is this: How is it that we see that we are seeing, 
hear that we are hearing, or otherwise become aware of our sensuous behaviour if we 
possess only five capacities properly called "senses"? Brentano treats this problem at 
great length, arguing that the special senses cannot possibly be responsible for this sort of 
perception because, among other reasons, it would require either that (a) each sense organ 
be conceived of as being sensitive to two sorts of objects, or (b) the sensual behaviour 
must be conceived of as manifesting the same qualities as the sense itself. Unhappy with 
both these options, Brentano is led to attribute to Aristotle the notion of an "inner sense." 
The inner sense is essentially an elaboration upon the capacity, postulated by Aristotle, to 
perceive the common sensibles: 
Essentially the problem is the same as when we distinguish 
between objects that are contraries within one genus. Let A 
be the white and B be the sweet, one of which occurs in the 
sense of sight, the other in the sense of taste, and let E and 
F be to these two sensations as they are to their objects. 
Now if E and F are in one sense, namely, in the sense that 
perceives sensations, then this sense contains not only the 
relation E and F, but also of C and D, hence that of A and 
B, i.e, the relation between the white and the sweet whose 
distinction was in question. This roughly is the way in 
which Aristotle could answer the objections that could be 
raised against his doctrine of an inner sense differing from 
all external senses, i.e., of a special sense directed towards 
the inner movements of the sensitive part itself.103 
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Inner sensation then, senses that we are sensing as a function of its distinction between 
the qualities of one genus and those of another, e.g., the distinction that colours differ 
categorically from sounds. 
On the surface Brentano's suggestion sounds like an outright contradiction to the 
conclusion Aristotle just reached concerning the possibility of a sixth sense. However, 
Brentano's suggestion is consistent with Aristotle's text so long as the inner sense is not 
understood as an entirely distinct and separable capacity. What Brentano refers to as the 
inner sense is, in fact, a function of the identity posited by Aristotle between the activity 
of the sensed object and the activity of the sensing subject. Aristotle tells us that, 
[sjince it is through sense that we are aware that we are 
seeing or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are 
aware of seeing, or by some sense other than sight. But the 
sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive both 
sight and its object, viz. colour: so that either there will be 
two senses both percipient of the same sensible object, or 
the sense must be percipient of itself. Further, even if the 
sense which perceives sight were different from sight, we 
must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must 
somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so, 
we ought to do this in the first case. (DA 425b 12-17)104 
What this means with respect to the present discussion is that the sense that we are 
sensing is concomitant with the sensation of its special object. To that end the inner 
sense can be understood as an abstraction of sensation proper. In other words, the 
sensation of the special object need not be accompanied by the inner sense, however, the 
inner sense must, on all occasions, be accompanied by the sensation of a special sensible 
object. 
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§ 2. Common Sensibles 
Aristotle offers a further argument as to why we need not posit a sixth sense, one that is 
specifically concerned with the common sensibles. The common sensible are so named 
because they involve "certain kinds of movement which are perceptible both by touch 
and by sight." (DA 418al9-20)105 In other words, the common sensibles are so called 
because they are commonly sensed by all of the proper sense capacities. The common 
sensibles include movement (kinesis), rest (eremia), number (arithmos), figure (schema), 
and magnitude (megethos). It is only later explained, in DA III 1, that 
all these we perceive by movement, e.g. magnitude by 
movement, and therefore also figure (for figure is a species 
of magnitude), what is at rest by the absence of movement: 
number is perceived by the negation of continuity 
[sunechous], and by the special sensibles; for each sense 
perceives one class of sensible objects. (DA 425al6-20)106 
It would seem, then, that, as in the case of the special sense objects, continuity (of a sort) 
is integral to the sensibility of the common sensibles. Those things that Aristotle refers to 
as the common sensibles are sensed as a result of variations in our multiple sensual fields. 
In other words, the variety of discontinuities within the fields of our five senses conspire 
to discern for us figure, magnitude, etc. when a sensible substance is numerically one or 
many, when it is in movement, and when it is at rest. 
Shute's take on Aristotle's distinction between (1) the special objects of sense, 
e.g., colour, or taste, (2) the common sensibles, e.g., movement, or magnitude, and (3) the 
indirect objects of the senses, is that we are equally sensitive to all three sorts of objects. 
According to Shute, these distinctions in Aristotle prevent him from having to distinguish 
between sensation and perception as we might today. Shute treats each of these objects 
as objects of sense proper, in other words, as objects that the senses are equally receptive 
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to (the eye is no more or less receptive to [1] and [2] than it is to [3]). Each of them 
represents an aspect of the sensible form of the object. 
These distinctions appear on analysis to present two 
characteristics: they represent varying degrees of simplicity 
in the sense data, so that when we come to sense the son of 
Diares the raw data of sense are considerably complicated 
by the various factors of the critical faculty as a whole, 
operating in the experience of the individual; but in each 
case, simple or complex, the object is particular. It is this 
color, white; or this magnitude, three inches by five inches; 
or this man, the son of Diares. The white body, or the 
object of a given size, or the man himself does not, of 
course, get into the eye. That is why Aristotle says that 
sensation is the reception of the form without the matter. 
But it is always the form of a particular.107 
Shute's reading of the common sensibles is similar to that of Sorabji's. Sorabji's reading, 
however, aims at addressing a specific problem in Aristotle's epistemology. 
In "Intentionality and Physiological Process: Aristotle's Theory of Sense-
Perception," Sorabji suggests that the common sensibles account for the apparent 
propositional nature oiaisthesis. According to Sorabji, it is through the propositional 
nature of aisthesis that Aristotle accounts for the apparent intentional structure of sensual 
content. Sorabji writes that, according to Aristotle, 
One can perceive that the approaching [2] thing is a man 
[3] and is white [1], that the white thing [1] is this or 
something else [3], whether the white thing [1] is a man or 
not [3], what the coloured [1] or sounding [1] thing is [3], 
or where [2], that one is perceiving [1/3], walking [1/3], 
thinking [1/3], living [1/3], existing, that one is sleeping, 
that something is pleasant [3], whether this is bread [3], 
whether it is baked [3], 'this is sweet' [3] and 'this is drink' 
[3].108 
Of these twenty-one (sometimes repeated) items that Sorabji claims we sense, sixteen are 
clear examples of one of the three sorts of sensible objects identified in DA II 6. Those 
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things proceeded by a [1] represent the sensation of a special sense object, a [2] represent 
a common sensible, and a [3] represent a thing of the sort Aristotle says we sense 
incidentally {kata sumbebekos). The four that are not clearly assignable to one of the 
three types of sensible objects are proceeded by a [1/3]. They belong to either the first or 
the third class of objects, the ambiguity stemming from the referent of the term "one". It 
should be noted that each of the more complex propositions, those that speak to the 
nature of the sensed substance—for example, "that something is pleasant", "whether this 
is bread", or "whether it is baked"—are clear cases of the third sort of sensible objects. 
Aristotle's comments concerning that which is sensed incidentally are brief. He 
writes: 
The senses perceive each other's special objects 
incidentally; not because the percipient sense is this or that 
special sense, but because all form a unity: this incidental 
perception takes place whenever sense is directed at one 
and the same moment to two disparate qualities in one and 
the same object, e.g. to the bitterness and the yellowness of 
bile, the assertion of the identity of both cannot be the act 
of either of the senses; hence the illusion of sense, e.g. the 
belief that if a thing is yellow it is bile. {DA 425a30-
425b4)109 
This passage effectively limits the scope of aisthesis to the special objects of sense and 
the common sensibles. This is clear from Aristotle's references to identity claims and his 
claim that they are not an act ofaisthesis. Aristotle says that identity claims bear "the 
illusion of sense" but, in fact, constitute beliefs which are not formulated as a function of 
aisthesis. It should be clear that the sort of predicative powers Sorabji seeks to associate 
with the common sensibles, the sort that communicate substantial identity claims, are the 
sort of things that Aristotle claims to be part of the illusion of sense and are not sensed 
according to the proper meaning of the term "aisthesis". Unfortunately, Aristotle offers 
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no further elaboration upon what is sensible kata sumbebekos before he concludes his 
discussion concerning aisthesis: "About the principle in virtue of which we say that 
animals are percipient, let this discussion suffice." (DA 427al4-16)110 It is apparent then, 
first, that the domain of aisthesis, properly construed, is limited to the special sense 
objects and the so-called common sensibles. Second, it is apparent that the faculty 
according to which we arrive at complex judgemental aspects of the sensed substance, 
that which Sorabji claims to be accounted for under the auspices of the common 
sensibles, actually falls beyond the scope of aisthesis entirely. 
§ 3. Phantasia 
Aristotle adds one more item to his taxonomy of sense-related capacities—namely, the 
imagination (phantasia). This capacity is of particular interest to the present study 
because Caston (1996) argues that Aristotle introduces phantasia in order to "preempt 
charges that he cannot explain the possibility of error" because phantasia "genuinely 
does admit of error"111 and to this extent, says Caston, Aristotle employs the notion of 
phantasia to addresses the set of problems we now refer to as the "problem of 
intentionality". Concerning phantasia, Aristotle writes: "imagination [phantasia] is 
different from either perceiving [aistheseos] or discursive thinking [dianoias], though it is 
not found without sensation, or judgement [hupolepsis] without it. That this activity is 
not the same kind of thinking as judgement is obvious." (DA 427M4-17)112 Brentano 
refers to this passage in support of his identification of phantasia with the passive 
intellect, one half of the intellectual capacity that will be scrutinized later in Part III. 
Gerson, however, argues that this passage is not accurately read as describing phantasia 
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as a type of thinking. Gerson cites 403a9 and 432al6-17 in support of his reading, 
however, his argument is far from definitive. Gerson's reading does seem to be 
supported by three aspects of Aristotle's discussion of phantasia: (1) Aristotle 
distinguishes phantasia from the other cognitive faculties that are (more) clearly 
identified as species belonging to the genus noein (DA 427M4; 427b24-26; 427b27-29; 
and 428al-5); (2) Aristotle articulates the various dependencies that obtain between 
aisthesis, phantasia and the various faculties of noein (DA 427b2-5; 427b27-29; and 
429a2-4); and (3) Aristotle does affirm that the brutes might possess phantasia, but 
denies that the brutes have mind (me hechein noun). (DA II 3; DA 428a7-l 1; and 428a21-
22) These aspects of Aristotle's discussion of phantasia suggest that the purpose of DA 
III 3 is to distinguish, define, then set aside phantasia in order to clear the way for 
Aristotle to address "the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks." (DA 
429al0-ll)114 As we shall see, although the capacity for falsity (pseudeis) will emerge as 
a prominent feature of phantasia, contra Caston, error (apate) is not accounted for by it. 
What is clear at this point is that Aristotle has here presented us with a variety of 
what he takes to be distinct behaviours related to each other by a complex set of 
interdependencies. Here Aristotle suggests the following dependencies: 
hupolepsis D (phantasia D aisthesis) 
Just how phronesis, episteme, and the emergence of doxa alethes factor into this matrix is 
not yet clear but the present context does seem to suggest, in agreement with Gerson, that 
phantasia is generally the precondition for all or most of the higher cognitive faculties. 
This reading is further suggested when Aristotle's introduction of phantasia here at 
427M4 is understood as the function that renders appearances (panta taphainomena). I 
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refer here to 427b2-5 where Aristotle speaks of panta taphainomena and the 
ramifications of the 'like by like' thesis. Already by 427b2-5, it is implied thatphantasia 
is, if not a sort of thinking (noein), then, with Gerson, we must take it to be integral to 
thinking. This reading is reinforced by 427b27-29 where we are told, "Thinking is 
different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement" (DA 
427b27-29)115 and further reinforced by the etymological analysis Aristotle offers at 
429a2-4. At 429a2-4 we are told that "phantasia" is derived from "phaos" (light) from 
which we are also given "phaino" and "phainomena". 
Concerning phantasia Aristotle tells us that it involves our capacity to "call up a 
picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images" (DA 427bl8-20)116 
and this, says Aristotle, is something that falls under our own volition (hotan 
boulometha). (DA 427b 17-21) Whether this is a provisional characterization remains to 
be seen. Before proceeding to elaborate upon phantasia, however, Aristotle adds that 
"when we merely imagine we remain as unaffected as persons who are looking at a 
painting of some dreadful or encouraging scene." (DA 427b23-24)117 In other words, in 
phantasia, unlike in judgement, we are able to refrain from reacting emotionally. It is at 
this point that Caston's suggestion that Aristotle introduces phantasia to "preempt 
charges that he cannot explain the possibility of error" because phantasia "genuinely 
does admit of error"118 departs from Aristotle's text. What Aristotle has made explicit 
here is thatphantasia allows us to refrain from error because we can imagine things that 
are false without committing to its truthfulness and, in so doing, incurring error. As 
Aristotle proceeds to distinguish phantasia from the other cognitive faculties it becomes 
increasingly clear that this reading does indeed cohere with Aristotle's intention. 
107 
Before we return to Aristotle's treatment of phantasia it is important to take note 
that, according to what we have already been told, judgement {hupolepsis) includes 
knowledge {episteme), opinion (doxa), prudence (phronesis) and their opposite. {DA 
427b24-26) This passage has the affect of situating five of the seven functions referred to 
thus far within the taxonomy of noein and not aisthesis. Knowledge {episteme), opinion 
{doxa), and prudence {phronesis) are sub-species of judgement {hupolepsis), judgement 
itself being a species of thinking {noein). Only discursive thinking {dianoias) and 
phantasia remain unaccounted for. At this point Aristotle has also effectively articulated 
the dependency relationships between six of these seven functions. Given: 
hupolepsis D {phantasia D aisthesis) 
we can understand that knowledge {episteme), opinion {doxa), prudence {phronesis) and 
their opposite are all contingent upon phantasia and, therefore, contingent upon aisthesis. 
For now, Aristotle sets aside these varieties of judgement for later discussion. 
He proceeds, however, to differentiate phantasia as a distinct faculty by arguing 
that if it is understood as "that in virtue of which an image arises for us" and is a "single 
faculty or disposition relative to images, in virtue of which we discriminate," and "either 
in error or not," then it must be distinguished from sensation {aisthesis), opinion {doxa), 
science {episteme), and intelligence {nous). {DA 428al-5)119 That phantasia is not 
aisthesis proper is clear from the fact that (a) imagination takes place in the absence of 
aisthesis {DA 428a6); (b) if phantasia were the same as aisthesis than it would be found 
in all animals possessed of aisthesis, this is held not to be the case {DA 428a7-l 1); (c) 
aisthesis is always true, phantasia is most often false {DA 428al 1-12); and (d) in 
common parlance we only speak of phantasia when there is some inaccuracy in our 
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impression of an object, when our impression is accurate we speak oiaisthesis. (DA 
428al2-15) Phantasia cannot be science (episteme) or intelligence (nous) either because 
neither episteme nor nous can be false but phantasia might be. Aristotle's argument that 
phantasia is not to be identified with opinion (doxa) involves his demonstration that 
phantasia does not involve belief (pistis) as does doxa. According to Aristotle "in the 
brutes though we often find imagination we never find belief." (DA 428a21-22)120 These 
later two disjunctions between phantasia and nous lend strong support to Gerson's 
position. 
A full examination of Aristotle's notion of phantasia and its status as a mode of 
nous or aisthesis falls beyond the purview of the present study. What is important, 
however, is that a closer examination of the disjunction that Aristotle articulates between 
phantasia and doxa, reveals even greater difficulties in Caston's suggestion that Aristotle 
introduces phantasia to "preempt charges that he cannot explain the possibility of error." 
The discrepancy lies in the behaviour that manifests error. It is not, contra Caston, 
manifest in phantasia. Aristotle makes this explicit when he tells us that "every opinion 
[doxe] is accompanied by belief [pistis], belief by conviction, and conviction [peithoi] by 
discourse of reason [logos]: while there are some brutes in which we find imagination, 
without discourse of reason. " (DA 428a22-24)121 We are then told, "what we imagine is 
sometimes false though our contemporaneous judgement about it is true; e.g. we imagine 
the sun to be a foot in diameter though we are convinced that it is larger than the 
inhabited part of the earth." (DA 428b2-4)122 The implication of Aristotle's analysis here 
is that a person can imagine something that is false yet still hold a judgement of those 
matters that is true. This not only tells us that the truth or falsity of the content of one's 
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imaginings do not determine the coherence of one's judgements with truth or falsity, it 
tells us, contra Caston, that error—understood as the commitment to, or belief in, a 
falsehood, i.e., the judgement that what is in fact the case is not so—is not manifest in 
phantasia but in something additional to it. Aristotle's deconstruction of opinion into 
belief (pistis) and conviction (peithoi) suggests that, properly speaking, error is manifest 
in one's conviction that such and such is the case and not in one's imagining that such 
and such is the case. 
Having distinguished phantasia from pistis and peithoi, Aristotle proceeds with 
an attempt to tell us just what phantasia is. Aristotle's explanation of phantasia is 
convoluted indeed: 
But since when one thing has been set in motion 
another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held 
to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, 
i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its 
content what can be perceived, and since movement may be 
produced by actual sensation and that movement is 
necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this 
movement must be (1) necessarily (a) incapable of existing 
apart from sensation, (b) incapable of existing except when 
we perceive, (2) such that in virtue of its possession that in 
which it is found may present various phenomena both 
active and passive, and (3) such that it may be either true or 
false. (DA 428M0-17)123 
Aristotle takes it as a given that phantasia is a movement (kinesis) and, in accordance 
with his stipulation at 427b6-14 that phantasia is never found in creatures who do not 
possess aisthesis, he is led to a number of conclusions. The first we have already 
surmised, namely that aisthesis is a precondition for phantasia. The second, however, 
represents the first definitive statement of what the capacity for phantasia entails: that is, 
the ability to render images to one's self. Aristotle says that these images can be either 
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active or passive (poiein kai paschein to echon) and by this he seems to mean that the 
percipient subject can effect the composition of these images by their own volition. This 
is also suggested when Aristotle tells us that "imagining lies within our own power 
whenever we wish" {DA 427M7-18)124 Third, Aristotle concludes that, despite the 
infallibility of the sensation of the kath' auto sensibles, these images might be either true 
or false {alethe kaipseude). Aristotle's brief discussion concerningphantasia comes to 
an end when he writes, "If then imagination presents no other features than those 
enumerated and is what we have described, imagination must be a movement resulting 
from an actual exercise of a power of sense." {DA 428b30-429a2)125 
According to Sorabji (1992), phantasia too is prepositional in nature, and Sorabji 
treats this capacity as an extension oiaisthesis. In fact, he translates "phantasia" as 
"post-perceptual appearance". A "post-perceptual appearance" is 'propositionaP because 
it is 
typically an appearance that something is the case, or, as 
we would sometimes prefer to say, an appearance as of 
something's being the case. I shall call both of these 
appearances prepositional, meaning by that no more than 
that something is predicated of something. There is not 
merely an appearance of whiteness, but of whiteness as 
belonging to something or as being located somewhere.126 
These last few lines, those in which Aristotle accounts for the presence of falsity in 
phantasia {DA 428b30-429a2), leave us with a picture of what the faculty entails that is 
different even from what we were led to believe at 428b 10-17, where we are initially 
introduced to the essential character of phantasia. Whereas 428b 10-17 led us to describe 
phantasia as a faculty through which we are able to render images unto ourselves by our 
own volition, and hence to do so without committing to the veracity of the image 
111 
composed, the text that follows attributes sole responsibility for such falsity to the 
sensation of those things that are sensed kata sumbebekos. Volition seems to have 
nothing to do with the presence of falsity in phantasia, nor does it seem to have anything 
to do with its content (by which I mean the building blocks of the compositions phantasia 
composes). The comments at DA 427b 17-18, then, must be read as suggesting that the 
role of the volition of the subject with regard to phantasia is limited to its activation. We 
are therefore led to the conclusion that phantasia, like aisthesis, is a passive faculty. In 
other words, it may be within our control to activate the faculty; the furnishings and 
fragments that we find within our imaginations are not within our control. 
Conclusion: The Extensions of Aisthesis 
In the preceding review we saw how, in the early chapters of DA III, Aristotle extends his 
theory of aisthesis to account for those phenomena that his accounts of the first and 
second actualities of aisthesis do not. Concerning the capacity according to which we 
come to know that we are sensing, we have seen that, although Brentano's 
characterization of it as the "inner sense" suggests that it is a distinct capacity in addition 
to the five standard senses, it is more accurately understood as a sensation concomitant 
with our sensation of the special objects of sense. The sense that we sense is itself 
concomitant with the second actuality of aisthesis; it is dependant entirely upon aisthesis 
proper, i.e., sensation of the special objects of sense. The common sensibles—including 
movement, rest, number, figure, and magnitude—are so called because they are sensed 
by the same faculties through which, and at the same time as, we sense the special objects 
of sense. Finally, phantasia is the capacity according to which we are able to render 
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images unto ourselves. Phantasia, as we have seen, is a power that falls under our own 
volition, however, the contents of those images are passively determined by the second 
actuality ofaisthesis. 
In the following chapter we will assess Aristotle's theory of aisthesis with respect 
to the extent to which it provides an adequate basis upon which we might understand 
Brentano's notion of the intentional inexistence of mental phenomena. 
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Chapter 6. AISTHESIS AND INTENTIONALITY 
Introduction 
Brentano claims that Aristotle himself spoke of the mental inexistence of the object of 
consciousness when, "In his book on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in 
the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the 
object which is thought is in the thinking intellect."127 As has been repeated throughout 
this study, it is this reference to aisthesis in Aristotle that has prompted scholars to 
identify intentionality with Aristotle's theory of aisthesis/sensation and to interpret 
intentionality as a recapitulation of Aristotle's description of sensation as receiving the 
form of an object without its matter (DA 412a3-6). Contrary to this view, it is my 
contention that an understanding of intentionality that is limited to a recapitulation of 
Aristotle's theory of sensation will fail to account sufficiently for the nuances of the 
concept and will inevitably lead its proponents to the so-called "problems of 
intentionality" (problems of the sort described in the second chapter). The purpose of 
this chapter is to (1) demonstrate the incongruities between intentionality a la Brentano 
and Aristotle's theory of aisthesis, while at the same time to (2) illustrate the connections 
between the misunderstandings that arise when we limit our understanding of 
intentionality to a recapitulation of aisthesis qua Aristotle and the various problems of 
intentionality discussed in Part I. 
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This chapter will proceed, in §1, with a brief synopsis of Aristotle's theory of 
aisthesis as described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the present study and will then offer, in 
§2, a similar synopsis of intentionality based upon the first and second chapters of the 
present study. I will then more closely scrutinize Aristotle's theory of aisthesis in two 
phases: The first, in §3, will demonstrate the insufficiencies of the proper faculties of 
aisthesis to account thoroughly for various aspects of intentionality. The second, in §4, 
will demonstrate the insufficiencies of various extensions of aisthesis to account for 
intentionality. 
§ 1. Aisthesis Summarized 
Aristotle's explication of aisthesis in DA II revealed two conditions with respect to the 
material constitution, that is, the first actuality, of the sense organ: (1) that the sensitivity 
of the material constituents of the organ must be continuous with the sensitivities 
exhibited by the elemental constituents of the external environment. These sensitivities 
are affected by the sensible qualities of the substance in which the qualities inhere. The 
elemental constituents of the external environment serve as the media of the activity of 
aisthesis, and they are able to do so because the sensitivities of the elemental constituents 
of the external environment and the sensitivities of the organ are the same. {DA 419al 1-
21, 420a3-5, 421b9) (2) The sensitivity of the organ is a function of its form, the 
actualization of which bestows upon the organ a certain qualitative neutrality with respect 
to a particular range of sensible qualities that the given organ is meant to sense. It is this 
range of sensible qualities that constitute its special object(s), e.g., colours, sounds, 
scents, etc. 
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With respect to the second actuality of aisthesis, we concluded that it is better to 
read Aristotle's theory of aisthesis as an account of the presence of sense data and that 
this presence is a function of the continuity between the mediating element(s) external to 
the sensing subject and the elemental constituents of the subject's sense organs. What we 
have called the "activity" of the senses is, in fact, a movement caused by the activity of 
the object. This movement is transmitted through the medium and into the organ, the 
elemental constituents of which, it is homogeneous with. For this reason, we concluded, 
that the term "activity" when predicated of that which possesses the capacity for sense, is 
so metaphorically and equivocally. Commentators agree that sensation in Aristotle is 
something stimulated by the external sensible object. However, owing to Aristotle's 
insistence that "man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does 
not depend upon himself (DA 417b24-26) we are led to conclude that the transition 
from inactivity to activity of the senses is beyond the control of the sensing subject. It is 
wholly involuntary and passive. 
Furhermore, it is clear from this account that aisthesis in Aristotle is limited to the 
presence of sense data and does not directly involve the creation of concepts or, what we 
have referred to as the "concretization" of the sensed object. It is owing to this limitation 
that I have concluded that there is no genetic principle proper to aisthesis. In contrast to 
the first actuality of aisthesis, which is genetic in the conventional sense discussed in GC 
I 7, the second actuality of aisthesis is not genetic. Aristotle says as much when he 
writes, "it is wrong to speak of a wise man as being 'altered' when he uses his wisdom." 
(DA 417b8-9)129 Aristotle's comments concerning the second actuality of aisthesis— 
including (i) "It is clear that what is sensitive [to aisthetikon] is so only potentially, not 
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actually," (DA 417a6-7) and (ii), "sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of 
knowledge." (DA 417M9)131 
That said, Aristotle's theory of sensation includes certain extensions to what 
qualifies as aisthesis proper. These extensions include (a) the sense that we are sensing, 
(b) the so-called common sensibles, and (c) phantasia or imagination. Concerning the 
sense through which we come to know that we are sensing, such a sense is concomitant 
with our sensation of the special objects of sense (DA 425M2-17); it is dependant entirely 
upon aisthesis proper, and can be understood as an immediate inference from the function 
of aisthesis. The common sensibles—including movement, rest, number, figure, and 
magnitude—are sensed by each of the standard sense capacities equally and at the same 
time as we sense the special objects of sense. (DA 425al6-20) Phantasia is the capacity, 
says Aristotle, that is 
(1) necessarily (a) incapable of existing apart from 
sensation, (b) incapable of existing except when we 
perceive, (2) such that in virtue of its possession that in 
which it is found may present various phenomena both 
active and passive, and (3) such that it may be either true or 
false. (DA 428M0-17)1" 
Although the activation of phantasia falls under one's own volition, the contents of 
phantastical images are passively determined by the second actuality of aisthesis. The 
capacity for imagination seems to be the very sort of capacity we are seeking as a 
possible analogue for intentional inexistence in Brentano. The connection is this: 
phantasia seems to account for the presence of falsity and error in our judgements and, as 
Caston argues, represents Aristotle's answer to the conventional problem of intentionality 
discussed earlier. Contrary to this argument, we concluded that error is, in fact, a 
function of judgement, i.e., the conviction or belief that what is in fact the case is not (or 
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vice versa), and not the function of phantasia. Finally, although we stopped short of 
definitively associating phantasia with those capacities that belong to aisthesis proper 
Aristotle makes it explicit that phantasia is dependent upon aisthesis for its content. {DA 
428b30-429a2) Generally speaking, then, all of the capacities that fall under the rubric of 
aisthesis proper operate on a pre-conceptual level. 
§ 2. Intentionality Revisited 
Intentionality of the sort that we are concerned with in the present study is sometimes 
referred to as "extra-practical intention". Intention of this sort is described by 
Spiegelberg as "the mere directedness toward the willed [or perceived, or thought about] 
object."133 Even this characterization of intentionality, however, which is informed by 
Spiegelberg's heavy Husserlian influence, diverges from that which we find in Brentano: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or 
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, 
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood 
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In 
presentation something is presented, in judgement 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate 
hated, in desire desired and so on.134 
The concept of intentionality articulated by Brentano accounts for two fundamental 
features of psychological states: (i) their manifestation of a concrete object, i.e., the 
"inexistence of an object," and (ii) the meta-character instantiated by the act itself in 
which the object is manifest, e.g., "in love loved."135 The later feature is most often 
overlooked in treatments of intentionality and its associated problems. It is that which we 
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have previously referred to as the "meta-character" of the psychological state. It is also 
this feature of psychological states that serves as both the basis of Brentano's 
rehabilitation of the science of psychology and the basis of his taxonomy of mental 
activities. 
§ 3. The Common Sensibles, Phantasia, and Intentionality 
Given their supposed role in Aristotle's attempts to address those problems we now refer 
to as the "problems of intentionality"—suggestions made primarily in Sorabji (1992) and 
Caston (1996)—it is necessary that we further scrutinize certain extensions of Aristotle's 
theory of aisthesis —specifically the common sensibles and phantasia. 
Sorabji's claim concerns the common sensibles and, we may recall, argues that 
Aristotle is able to preempt problems of the sort we today associate with intentionality 
given the apparent predicative nature of aisthesis and our sensation of the common 
sensibles specifically. We can begin by noting that we were led to reject Sorabji's 
characterization of aisthesis as predicative primarily because of the inconsistencies 
between Aristotle's characterization of the objects of sense proper and those things that 
are sensed "indirectly" (kata sumbebekos). All of the predicates that Sorabji claims that 
we have the power to sense—e.g., that a thing is a man, that the white thing is this or 
something else, that one is sleeping, that something is pleasant, etc.—are in fact things 
that Aristotle says we sense indirectly. They are, effectively, things that we infer from 
our sensations of that which is sensed directly—what Aristotle calls the special objects of 
sense, and the common sensibles. 
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Aside from these interpretive difficulties, Sorabji's contention that Aristotle 
addresses with his notion of the common sensibles the same problems that Brentano 
addresses with intentionality is problematic. According to Sorabji, Aristotle's notion of 
the common sensibles represents a certain predicative function. Sorabji suggests that 
aisthesis can tell us "that something is pleasant". This is the closest Sorabji comes to 
suggesting that aisthesis can account for what we have thus far referred to as the meta-
character of intentionality. However, for Sorabji to account for such perceptions by 
appealing to Aristotle's notion of aisthesis is tantamount to a category mistake. It is clear 
from our previous discussions of judgement (hupolepsis), that the activity that leads us to 
the conclusion "that something is pleasant" is properly characterized as a judgement 
(hupolepsis) and not a sensation proper. 
Caston (1996) argues that Aristotle introduces the faculty of phantasia in order to 
account for the persistence of error given that Aristotle claims that the faculty for the 
sensation of the special objects of sense is infallible. (DA 428al0) Based upon this 
understanding ofphantasia, Caston argues that it is with this faculty that Aristotle 
responds to what we previously referred to as the conventional problems of intentionality. 
Contrary to this position, in §3 of Chapter 5, we saw that Aristotle distinguishes between 
error on the one hand, and falsity on the other. We saw that phantasia does indeed 
permit of falsity meaning that one can imagine things and situations that do not cohere 
with the facts. Aristotle makes it clear, however, that one might imagine things that are 
false without committing themselves to their truth. This is what Aristotle means when he 
says, "when we think something to be fearful or threatening, emotion is immediately 
produced, and so too with what is encouraging; but when we merely imagine we remain 
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as unaffected as persons who are looking at a painting of some dreadful or encouraging 
scene." (DA 427b21-24)136 Aristotle makes it clear here that one stands in indifference to 
that which s/he imagines. Error—understood as the possession of a false opinion 
(doxe)—according to Aristotle, requires belief (pistis) and conviction (peithoi) and that 
belief and conviction are the product of nous. (DA 428a22-24) 
§ 4. The Comparative Ontologies of the Aistheton and the Inexisting 
Object 
The most compelling reason to search for a notion other than aisthesis in Aristotle upon 
which to base our understanding of intentionality in Brentano remains the fundamentally 
pre-conceptual nature of aisthesis. Therein lies the greatest discrepancy between the 
object of sense, the aistheton, and the inexisting object: whereas the first represents a 
mere quality of a fully formed concrete object, the latter represents a fully concretized 
object that embodies a certain identity to its subject. Indeed, the prime motivation for the 
formulation of the theory of intentionality was, and remains, the need to account for the 
presence of content in mental, as opposed to physical, phenomena; that is, in order to 
account for the objects of our thoughts. In Brentano the inexisting object is already 
presented as being significant in some way, we have referred to this significance 
generally as the meta-character of an intentional state. In order that, to use Brentano's 
example, a thing can be experienced as loved we must recognize that it must be perceived 
as something and that thing must be of a certain nature which implies a certain identity, 
that is, it implies that the thing embody a certain identity for the experiencing subject and 
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that the identity embodied is one that arouses love for that subject. This we have referred 
to previously as a certain cognitive maturity on the part of the inexisting object. 
This understanding is wholly intertwined with the ontological distinction between 
mental and physical phenomena both of which represent for Brentano concrete objects. 
Following our discussion in Chapter 2,137 we can appreciate that, for Brentano, the 
inexistence of the object is indicative of a significant genetic principle of intentionality. 
In fact, such a genetic principle is implied in Brentano's claims that, "[w]e have no right, 
therefore, to believe that the objects of so-called external perception really exist as they 
appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably do not exist outside of us."138 And it is further 
implied, in his claim that, 
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are 
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as 
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire 
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a 
phenomenal and intentional existence.139 
This genetic principle is indeed the essential feature of intentionality for, according to 
Brentano, inexisting objects constitute the class of objects for which we can affirm real 
existence. 
Such a principle, however, is specifically the sort of genetic principle we have 
already denied to Aristotle's theory of aisthesis. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the first 
actuality of aisthesis constitutes genesis in the conventional sense discussed in GC17— 
namely, the creation that occurs in the union of form and matter the product of which is 
the sense organ and not the sensed object. Aristotle tells us that "it is wrong to speak of a 
wise man as being 'altered' when he uses his wisdom," (DA 417b8-9)140 and, in so 
doing, Aristotle himself denies that aisthesis is genetic in the standard sense. What is 
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suggested by our reading of the second actuality of aisthesis as Aristotle's account of the 
presence of sense data simpliciter is that the identity of the objects of sense are the pure 
qualities themselves and not those qualities as qualities of this or that substance. This 
means that the object of aisthesis is precisely the opposite sort of object that is 
represented by Brentano as that which enjoys intentional inexistence, the object of 
aisthesis does not exhibit anything near the sort of cognitive maturity that the inexisting 
object does. 
Conclusion: Aisthesis and Intentionality 
The stated purpose of this chapter is to illustrate, contrary to the currently received view, 
that aisthesis in Aristotle is not analogous to intentionality in Brentano. Referring to our 
previous discussions concerning intentionality in Chapters 1 and 2 of Part I, we can recall 
that Brentano's initial motivation for devising his model of consciousness was to 
rehabilitate the discipline of psychology by establishing its legitimacy among the 
empirical sciences, and to do so contrary to the criticisms of Auguste Comte. One of the 
central notions in this rehabilitation is the intentional inexistence of the content of 
cognitive activity. This essential characteristic of mental phenomena is made apparent 
through what Brentano called inner perception. This much is explained in Part I of the 
present study. Here we find an apparent likeness between certain aspects of Aristotle's 
psychology and Brentano's, for it is clear that what Brentano refers to as inner perception 
is an appropriation of the immediate awareness of sensual activity that Aristotle accounts 
for through the identity of the activity of the aisthetikon and the aistheton. However, 
intentionality in Brentano is not identical with the capacity for inner perception; it is, 
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rather, one of its objects. The intentional character of cognitive acts is that which is made 
apparent to us through our immediate awareness of our sensual activity. This is 
Brentano's innovation, not that cognitive activity bears this structure (for, as we know 
from Part I, this too is an observation Brentano credits to Aristotle and his medieval 
commentators) but that such a structure is present to observation and thus available to 
serve as the foundation of an empirical science. 
The dissimilarities between intentionality and aisthesis are especially apparent at 
numerous points in the present explication. We saw the first of these dissimilarities at the 
end of DA II 5, when, having arrived at the conclusion that aisthesis represents the sort of 
power corresponding to the capacity to exercise acquired knowledge, Aristotle points out 
that the two sorts of power differ in that one, the power to exercise knowledge, falls 
under our volition, whereas our sensual powers do not. On the other hand, the content-
fullness represented by intentionality, we recall, is that which Sorabji claimed was 
accounted for by the apparent propositional nature of aisthesis, specifically our capacity 
to sense the common sensibles. Upon scrutiny, the apparent likenesses between aisthesis 
and intentionality did not obtain for, according to Aristotle, the identity of the bearer of 
sensible qualities is not something that is sensible kath' auto. Substantial identity claims, 
we are told in DA II 6, are the sort of things that belong to the third sort of sensible 
objects, those that are sensed incidentally (kata sumbebekos). It is also with respect to 
such claims that we are prone to error. Our capacities to sense what is sensible kath' 
auto, however, are, as Aristotle tells us, infallible. Given the conclusion we were led to 
concerning the third sort of sensible objects—namely, that the domain of aisthesis does 
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not extend beyond our power to sense what is sensible kath' auto—we are again 
confronted with a dissimilarity between the two notions. 
The most compelling reason to dismiss the analogy between aisthesis and 
intentionality relates to the ontological concerns for the foundations of consciousness that 
emerge out of the petitio principii that is latent in Brentano's model. To reiterate: 
because (a) consciousness is conditional upon the presence of its object, (b) the presence 
of the object is conditioned by its intentional inexistence, and (c) such an intentional 
inexistence occurs only in consciousness, we are led to a circularity that pre-empts our 
capacity to account for the genesis of consciousness. Further, given that the ontic 
foundation of consciousness in general is bound to its intentional character, if aisthesis 
were sufficiently analogous to intentionality, we would expect aisthesis to also possess or 
be identified with some sort of power capable of affecting the genesis of cognitive 
activity. However, no such genetic powers are correlated with aisthesis. Granted, as 
most scholars of Aristotle's psychology agree, aisthesis is that which furnishes the 
organism with the worldly contents of its cognitive activity. This furnishing-with-content 
is one serial event in a process that we are told is initiated by the endowment of some 
body with a soul. This event, according to DA 417M6-18, occurs at conception. Indeed, 
the possibility that aisthesis might account for this sort of creative activity is clearly 
excluded by the thoroughly passive character attributed to aisthesis. Any understanding 
of intentionality, then, that is strictly based upon the apparent analogy between it and 
Aristotle's notion of aisthesis is inevitably deficient. 
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NOTES TO PART II 
1
 cua6r|afs EOTI TO BEKTIKOV TGOV aia6r)TG0V EIBCOV dveu Tfjs OXris (DA 424al8-19) 
2Brentano(1995):88. 
3
 816 fi yvxA EOTIV EVTEXEXEICC f| TTpcoTri acouaxos cpuaiKou BuvduEi ^corjv 
E'XOVTOS. (DA 412a27-412bl) 
TOIOUTOV Be 6 ocv fj opyaviKov. (opyava BE KCU TCC TCOV cpuTcov HEprj, dXXa 
iravTEXcos airXa, oTov TO cpuXXov TTEpiKapTriou aKETraaiia, TO BE TfEpiKdpTfiov 
KapTrou- ai BE pi^ai TCO OTOUCCTI dvdXoyov- diacpco y a p E'XKEI TTJV Tpo<pr|v.) EI 8r| 
TI KOIVOV ETfl Tfdoris yuxfis BET Xsysiv, Eirj av EVTEXEXEICC f] TTpcoTri oconaTos 
9uaiKou opyaviKou. (DA 412bl-7) 
It is important that I distinguish between "energeia", often translated "actuality", and 
"entelecheia" which is also often translated as "actuality". The two terms are not 
synonymous in the way that these common translations suggest. "Energeia" literally 
means "actuality" in the sense that only through "energeia" do things come into 
existence. That is why the term "energeia" is properly juxtaposed against the term 
"dunamis" meaning "potentiality", i.e., not existing (yet). Although the etymology of the 
term "entelecheia" is often disputed, the LSG suggests that the word is composed of the 
two terms "enteles", meaning complete or full, and "hechein". This etymological 
analysis suggests that the term "entelecheia" might better be understood as "that which 
imparts telos", rather than "actuality". A better singular term for translating 
"entelecheia" might be "activation", in that the "entelecheia" activates its subject by 
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imparting telos to it. "EntelecheicT sets its subject on a purposeful course. Sachs 
correctly recognizes the error in translating "entelecheia" as "actuality," however, his 
translation of the term with the phrase "being-at-work-staying-itself' is questionable. It 
is questionable first, because it does not fully distinguish between "entelecheia" and 
"energeia", which he translates with the phrase "being-at-work", and second, because the 
meaning of the phrase "being-at-work-staying-itself is itself obscure. 
6
 Chen (1956): 59. 
7
 Chen (1956): 59. 
8
 Chen points specifically to Metaphys. 1035b 14-22 which reads: 
And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of a 
living being) is their substance according to the formula, 
i.e. the form and the essence of a body of a certain kind (at 
least we shall define each part, if we define it well, not 
without reference to its function, and this cannot belong to 
it without perception), so that the parts of soul are prior, 
either all or some of them, to the concrete 'animal', and so 
too with each individual animal; and the body and parts are 
posterior to this, the essential substance, and it is not the 
substance but the concrete thing that is divided into these 
parts as its matter. To the concrete thing these are in a 
sense prior, but in a sense they are not. {Metaphys. 
1035M4-22) 
9
 Van den berg, I.J.M. Aristoteles verhandeling over de zeil. quoted in Bos (2005). 
10
 In German Theiler (1959) offers: "des naturlichen mit Organen ausgestatteten 
Korpers." In French Bodeus (1993) offers: "un corps naturel pourvu d'organes." We can 
also anticipate yet another rendition of the phrase from Shields' forthcoming translation 
and commentary. 
11
 Bos (1999): 43. 
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Bos (1999): 43. Bos elaborates by suggesting that by using the phrase "somatos 
physikou" Aristotle means to identify an elementary body (a body composed of the 
elements) and suggests, as I am about to do, that 412al 1 distinguishes between living and 
non-living natural bodies, the difference being that non-living bodies are informed matter 
simpliciter—Bos refers to them as "elemental bodies"—and living natural bodies are 
bodies that are actualized in a particular way that involves the pneuma, or medium. Bos 
refers here to the medium that Aristotle implicates in his accounts of the various senses (a 
matter that I will speak to in later sections of this chapter). What Bos seems to imply is 
that in cases of form/matter composition that result in non-living bodies, the elements are 
implicated only as constitutive parts, whereas form/matter compositions that result in 
living bodies implicate not only the elements as constitutive parts but also certain 
elements as pneuma. Given then, that the term "pneuma" also refers to elemental 
materials—namely, air and water—Bos' account offers little by way of elucidation with 
respect to the difference between the composition of non-living and living bodies except 
to say that the latter implicate elemental materials in some extended way. 
13
 See, e.g., George A. Blair, "The Meaning of'Energeia'' and 'Entelecheid' in Aristotle," 
in International Philosophical Quarterly 1 (March 1967): 101-117; Daniel Graham, 
"The Etymology of Entelecheia," in American Journal of Philology 110 (1989): 73-80; 
and William Charlton, "Aristotle and the Uses of Actuality," in Proceedings of the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1989): 1-22. 
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COOTE oi opoi TOIOUTOI oTov "TO 6py(^Eo8ai Kivriaij T15 TOU TOIOUBI acbiaaTos r\ 
lupous r| BuvdiiEcos UTTO TOOBE EVEKO TO08E", Kai 81a T a u r a fiSri cpuoixou TO 
0EGopfjaai TTEpi ^uxfis, TI Trdoris f\ Trjs TOIOUTTIS. (DA 403a26-28) 
15
 Slakey's preferred rendering of "sumbainei" is "consists in" (we find this rendering in 
both Hett's [1936] and Hicks' [1976] translations) rather than "depends on" (as it is 
rendered in Smith's [1984] translation) for he reads Aristotle as saying that aisthesis is 
the change spoken of here. This, he claims, is supported by 417b20-21, where we are 
told that our senses are spurred into activity by external objects. As we shall see in what 
follows, I agree with Slakey that aisthesis 'consists in' a sort of alteration, however, I 
disagree considerably with respect to the sort of alteration that aisthesis consists in. 
16
 cpoco! 8E TIVEJ KOU TO oiaoiov UTTO TOU oiaoiou Trdaxeiv. TOUTO BE TTCOS BuvaTov 
f] OCBUVCCTOV, EiprjKaiaEV EV TOT$ KOC06AOU Xoyois TTEpi TOU TTOIETV KCCI TTOCOXEIV. (DA 
416b35-417a2) 
17
 BfjXov ouv OTi TO aioSriTiKov OUK EOTIV EvepyEia, dXXa Buvdnei novov. (DA 
417a6-7) 
18
 ETTEIBTI BE TO aioBdvEaBai XEyoyEV Bixcos (TO TE y a p Buvduei OKOOOV KOU opcov 
aKouEiv Kai opdv XsyonEV, K&V TUXTJ KOSEGBOV, Kai TO riBri Evspyouv), Sixcoj dv 
XdyoiTo Kai fi aia8r)ais, r\ UEV COS Buvdwei, fi 8E COS EVEpyEia. ouoicos 8E Kai TO 
aiaSriTov, TO TE Buvdnei 6v Kai TO EVEpysia. (DA 417a9-14) 
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5iccipET£ov 8E KO\ TTEpl 8uvdu.Eco$ Kai EVTEXEXEIOS:- VUV y a p d-rcXcbs EXsyouEv 
TTEpi aurcbv. (DA 417a21-22) 
20
 TroXXotKis ££ EvavTiaj u.ETa(3aXcbv E^ECOC;. (417a31-32) 
21
 6 5' EK TOU E'XEIV Tt\v dpiBjiriTiKriv [Smith notes here that he is reading "a'ia0r|Gis", 
whereas Ross prints "dpi0u.r}TiKr]v"] f\ rrjv ypau.y.aTiKr|v, [xf\ EVEpysTv 8E, £15 TO 
Evepyetv. (DA 417a32-417bl) 
Myles Burnyeat, "De Anima II 5," in Phronesis: A journal of Ancient Philosophy 47 
no. 1 (2002): 29. 
23
 Burnyeat (2002): 65. 
24
 Burnyeat (2002): 74. 
25
 TO |4EV ouv E'IS EVTEXEXEIOV dyEiv EK 8uvd|jEi OVT05 [KOTO] TO voouv Kai 
<ppovouv ou BiBaoKaXiav dXX' ETEpav ETrcovuuiav E'XEIU SiKaiou- TO 8' EK 8uvduEi 
OVT05 navSdvov Kai Xanfidvov ETnoTT|u.T")v UTTO TOU EVTEXEXEIOC OVTOJ Kai 
8i8aoKaXiKou f)Toi OU8E TrdoxEiv cpaTEOv, [cboiTEp Eipryrai,] r] 8uo Tpotrous slvai 
dXXoicbaEcos, Trjv TE ETTI TCCS oTEpryriKas 8ia0EO£is u.ETa(3oXr}v Kai Trjv ETTI TO$ 
E^EIS xai Triv <puaiv. TOU 8' aia0riTiKou fi uiv TrpcoTTi u.ETa(3oXri yivETai UTTO TOU 
yevvcovTos, OTOV 8e yevvr)0fj, exei r)8r), coaTrep £TriaTrnar]v, Kai TO aia0dv£a0ai. 
TO KOT' EVEpyEiav 8E onoicos XsyETai Tab OECOPETV- 8iacpEpEi 8E, OTI TOU uiv TO 
Tfoir|TiKd Trjs Evspysiaj E^COBEV, TO opaTov Kai TO aKouaTov, 6y.oicos SE Kai TO 
Xomd TCOV aio0riTcov. (DA 417b9-21) 
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6 8' EK xoO ex^iv Tr\v dpi0u.r|TiKifiv [Smith notes here that he is reading "aia0r|ais", 
whereas Ross prints ''dpi0ur)TiKr]v"] f\ TT\V ypauuaTiKiiv, [xr\ EvspyEtv 8E, els TO 
EVEpysTv. (DA 417a32-417bl) 
27
 Trav 8E xpcoucc KIVTITIKOV EOTI TOU KOT' evepysiav 8iaq>avous, Kai TOUT' EOTIV 
auTou fi <puai$- (DA 418a31-418b2) 
28
 Apostle (1981): 117. 
29
 OTIHETOV 8E TOUTOU cpavEpov- sav y a p T15 0ri TO E'XOV xpcoiaa ETT' OUTTIV Tr|v 
oyiv, OUK o^ETai- dXXa TO UEV xpcoua KIVET TO 8iaq>avEs, oTov TOV aEpa, OTTO 
TOUTOU Ss OUVEXOUS OVT05 KIVETTOI TO aia0r)Tripiov. ou y a p KaXcos TOUTO Xsysi 
AriiiOKpiTog, OIOUEVOS, si ysvoiTO KEVOV TO UETa£u, 6paa0ai ocv dKpi|3cbs «a\ E! 
(aupiari^ EV Tqb oupavcp eny TOUTO y a p d8uvaTov EOTIV. TraaxovToj y a p TI TOU 
aia0r)TiKou yivETai TO 6pdv- UTT' OUTOU UEV OUV TOU opconEVOU xpcouaTOs 
d8uvaTov- XsiTTETai 8r) UTTO TOU u.ETa£u, COOT' dvayKaTov TI slvai UETO^U- KEVOU 
8E ysvonEvou oux OTI aKpi(3db5, dXX' oXcos OU6EV 6cp0iioETai. (DA 419al 1-21) 
30
 Apostle (1981): 119. 
31
 ETI CCKOUETOI EV dspi, KCCV USOTI. (DA 419bl8) "KCCV u8aTi" is one of Ross' 
emendations; other texts read, "Kai," or "Kai EV." 
32
 TOUTO 8E yivETai OTOV UTroyivr) TrXriyEis 6 drip «ai [\f] 8iaxu0rj. (DA 419M8-22) 
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v|xxpir™<6v uiv ouv TO KIVTJTIKOV EVOS dspos auvexEicx U£XPlS dKofis. ocKofj 8e 
auiicpuris <EOTIV> drip- Bid 8E TO EV dspi ETVCJI, KIVOUUEVOU TOU E£GO 6 etaco 
KivEiTai. (ZX4 420a3-5) 
34
 EOTI 8E Kai fi oocppriois Bid TOU u.ETa£u, oTov dspos r] u8aTO$- (DA 421b9) 
35
 EOTI BE KOIVOV 0 9 % Kai yeuoEcos TO TTOTOV. ETTEI 8' uypov TO yEucrrov, dvdyKri 
Kai TO aiaBryrripiov OUTOG UTITE uypov ETVCCI EVTEAEXEI'O: U.TITE dBuvaTov 
uypa(vEa0ai- (DA 422a33-422b2) 
36
 E£ dspog |iEV y d p r] UBOTOC; dBuvaTov ouaTfjvai TO E'U^UXOV acou.a- BsTydp TI 
OTEpsov Elvai- (DA 423al2-13) 
37
 COOTE dvayKaTov TO acoua Elvai TO u.ETa£u TOU dTTTiKoG TrpoaTTEcpuKos, 8i' ou 
yivovTai ai aio6r|OEi5 TTXEIOUS ouaai . (DA 423al5-17) 
38
 E£ dspos uiv y d p r] 08aTO$ dBuvaTov auaTf]vai TO EUA|A/XOV acbua- BsTydp TI 
aTEpedv elvai- (DA 423al2-13) 
39
 cos Tfjs aioOrioEcos oTov UEOOTTITOS ivog ouoris Trig EV TOTS aia0r|ToTg 
EvavTicboEcos- (DA 424a4-5) 
40
 See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 1. 
EOTI BE KOIVOV dcpfis Kai yEUOECos TO TTOTOV. ETTEI 8' uypov TO ysuoTov, dvdyKri 
Kai TO aia0r)Tripiov OUTOU u.r)TE uypov ETVOI EVTEAsxEia MTITE dBuvaTov 
uypaivsaOai- (DA 422a33-422b2) 
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"Mesotes" occurs twice in DA: once at 424a4 and again at 43 lal 1. Occurrences of 
"mesotes" and its cognates can be found scattered throughout the remaining corpus, with 
the highest concentration in the Nicomachean Ethics (1233b34, 1234a4, 1234al4, 
1106b27,1106b34,1107a2, 1107a7,1125b26,1127a41, 129a4,1133b32, and numerous 
others.). 
43
 OTTEp f\ OUK e'oTiv aAAoioua8at...rj eVepov yevoj dXXoicoaecos. (DA 417b2-7) 
Everson offers a similar categorization of the trends in the interpretation of aisthesis: 
What I have called the '"literal" reading, Everson calls the 'literal' interpretation without 
the quotation marks. What I have called the '"an alteration in a quite different sense'" 
interpretation Everson calls the 'spiritual' interpretation. Aside from these nominal 
differences our two categories include the same sorts of interpretations. My choice to 
enclose the term 'literal' in quotes is based upon my preference to call the literal 
translation that which most closely communicates the intent of the text. At this point in 
my investigation I am not yet prepared to render the judgement that the one is indeed the 
literal translation. My choice to avoid the term 'spiritual' is based upon the absence of 
the term in those interpretations that are not properly construed under the rubric of the 
'"literal" reading' and in those interpretations that Everson lists under the rubric of the 
'spiritual reading'. I also hope to avoid the judgement of metaphysical dubiousness that 
is often associated with the word 'spiritual'. See Stephen Everson, Aristotle on 
Perception (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1997). 
44
 iaev cuaGriais EGTI TO BEKTIKOV TCOV aia0r]Tcov siBcbv CCVEU TT\S uAris.... (DA 
424al8-19) 
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r] ETepov ysvos dXXoicboEco$. (DA 417b7) 
46
 8iaq>EpEi 8E, OTI TOU HEV TCC TroiriTiKa Trjs EVEpyEiag E£CO0EV, TO opaxov Kai TO 
CXKOUOTOV, onoi'cos 5E KOI xa Xoma TCOV aia0r|Tcov. aiTiov 8' OTI TCOV Ka9' 
EKaaTov f| Kaf EvspyEiav aTa0r)ais, f\ 8' ETncmr)|ar| TCOV Ka06Xou- TauTa 8' EV 
auTfj Tfcbs EOTI Trj yuxfi- (DA 417b 19-24) 
47
 816 vofjaai UEV ETT' OUTGO, OTTOTCCV fiouXr]Tai, aiaSdvEoSai 8' OUK ETT' auTcp-
dvayKatov y a p uTrdpXEiv TO aio0r|T6v. (DA 417b24-26) 
48
 TO 8' aia0riTiK6v 8uvd|jEi EOTIV OTOV TO aia0r|T6v r]8r| EVTEXEXEICX, Ka0ctTfEp 
etprrrai. Trdaxei uev ouv oux onoiov 6v, TTETTOVOOS 8' couoicoTcci Kai EOTIV OTOV 
EKEIVO. (DA 418a3-6) 
49
 See Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," in Philosophical Review 70 
(October 1961): especially page 474; see also Richard Sorabji, "Body and Soul in 
Aristotle", in Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 49 (January 
1974) and Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's 
Theory of Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima eds. M. Nussbaum and 
A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
50
 Thomas J. Slakey, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," in Philosophical Review 70 
(October 1961): 472. 
51
 Slakey (1961): 474. 
52
 Daniel N. Robinson, Aristotle's Psychology, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989): 65. 
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 Robinson (1989): 65. 
54
 Richard Sorabji, "Body and Soul in Aristotle" in Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy 49 (January 1974): 53. 
55
 See Philip Webb, "Bodily Structure and Psychic Faculties in Aristotle's Theory of 
Perception," Hermes 110 (1982): 25-50; Terrell Ward Bynum, "A new Look at 
Aristotle's Theory of Perception," History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 163-178; 
and Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
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 Sorabji (1992): 209. 
57
 See Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 3. 
58
 J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981): 66. 
59Ackrill(1981):66. 
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 Ackrill (1981): 67. 
61
 Ackrill (1981): 67. 
62
 Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, "Changing Aristotle's Mind," in Essays on 
Aristotle's De Anima. eds. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992): 36. (I have excluded a note in parentheses that states, "the next section will show 
that Putnam now dissociates himself from functionalism for reasons that bring him even 
closer to Aristotle".) 
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 Nussbaum and Putnam (1992): 36. 
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 Nussbaum and Putnam (1992): 36-37. 
65
 Nussbaum and Putnam (1992): 37. 
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See T. H. Irwin, "Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind," in Psychology: Companions to 
Ancient Thought Vol. 2, Stephan Everson ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1991), and S. 
Marc Cohen, "Hylomorphism and Functionalism," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, 
eds. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
67
 TOU 8' aia0r|TiKOu f| nev TrpcoTri UETa(3oAf] yiveTOu UTTO TOU yevvcovToj, o r a v 
5E yEvvri8rj, E'XEI f\br\, cocnrEp ETTiaTTiuriv, Kai TO aia6dvEa8ai. (DA 417M6-18) 
68
 TO KCXT' EvspyEtav 8e 6|ao(cos Xeyexai TCO 9ecopeTv. (DA 417M9) 
69
 aio0r|ais EOTI TO BEKTIKOV TCOV aioBriTcbv EI8COV CXVEU Tfjj uXris. (DA 424al8-19) 
Franz Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of the Active 
Intellect, with an Appendix Concerning the Activity of Aristotle's God, Rolf George trans. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press 1977): 54. 
71
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Process by Which the Aristotelian Writings Arrived at Their Present Form (1888). 
75
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See D.Z. Andriopoulos, "Aristotle on Perception," in Philosophical Inquiry: 
International Quarterly 15 no. 3-4 (Summer-Fall 1993): 85-98, and Aysel Dogan, 
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University Press, 1992): 19. 
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89
 Burnyeat (1992): 19. Burnyeat is led by this sentiment to argue that because this 
notion of matter is incompatible with the sort that has evolved in response to the 
metaphysical and epistemological problems arising out of the Cartesian model of the 
mind/body, Burnyeat concludes that Aristotle's theory of aisthesis is not credible. 
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TToAAcci TE y a p ai auvOEGEis TCOV u.Epcov Kai TroAAaxcos- Tivos ouv f\ TTCOS 
uTroAa(Mv TOV VOUV XPH ouvSeaiv eTvai, rj KCCI TO aiaGriTiKov r\ 6PEKTIK6V;6|JO(OOS 
8E dTOTrov Kai TO TOV Aoyov Tfis UI^ECOS sTvai TT]V yuxnv- ou y a p TOV ai/Tov EXEI 
Aoyov fi ui^is TCOV OTOIXEIOOV Ka0' rjv aap£ Kai Ka0' r)v OOTOUV. aun(3r|aETai ouv 
TToAAds TE yuxds E'XEIV Kai KOTO Trav TO acona, EITTEP TrdvTa UEV EK TCOV 
OToixeicov HEiaiyiaevcov, 6 8E Tfjs U(£ECOS Aoyos dpuovia Kai v^uxn- (DA 408al 1-18) 
91
 E'XEI 5' OUTCOS COOT' EI UEV 5i' EV05 TTAE(CO aia0r)Td ETEpa OVTO dAAiiAcov Top 
yevEi, dvdyKri TOV E'XOVTO TO TOIOUTOV aia0rpT|piov dy.q>oTv aia0r|TiK6v sTvai 
(oTov EI E£ dEpog EOTI TO aia6r)TTipiov, Kai EOTIV 6 drip Kai yocpou Kai xpdag), EI 
8E TTAE(CO TOU auTou, oTov x P o a 5 KOtl OTIP K a i uScop (du.9co y a p 8ia<pavfj), Kai 6 
TO ETEpov auT&bv E'XCOV |i6vov aiaOTiaETai TOU 81' djjcpoTv, TCOV 8E a n ACOV EK 8UO 
TOUTCOV aia8riTr|pia novov EOTIV. (DA 424b22-425a3) 
92
 aio8riais EOTI TO 8EKTIKOV TCOV aia6r|Tcbv E'ISCOV dvEU Tfjs OAris. (DA 424al8-19) 
It is interesting to note that in his translation of this passage, Smith seems to make 
explicit the sense that sensation involves a process whereby the sensible qualities are 
internalized where the text is not necessarily read in such a way. 
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 UTT' auTou MEV ouv TOU opcouEvou xpcouaTos d8uvaTov AsiTTETai 8r) UTTO TOU 
H£Ta£u, COOT' dvayKaTov TI sTvai UETO^U- (DA 419al8-20) 
94
 One might even extrapolate from the preceding analysis that, without its matter, the 
form of an object is its activity. 
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Biacpepei Se, 6TI TOU \ikv TO Troir)TiKa rf\s Evspyslas e^co8ev, TO opaTov Kai TO 
dtKouarou, oiaoicos 8E Kai TO Xoura TCOV aia0r]Tcbv. aiTiov 8' OTI TCOV KO0' 
EKaaTov f| KOT' Evepyeiav aio0r|ois, fi 8' ETrioTrnar) TCOV KCC06XOU- T a u i a 8' EV 
auTfj Trco5 EOTI Trj yuxfl- {DA 417b 19-24) 
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 816 vofjaai uiv ETT' OUTGO, OTroTav (3ouXr)Tai, aiaGdveaSai 8' OUK eir' auTcp-
dvayKaTov y a p UTrdpxEiv TO aia0r)Tov. {DA 417b24-26) 
97
 This is a prejudice that is likely an artifact of the prevailing physicalist paradigm. 
98
 "OTI 8' OUK ECTTIV aioQr\ais ETEpa Trocpd TOCJ TTEVTE (Xsyco 8E TOUTOS oyiv, 
OCKOTIV, oocpprioiv, ysuoiv, d(pr|v), EK TCOV8E TTIOTEUOEIEV dv TI$. (DA 424b22-24) 
99
 COOT' EI HEV 8i' EV05 TTXEICO aia0r|Td ETEpa OVTOC dXXr)Xcov Tcp yivsi, dvdyKri 
TOV s'xovTa TO TOIOUTOV aia6r|Tr]piov du.cpoTv aia8r)TiK6v ETVOI. (DA 424b31-33) 
100
 EI 8E TTXE{CO TOU auTou, oTov XP°aS K a i "HP K a i u8cop (du.9co y a p 8ia9avrj), 
Kai 6 TO ETEpov auTcov E'XCOV uovov aia6riaETai TOU 81' ducpoTv. (DA 424b34-
425a3) 
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 'ETTEI 8' aio0av6iiE0a OTI 6pco|i£v Kai dKouo|j£v, dvdyKr] r] TT) oysi 
aia0dvEO0ai OTI opa , r] ETEpa. (DA 425b 12-13) 
102Brentano(1977):58. 
103
 Brentano (1977): 63-64. 
104
'ETTEI 8' aio0av6nE0a OTI 6pcby.EV Kai OKOUOUEV, dvdyKri r\ Trj O^EI 
aia0dv£a0ai OTI opa , r] ETEpa. aXX' fi auTr) Ecrrai TTJS oyEcog Kai TOU 
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UTTOKEIUEVOU XPCOUCCTOS, COOTE f] 8uO TOU aUTOU EOOVTai f\ CXVTT] ai/TfJS. ETl 5' El 
Kai ETepa Eirj r\ Trjs oyecos aiaGriaij, r] E15 diTEipov ETOIV f\ auTr) TI$ ecrrai auT%-
COOT' ETTl TfJS TTpCOTTlS TOUTO TTOir)TEOV. (DA 425bl2-17) 
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 TOC y a p TOICCGTCC OUSEHIOIS EOTIV 181a, dXXd Koivd Trdaaij. (DA 418al9-20) 
106
 TauTcc y a p navTa [Kivriasi] aio6avouE0a, oTov uEyE0o$ KIVTIOEI (COOTE Kai 
axfjiaa- nEyE0o$ y a p TI TO axrjua), TO 8' fipEiaoOv TCO [XT\ KtvElaBai, 6 8' dpi0nos 
Trj dTTocpdoEi TOU OUVEXOOS, <a\ T0T5 '181015 (EKaaTTi y a p EV aia0dvETai aiaGriois)-
(DA 425al6-20) 
107
 Shute (1964): 99. 
108
 Richard Sorabji, "Intentionality and Physiological Process: Aristotle's Theory of 
Sense-Perception," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. eds. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 197. I have added the digits in square brackets 
for the sake of the point I am about to make. 
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 TO 8' dXXr|Xcov 181a KaTd aun(3E(3r|K6$ aiaSdvovTai ai aia0r|aEis, oux f\ 
ai/Tai, dXX' fj uia, oTav a\ia ysvriTai n aio0riois ETTI TOU auToO, otov x°^ns 6TI 
TfiKpd Kai £av0r) (ou y a p 8r] ETEpag yE TO E'ITTETV OTI diacpco EV)- 816 Kai 
dTraTaTai, Kai £dv rj E,avQ6v, xoXnv OIETOI slvai. (DA 425a30-425b4) 
110
 TTEpi HEV ouv Tris dpxrJS ?} cpanev T O ^cpov cciaBriTiKov elvai, Sicop(o6co TOV 
Tporrov TOUTOV. (DA 427al4-16) 
n iCaston(1996):22. 
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cpavTaoia y a p ETEpov Kai aia0r|aEcos Kai 8iavoias, ai/Tti TE OU yiyvETai OCVEU 
aia9riaEcos, Kai dvsu TOUTTIS OUK EOTIV UTTOXTI^IS. OTI 5' OUK EOTIV f] auTri 
[voriais] Kai UTToXriyis, cpavEpov. (DA 427b 14-17) 
113
 Lloyd Gerson, "The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's De Anima," Phronesis: A Journal 
of Ancient Philosophy 49, no. 4 (2004): 354. Gerson cites 403a9 and 432al6-17 in 
support of his reading. 
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 TOU uopiou TOU xfis yuxfis co yivcooKEi TE fi yuxn Kai cppovsT. (DA 429al0-ll) 
115
 m p i 8E TOU VOETV, ETTEI ETEpov TOU aio0dvEo0ai, TOUTOU 8E TO uiv cpavTaoia 
BOKET ETVOI TO 8E uTf6Xr)vf IS. (DA 427b27-29) 
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 Trpo omadTcov y a p EOTI TI Troir|oao0ai, COOTTEP oi EV TOT$ iavr)u.oviKoTs 
TIBEUEVOI Kai EiBcoXoTfoiouvTES. (DA 427bl8-20) 
117
 KaTa 8E TT)V 9avTaa iav cboauTcog E'XOUEV COOTTEP av E'I 6ECOU.EVOI EV ypaq>f) Ta 
BEIVO ri 0appaXea. (DA 427b23-24) 
118Caston(1996):22. 
119
 si 8rj EOTIV fi cpavTaoia Ka0' fiv XsyoiiEV cpdvTaaud TI TIMTV yiyvEoOai Kai nf] E'I 
TI KaTa u.ETacpopdv Xsyoiaev, < a p a > |a(a TIS EOTI TOUTCOV 8uva|ii$ r] k'^ 15 Ka9' a ; 
KpIvouEV Kai dXri0Euo|i£v f\ y£u86|jE0a;ToiauTai 8' EIGIV aTo0r|ais, 86i§a, 
ETTiaTrmri, V0O5. (DA 428al-5) 
120
 TCOV 8E 0ripicov OU0EVI uirapxEi TROTIS, cpavTaoia 8E TTOXXOTS. (DA 428a21-22) 
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•S0A9Y sg P91311 '1000^311311 ox sg i3xojii 'SIXOJII j30Aoyo>m U^pg A3rl UODIL 1x3 
BfjXov ouv OTI TO aioBriTiKou OUK EOTIV EvspyEig, dXXd SuvdiiEi uovov. (DA 
417a6-7) 
131
 TO KCCT' Evepyeiav 8E oiaoicoj XEyETai TCO SECOPETV. (DA 417bl9) 
132
 Kcu TauTriv 6(joiav dvdyKri elvai TTJ aiaOriaEi, Eir) dv CIUTTI fi Ki'vriais OUTE dveu 
aiaBrjaEcos EVSEXOMEVTI OUTE \xf] aiaSavonsvois uTrdpxEiv, KCCI TTOXXCC KOCT' auTr)V 
KCCI TTOIETV Kai TrdaxEiv TO E'XOV, KCCI ETVOCI KCCI dXr|0fi KCCI vyEuSfj. (DA 428bl0-17) 
133Spiegelberg(1981):4. 
134Brentano(1995):88. 
135
 It is this second facet of psychological states that Husserl seeks to bracket in the 
performance of reduction and the systematic of doing so defines his phenomenological 
method. It would be a grave misunderstanding of Husserl's science to construe his 
notion of intentionality, as does Spiegelberg, as "the mere directedness toward the willed 
object" for to do so is to undermine the work of the methodology Husserl prescribes. The 
"mere directedness toward the willed object" may indeed be the ultimate object of 
phenomenological investigation, however, it is not revealed, says Husserl, until the final 
and controversial phenomenological reduction is performed. 
136
 ETI 8E OTCCV |i£v 8o£daco|j£v BEIVOV TI f\ (po^Epov, EU0US aunTrdaxonEV, 6|ao(cos 
8E Kav 8appaXEOv- KctTa 8E TT\V cpavTaaiav cbaauTcos EXOUEV cbcrrrEp dv E'I 
GECOHEVOI EV ypacprj TO: 8EIVCC X\ GappaXsa. (DA 427b21-24) 
Recall that it is with this distinction that Brentano fixes the boundary between the real 
and the non-real. 
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Brentano (1995): 10. 
Brentano (1995): 92. 
5io ou KccAcbs E'XEI Aeysiv TO (ppovouv, 6TCCV 9povrj, dXXoiouo8ai. (DA 417b8-9) 
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PART III - NOUS 
Chapter 7. THE FIRST ACTUALITY OF NOUS 
Introduction 
Up to this point we have spoken of "nous" in Aristotle in a way that may lead the reader 
to believe that the term refers to a single concept that is found in discussions of a single 
subject matter—namely, psychology. In fact the term is implicated in discussions 
throughout Aristotle's corpus in the varying contexts of psychology, ethics, cosmology, 
to name just a few. For this reason it is important that I explicitly define the scope of the 
forthcoming conversation concerning nous to the domain of psychology. The present 
chapter and the next will address the following two questions respectively: 
(1) How are we to properly understand the manner according to which the intellectual 
faculties, referred to in the context of DA by the term "nous", are manifest in the 
thinking subject? In other words, what constitutes the first actuality of nous in 
Aristotle's psychology? 
(2) How are we to properly understand the functioning of the intellectual faculties, 
i.e., to explain what, according to Aristotle, the activity of thinking involves? In 
other words, what constitutes the second actuality of nous in Aristotle's 
psychology? 
By limiting the scope of the discussion upon these two questions we are able to focus our 
attentions primarily upon occurrences of the term "nous" in DA as opposed to those 
found in GA, Metaphys., NE, and elsewhere. 
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Like aisthesis, nous is identified throughout DA as one of the vital powers of the 
soul. This means that, as in the case of aisthesis, the definition of the soul at the outset of 
DA II as "an actuality of the first kind [entelecheia heprote] of a natural body having life 
potentially in it" {DA 412a27-412bl)1 bares a certain significance to nous. Nous too is, 
according to this definition, subject to a first and a second actualization whereby the 
intellectual powers are first instantiated in the potentially thinking subject, and second 
activated through some process that results in actual thought. This chapter will treat the 
first mode of the actualization of nous and will illustrate how the first actuality of nous, 
that is, the instantiation of the intellectual powers, differs significantly from the 
instantiation of the sensual powers. 
§ 1. De Anima / 
Aristotle's treatment of aisthesis is, for the most part, contained within the later chapters 
of DA II. Aristotle's treatment ofnous, however, is prefaced by numerous preliminary 
statements that are scattered throughout the treatise. These statements aim at preparing 
his reader for the unique challenges presented by nous and thought. It is important that 
we review these comments and to consider them in relation to Aristotle's distinction 
between first and second actualities even though many of the statements are made before 
Aristotle makes this distinction explicit. 
The first such comment is found in the introductory chapter of DA: 
A further problem presented by the affections of soul is 
this: are they all affections of the complex of body and 
soul, or is there anyone among them peculiar to the soul by 
itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we 
consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in 
which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving 
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the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation 
generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but 
if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be 
impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a 
condition of its existence. (DA 403a3-10)2 
Here Aristotle suggests that the first actuality of intellect might not involve a change in a 
body or an otherwise material manifestation, and so it might be an affection "peculiar to 
the soul by itself." In his commentary, Apostle clarifies what it means to be an affection 
peculiar to the soul. He writes, "[a]n attribute [or affection] proper to the soul would be a 
property of the soul not requiring a body for existence."3 That said, Apostle continues, if 
such an attribute could be identified, Aristotle could conclude that the soul is separable 
from the body.4 Contrary to the position that the soul is separable from the body, Apostle 
is quick to argue that if thinking presupposes sensation or imagination, then nous cannot 
be peculiar to the soul. This position, however, is specious, for it conflates the first and 
second actualities of nous. Apostle suggests that if the activity of nous, that is, its second 
actuality, presupposes the second actuality of aisthesis and/or phantasia, then the first 
actuality of nous must involve the body. This is clearly a faulty inference given that 
nothing, as of yet, dictates that the first actuality of nous is in any way contingent upon 
those additional conditions that might be required before the second actuality of nous 
comes to fruition. Again, at this early point in the treatise the distinction between first 
and second actualities has not yet been made explicit. For this reason, we must refrain 
from concluding anything concrete with respect to the first and second actualities oinous 
and be satisfied to read the passage as an allusion to a significant problem not yet 
addressed. 
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Similarly, Brentano reads doctrine into the early portions of DA prematurely: 
These passages include DA 11: "of these some [properties of the soul] are taught to be 
affections proper to the soul itself, while others are considered to attach to the animal 
owing to the presence within it of soul." (DA 402a9-10)5; DA I 3: "It is a mistake to say 
that the soul is a spatial magnitude" (DA 407a2-3)6; and DA I 5: 
we should expect each part of the soul to hold together a 
part of the body. But this seems an impossibility; it is 
difficult even to imagine what sort of bodily part mind 
[nous] will hold together, or how it will do this. (DA 
411M4-19)7 
Brentano reads these passages as indicative of certain exigency of thought, namely, that 
the part of the soul that is responsible for intellectual activity must be unmixed, because 
"if it were mixed with the body it would have certain physical properties that would make 
it incapable of apprehending the contrary forms; it would be warm or cold, and would in 
one case be prevented from knowing cold, in the other, from knowing warmth."8 This 
may indeed turn out to be the case, however, this early in the treatise, neither Brentano 
nor Aristotle is in a position to defend doctrine. It is significant, though, that Brentano 
refers here to comments Aristotle made earlier (in DA I 2) concerning Anaxagoras and 
his treatment of nous and soul (psyche). 
Of Anaxagoras, Aristotle tells us that he 
distinguishes] between soul [psyche] and thought [noun], 
but in practice he treats them as a single substance, except 
that it is thought that he specially posits as the principle of 
all things; at any rate what he says is that thought of all that 
is is simple unmixed, and pure. He assigns both 
characteristics, knowing and origination of movement, to 
the same principle when he says that it was thought that set 
the whole in movement. (DA 405al3-19)9 
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Aristotle's only criticism of this view is that Anaxagoras fails to distinguish clearly 
between "soul" (psyche), and "mind" (nous) and to clarify their specific role in his 
ontology. (DA 404M-6 and 405al4-18)10 For the present purposes it is sufficient to note 
that Brentano's reading suggests agreement between Aristotle and Anaxagoras regarding 
the nature of nous, and that this nature is intimately connected with the exigencies of its 
function. 
According to Gerson too, the attributes of nous identified here, and again in DA I 
4, represent Aristotle's earliest descriptions of nous. Intellect is said to be a "sort of 
substance," that it "comes to be in us," that it is "indestructible" (aphthitos), and that it is 
"unaffected" (apathes).n This claim deserves some merit given that, as we shall see, 
these same attributes are attributed to nous at various points throughout DA. 
§ 2. De Anima // 
As we have already noted, the definition of soul at DA II 1—"an actuality of the first kind 
[entelecheia heprote] of a natural body having life potentially in it" (DA 412a27-
412bl)12—is as relevant to nous as it is to aisthesis, for it specifies that soul is the first 
actuality of the vital powers. Thought being one of the vital powers, this definition 
connects nous to the distinction Aristotle makes in DA II 5 between first and second 
actualities. 
Aside from these general statements about the soul only two other comments are 
made in DA II that are directly relevant to the first actuality of nous. (Certain other 
comments that are relevant to the second actuality of nous will be examined in the 
following chapter.) In a passage reminiscent of the comments from DA I quoted above, 
150 
Aristotle states: "We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think; it seems 
to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; 
it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers." (DA 413b24-
29)13 According to Apostle, this passage stipulates that "intellect seems to differ from the 
other kinds of soul in genus and not in species; for it is indestructible, which differs 
generically from what is destructible."14 The other kinds of soul Apostle refers to here 
are the nutritive and/or the sensual—as opposed to the intellectual. Apostle rightly points 
out that this passage is not a definitive statement of doctrine and that "the word 'seems' 
in the text indicates that the problem has not yet been solved."15 The taxonomy of souls 
Apostle alludes to is one that Aristotle introduces in DA II2 and elaborates in DA II3. 
Of intellectual souls Aristotle writes: 
Lastly, certain living beings—a small minority—possess 
calculation [logismon] and thought [dianoian], for (among 
mortal beings) those which possess calculation have all the 
other powers above mentioned, while the converse does not 
hold-indeed some live by imagination alone, while others 
have not even imagination. The mind that knows with 
immediate intuition presents a different problem. (DA 
415a7-12)16 
Given that Aristotle here stipulates that calculation and thought are not found without the 
nutritive or sensual faculties, one might be led to conclude, contra DA 413b24-29, that 
nous is not separable from the other affections of the soul. That said, the passage says 
nothing about nous specifically or explicitly and, again, such a conclusion might entail an 
equivocation of the first and second actualities of nous, for at this point nothing definitive 
has yet been stipulated with regard to the first actuality of nous nor the precondition for 
its activity. It is not until DA III 4 that the connections between the first and second 
actualities of nous begin to emerge. 
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§3. DeAnima /// 4 
Aristotle's discussion of nous proper begins at DA III 4: 
Turning now to the part of the soul with which the 
soul knows and thinks (whether this is separable from the 
others in definition only, or spatially as well) we have to 
inquire (1) what differentiates this part, and (2) how 
thinking can take place. (DA 429al0-13)17 
With this passage Aristotle demarcates the two general concerns with regard to nous that 
inform the present part of our investigation: (1) concerns the first actuality of nous and is 
the primary focus of DA III 4 and 5. (2) Concerns the activity of nous, its second 
actuality, and is the primary focus of DA III 6 and 7. Commentators tend to lose sight of 
this subtlety; first, because the two matters are intimately related, as Aristotle has warned 
throughout the treatise, and second, because Aristotle's discussions in DA III 4 and 5 do 
oscillate between the two issues. 
With particular regard to (1) specifically, having characterized thinking as an 
activity that is, in some way, similar to sensing, Aristotle claims that: 
The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while 
impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that 
is, must be potentially identical in character with its object 
without being the object. Mind must be related to what is 
thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible. (DA 429al5-18)18 
Here Aristotle is ostensibly characterizing the activity of thinking, however, he does so 
with the clear intention of drawing from this characterization certain conclusions with 
regard to the first actuality of nous: 
Therefore, since everything is a possible object of 
thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate 
[krate], that is, to know [gnorize], must be pure from all 
admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature 
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is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it too, like the 
sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that 
of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is 
called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks 
and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. 
For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended 
with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. 
warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive 
faculty: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the 
soul 'the place of forms', though (1) this description holds 
only of the intellective soul, and (2) even this is the forms 
only potentially, not actually. (DA 429al8-29)19 
In this passage Aristotle introduces what has come to be known as the "passive intellect". 
This is to be distinguished from the "active intellect" introduced later in DA III 5. For the 
time being it is sufficient to understand that Aristotle is often said to bifurcate nous into 
the passive and the active. Because Aristotle here defines the intellect as something with 
"no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity", it is believed that he is 
here distinguishing a passive faculty. Brentano, for example, argues that for Aristotle 
thought is an affection and that he is here describing a faculty that receives intelligible 
forms. This faculty must be construed as pure potentiality, thereby necessitating an 
active principle that is yet to be defined.20 
This reading seems to coincide with these later comments: 
Once the mind has become each set of its possible 
objects, as a man of science has, when this phrase is used of 
one who is actually a man of science (this happens when he 
is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its 
condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense 
from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of 
knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind too is then 
able to think itself. (DA 429b5-9)21 
Here Aristotle speaks of an intellect that becomes its objects in a way suggestive of a 
certain passivity. Aristotle also reiterates the distinction he made at the outset of his 
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discussion concerning aisthesis in DA II 5 when he says that having become a man of 
science his "condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the 
potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery." 
Caston, too, maintains that the intellect spoken of here is distinct from that which we will 
find later in DA III 5. The difference between Caston's view and that of Brentano is, as 
we shall see, that Caston identifies the intellect discussed here in DA III 4 with the 
common human sort of intellect, whereas the intellect of DA III 5 he identifies with the 
divine.22 
One of the major difficulties with reading these passages as identifying a distinct 
passive intellectual faculty is that Aristotle prefaces this characterization of nous by 
saying that "mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate [krate], that is, to know 
[gnorize]" must be unmixed. The notion that intellect is defined by its passivity seems to 
run contrary to this assertion. It is clear that Aristotle has precluded the possibility that 
nous is receptive to its object in the same way that aisthesis is—that is, as a function of 
the actualization of a state of qualitative neutrality—for even a state of qualitative 
neutrality would constitute a sort of nature and, according to Aristotle, a hindrance to its 
intellectual potential. Gerson offers a similar reading. 
Gerson reads DA 429b5-9 as an argument, on Aristotle's part, that intellect must 
be non-bodily. This is because if intellect were to be bodily, then it too must have form.23 
The actualization of form in the material constituents of this hypothetical bodily intellect 
would mean that the potency of intellect is limited. In a manner of speaking, the 
maximum potency of our hypothetical bodily intellect would be equal to infinite potency 
less the 'volume' of potency expended in the actualization of its bodily form. This is 
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unacceptable to Aristotle because such a limitation itself entails the possibility for 
something to transcend intellect. This would be contrary to Aristotle's insistence that 
nothing is beyond the scope of what intellect is capable of thinking. This too, explains 
why the intellect is unmixed (amige) and unaffected (apathes). Both implicate form in 
some way: to be mixed suggests impurity in form; to be affected means to have been, or 
to be susceptible to, change in form. 
Gerson's analysis suggests that "immaterial", "unmixed", "unaffected", and 
"separable" all seem to be, in some way, synonymous with the essence Aristotle seeks to 
articulate. DA III 4 offers one further argument for the separability of nous from the 
body: 
Again in the case of abstract objects what is straight 
is analogous to what is snub-nosed; for it necessarily 
implies a continuum as its matter: its constitutive essence is 
different, if we may distinguish between straightness and 
what is straight: let us take it to be two-ness. It must be 
apprehended, therefore, by a different power or by the same 
power in a different state. To sum up, in so far as the 
realities it knows are capable of being separated from their 
matter, so it is also with the powers of mind. (DA 429b18-
22)24 
Aristotle's argument here seems to rest upon the idea that because the objects of the 
intellect—that is, the things the intellect comes to know—are separable from the matter 
in which they are manifest, so too must the intellect be separable from its body. The 
remainder of DA III 4 addresses a certain aporia that may arise out of Aristotle's 
treatment of nous, one that implies a certain skepticism with regard to our capacity to 
have knowledge concerning the intellect. 
DA 429b 18-22 is, however, a point of departure for Brentano's treatment of nous. 
Brentano begins his treatment by explaining what he takes to be Aristotle's reasons for 
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positing a cognitive capacity over and above our sensory capacities. Brentano's reading 
claims that although our senses are receptive of colours and scents and all of the other 
objects of sense they are not receptive of the notion of colour or scent in general. Nor are 
our senses sensitive to concepts such as number or substance. Because we do indeed 
possess information of this sort, there must be some faculty capable of receiving and 
processing it.25 On the other hand, our sensory and intellectual faculties are similar in 
many respects: Both faculties discriminate, both distinguish things, and both direct our 
desires and actions.26 Given these similarities we must also suppose that intellect "is 
without affection, but capable of receiving the intelligible forms, just as sense is capable 
of receiving the sensible forms."27 According to Brentano it is our capacity to have and 
manipulate concepts and not merely our capacity to sense the qualities of things that 
compels Aristotle to conceive of intellect as a distinct faculty. This suggestion is 
reinforced by Aristotle's characterization of the soul as the "place of the forms" at DA 
429a27-29. 
Brentano also reads DA III 4 as stipulating that the intellectual part of the soul is 
immaterial. Brentano says, "He [Aristotle] agrees with Plato in taking the intellectual 
soul for something spiritual.. .the intellect is for him a faculty of the soul alone, not a 
faculty of the ensouled body, and he holds its acts to be activities purely of the soul."28 In 
defense of this position Brentano makes reference to no less than twenty-two separate 
passages scattered throughout DA and numerous others from Metaph., NE, DS, Parts, and 
GC.29 Brentano argues that "if it [nous] were mixed with the body it would have certain 
physical properties that would make it incapable of apprehending the contrary forms; it 
would be warm or cold, and would in one case be prevented from knowing cold, in the 
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other, from knowing warmth."30 We will see similar analysis invoking the exigencies of 
thought later in Gerson's treatment of nous. Gerson's reading of DA III 4, however, 
cannot be separated from his reading of DA III 5. 
§4. D e A n i m a / / / 5 
DA III 5 is perhaps the most esoteric and contentious piece of text in the entire 
Aristotelian corpus. It is here that Aristotle makes his sole explicit reference to the so-
called "active intellect" mentioned previously. I quote DA III 5 here in its entirety: 
Since in every class of things, as in nature as a 
whole, we find two factors involved, (1) a matter which is 
potentially all the particulars included in the class, (2) a 
cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them 
all (the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its 
material), these distinct elements must likewise be found 
within the soul. 
And in fact mind as we have described it is what it 
is by virtue of becoming all things, while there is another 
which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is a 
sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes 
potential colours into actual colours. Mind in this sense of 
it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its 
essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to 
the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which 
it forms). 
Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the 
individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual 
knowledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior 
even in time. Mind is not at one time knowing and at 
another not. When mind is set free from its present 
conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: 
this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not, however, 
remember its former activity because, while mind in this 
sense is impassible, mind as passive [ho de pathetikos 
nous] is destructible), and without it nothing thinks. {DA 
430al0-25)31 
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Here we see a reiteration of the attributes inherited from Anaxagoras—"separable, 
impassible, unmixed"—and an explicit reference to "mind as passive". 
Generally speaking, modern scholars recognize four basic strategies for the 
approach to the first actuality of nous: 
(1) The first, maintain a distinction between the passive bodily intellect and the active 
intellect that is separable (as opposed to separate) from the knowing subject yet able 
to effect the actualization of knowledge in the subject.32 
(2) The second strategy is to introduce certain innovations into the interpretation of the 
phrase "full actuality" with regard to nous.3i 
(3) A third strategy is to disregard DA III 5 altogether as a hiccup in Aristotle's otherwise 
conventional naturalism. This is what I will call the divine substance/"Platonic 
holdover" strategy, as those who adopt this strategy often describe the active intellect 
in one or both of these ways.34 
(4) The fourth strategy interprets the active and the passive intellects as two aspects of a 
single intellect.35 
The remainder of this section will review each of these approaches by offering precis of 
its prominent modern proponents. 
§ 4.1. INTELLECT QUA SEPARABLE VS. SEPARATE 
The controversy concerning the proper interpretation of nous re-emerges in the modern 
era in a polemic between Eduard Zeller and Franz Brentano.36 Zeller follows Alexander 
(second century AD) and Pompanazzi (early sixteenth century AD) in his interpretation 
158 
of the nature of the soul and its composite parts. In his Aristotle and the Earlier 
Peripatetics (1897),37 he writes: 
As he came to conceive of body and soul as essentially 
united, and to define the soul as the entelechy of the body, 
and as, further, he became convinced that every soul 
requires its own proper organ, and must remain wholly 
inoperative without it, he was necessarily led, not only to 
regard the pilgrimage of the soul in the other world as a 
myth, but also to question the doctrines of pre-existence 
and immortality as they were held by Plato. Inasmuch as 
the soul is dependent upon the body for its existence and 
activity, it must come into existence and perish with it.38 
Brentano's response to this position in his The Psychology of Aristotle (1867) sparked a 
polemic between the two scholars the central issue of which was the proper interpretation 
of nous?9 
Brentano's interpretation of DA III 5 begins with a summary of the conclusions 
Aristotle has already reached by this point in the treatise. According to Brentano, one of 
these conclusions is that "Aristotle's theory of knowledge leaves no room for a second 
faculty of intellectual cognition in man. But they [past interpreters] have shown us at the 
same time the need for another mental power without which our thinking would be as 
little possible as an effect without a cause."40 Furthermore, 
this power cannot immediately generate thoughts in our 
intellect, because, firstly, this would dissolve the 
connection that exists between sensory representation and 
concept; and secondly, because the intellectual part would 
have to think continually; and finally, because, as in the 
sensitive part so also in the intellectual, the influence that 
makes it into something that actually thinks must initially 
come from some other thing.41 
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In other words, the realization of intelligible form can only be effected by a power that is 
distinct from, yet similar to, the sensory apparatus of the subject and occupied with 
perpetual activity. 
The active intellect plays that role in Brentano's reading of Aristotle's 
psychology. As we have already seen, according to Brentano's reading, DA III 4 
establishes that thought is an affection and that there is a certain faculty that receives 
intelligible forms. Accordingly, that faculty must be construed as pure potentiality 
necessitating the evocation of an active principle.42 Brentano reads the opening passage 
of DA III 5 as a reiteration of the principle that necessitates the postulation of the active 
intellect and, in so doing, links the passive to the active intellect.43 This principle 
stipulates that wherever there is change there is matter that receives the change and an 
active principle that affects the change, likewise in thought.44 
Furthermore, Brentano takes 430a 10 as stipulating that this active principle must 
be something that is in the soul.45 The active intellect is, as Aristotle claims, separable 
from the passive intellect. However, as Brentano reads it, it is so only in an abstract 
way—that is, the active intellect is separable from the passive in thought but not in 
being.46 Brentano believes that this unity is reinforced by Aristotle's use of the term 
'hexis' to describe the condition of the active intellect—namely, its persistence as pure 
actuality—in the subject. Regardless of the scope of applications for which 'hexis' might 
be employed, Brentano tells us that "it can be used only for forms that are in a subject, 
whether they be substantial forms of a corporeal matter, or accidental forms, but never for 
a pure substantial actuality."47 This analysis influences Brentano's reading of 408b 18 
where Aristotle suggests that nous seems to enter the subject from without like a sort of 
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substance. It also leads him to conclude that the active intellect cannot be identified with 
the divine. 
Despite this rejection of a divine characterization of the active intellect Brentano 
proceeds to make comments that detract from its weight by suggesting that, in the present 
discussions, Aristotle is, in fact, employing multiple senses of the term "nous". Brentano 
writes: 
Aristotle likes to use one and the same word in many 
different senses... Aristotle also uses the expression nous in 
several senses... But it is no accident that the different 
meanings are designated by the same word; rather, they 
have a certain connection with each other, and for the nous 
poietikos this connection can be made clear in two ways. It 
can be explained on the basis of the fact that the nous 
poietikos belongs to the intellectual part of the soul... We 
have seen above that in some passages where Aristotle 
speaks of the faculty of desire he calls it nous as well, and it 
is not improbable that he did so because the will belongs to 
the intellectual part and is united with the intellect in the 
same subject.48 
Brentano, then, reads DA III 5 as presenting one of a number of senses in which the term 
"nous" is used. The inference being that DA is comprised of a number of discreet 
discussions of "nous" each of which is separable, that is, distinguishable, in the abstract. 
In DA III 5, says Brentano, "nous" is used to describe that aspect of intellectual activity 
that represents the active principle, a principle that is required by Aristotle's ontology in 
general. 
§ 4.2. INTELLECT QUA DEGREES OF ACTUALITY 
Wedin's analysis of DA III 5 begins with a comment on the common translation of nous 
poietikos, "the standard translation of 'nous poietikos'' as 'active mind' is, I suggest, off 
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the mark doctrinally as well as linguistically (here 'creative mind' fares much better)."49 
And so, Wedin distinguishes between the creative or productive mind on the one hand 
and the receptive mind on the other. The difference, however, is not a difference between 
one discrete part and another. It is, rather, a distinction between moments of the selfsame 
subject. Wedin writes, "the expression 'nous duname? gives us a way of talking about 
what a subject is capable of, noetically speaking."50 What Wedin here refers to as 
"receptive mind", what is more commonly referred to as the affected intellect (nous 
pathetikos), is reduced to a state of the cognitive apparatus of the physical material 
subject. Further, "Receptive and productive minds are mechanisms rung in to explain 
how that capability is exercised."51 Accordingly, productive mind, what is more 
commonly referred to as the active intellect (nous poietikos), represents the cognitive 
apparatus of the physical material subject engaged in its proper activity. Here we see 
how Wedin, as a representative of a particular tradition, posits varying degrees of 
actuality to escape from certain interpretive difficulties presented by nous in DA. The 
productive and the receptive minds become, in Wedin's own words, "lower-level 
subsystems" of the physical material organism, each represent varying modes of 
actuality. 
Wedin's interpretation of DA III 5 shares certain affinities with Brentano's in that 
they both interpret nous in a way that maintains an abstract distinction between passive 
and active nous. Wedin's reading is to be distinguished by his serialization of the two as 
moments in a singular process through which the actualization of nous occurs. Wedin's 
reading is problematic, however, because of the implicit priority (temporal) it gives to 
passive nous over active nous. Wedin's reading suggests that passive nous precedes the 
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active contrary to Aristotle's explicit stipulations to the contrary, not where he says that 
"the active is superior to the passive factor", but where he tells us that without nous qua 
active, nothing thinks. 
§ 4.3. INTELLECT QUA DIVINE SUBSTANCE 
Victor Caston is a contemporary representative of what I have called the "dismissible 
intellect/Platonic holdover" tradition. Traces of this approach to nous and to DA III 5 can 
be found in Zeller (mentioned above), Pomponazzi, Avicenna, and Alexander of 
Aphrodisias before him. In keeping with this tradition, Caston's thesis is that the so-
called active intellect "is nothing but its essence, which is just actuality, and it functions 
without interruption for eternity - characteristics ascribed only to God, who is unique."52 
More specifically, Caston argues that the active intellect belongs to a species of divine 
intellect distinct from the human species. 
In his "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal" (1999) Caston writes: 
"God moves our intellects as he moves the heavenly spheres, that is, 'as beloved': he 
constitutes the complete actualization towards which all of our intellectual striving is 
directed, in emulation of his perfect state."53 Further, "Aristotle regards such final 
causation as an efficient cause, but not in a way that would make it part of what we would 
call the causal processes or mechanisms of human psychology."54 
Caston's analysis begins by noticing that the very proposition that there are two 
intellects as opposed to a single intellect is an oddity in the treatment at large: although 
Aristotle acknowledges that distinct sense objects (colour, taste, scents, etc.) correspond 
to distinct sense organs, he clearly takes the capacity for sensation to be singular.55 
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Similarly, Aristotle speaks of a variety of intellectual exercises—the understanding of 
essences, propositions, calculations, etc.—which are presumably, says Caston, functions 
of a single capacity.56 However, despite Aristotle's tendency to consolidate similar 
activities under single capacities, at the end of DA III 5 he concludes that there are two 
distinct intellects, one of which—the intellect that becomes all things—plays what is, in 
Caston's opinion, a well delineated role in human cognitive activity, while the other—the 
so-called active intellect—is enigmatically disenfranchised.57 
Caston's interpretation that this second intellect is an intellect of a different sort 
than that possessed by the human soul is based upon his analysis of the argument 
structure of DA III 5. Caston argues that the opening passages of the chapter—where 
Aristotle tells us that "Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two 
factors involved, (1) a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class, 
(2) a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all.. ."58—represent a 
universal affirmative such that what is affirmed of natural things is also affirmed of souls 
in general. Specifically, Caston argues that the "hosper" of 430al0 suggests that the 'en' 
at 430a 10 and 430a 14 are to be understood in the taxonomical sense according to which a 
thing is said to belong in a genus or species.59 Based upon this taxonomical reading we 
can, says Caston, conclude that the genus of soul is comprised of two species, one 
corresponding to matter Qiule) and another corresponding to activity (poietikori) or cause 
(aitiori). This is so for the genus of soul just as it is the case for every genus of natural 
things. This reading is, says Caston, further reinforced by what he takes to be 
taxonomical language: Aristotle uses terms like 'genos' and idiaphora\ meaning 'kind' 
or 'genus' and 'differentia' respectively.60 
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Caston proceeds then to elaborate on the sense in which the divine active intellect 
is separate (choristheis) from the human passive intellect. Referring to prior passages in 
DA where Aristotle employs the aorist tense (specifically, 413b32 - 414a3, and 414a29 -
bl) , Caston argues that the aorist conjugation of the verb "chorizein", meaning "to 
separate", that occurs at 430a22 is not properly construed as referring to a temporal 
moment. Instead, Caston reads "choristheis" as referring to a conceptual, specifically 
taxonomical, sort of separation and not a moment of separation before which time the 
intellects were somehow joined.61 Accordingly, Caston reads the concluding sentence of 
DA III 5 as referring to the divine species of intellect that is made up of a single member. 
Caston's last argument to support his reading of DA III 5 takes the form of a 
comparison between characteristics attributed to the divine intellect in the chapter and 
those attributed to God in Metaphys. XII 7 - 9 . Caston observes that each of the 
following characteristics are attributed to God in Metaphys. XII 7 - 9 in a comparable 
way:62 (1) separate (choristos, 430al7), (2) impassible {apathes, 430al8), (3) unmixed 
{amiges, 430al8), (4) in its essence actuality (te ousia on energeia, 430al8), (5) more 
honorable {timioteron, 430al8), (6) the same as the object of thought {to auto ... to 
pragmati, 430a20), (7) prior in time to capacity in general {chrono protera ...olds, 
430a21), (8) uninterruptedly thinking {ouch hote men voei hote d' ou noei, 430a22), (9) 
solely what it is {monon touth' hoper esti, 430a22 - 23), (10) alone immortal and eternal 
{monon athanaton kai aidion, 430a23), and finally, (11) the necessary condition of all 
thought {aneu toutou outhen noei, 430a25). Based upon this comparison, the linguistic 
analysis summarized above, and the analysis of Aristotle's argumentative form, Caston 
claims that "the only reasonable conclusion is that the second intellect and the Divine 
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Intellect are identical."63 Based upon these premises Caston modestly proposes that the 
active intellect is divine intellect and the final cause of all intellectual activity. 
§ 4.4. INTELLECT QUA UNIFIED 
Gerson's "The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's De Anima" (2004) situates Aristotle's 
reference to the active intellect in a larger discussion addressing the antecedent conditions 
for intellectual activity. Gerson's reading defines nous as both the material (pathetikos) 
and the efficient (poietikos) cause of thought. His reading of nous identifies the 
composite-body (the form/matter composite) as the subject of psychic states. Nous, as it 
turns out, is something that the living subject, the individual substance (qua composite), 
has (hos hexis tis). Its potency (and its activity) is realized in the interaction of one 
specially endowed form/matter composite with some other form/matter composite. In 
other words Gerson's account of nous aims at defining what constitutes, for Aristotle, the 
necessary conditions for intellectual activity, the state of affairs in which intellectual 
activity arises. 
Gerson identifies eight main points in DA III 5. The first point is Aristotle's 
reiteration of his general schema for ontological analysis (430al0-14 see Metaphys. 
1032al7-20). The second point is the crux of the problem that Aristotle has been trying 
to resolve since DA III 3.64 We are told that these problems are sometimes addressed by 
postulating two separate intellects. However, as Gerson reads him, Aristotle argues that 
this need not be the case.65 The third point is that the intellect under discussion now is the 
same as that described in DA III 4.66 The fourth point is an affirmation of the identity 
between the knower and the known (DA 430al9-20).67 The fifth point is a reiteration of 
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the distinction between actual thinking that requires images and the activity of intellect 
qua separate.68 The implication of this distinction responds to the first problem that 
Aristotle seeks to resolve. In DA III 4 intellect is discussed in so far as it exists in the 
composite individual, under these conditions the intellect is, for all intents and purposes, 
mixed and affected, but only in so far as its activity engages images. Intellect, construed 
as separate from the body, is the subject of DA III 5. As such the intellect is unmixed and 
unaffected. It is also, says Aristotle, immortal (athanaton). Gerson is adamant that the 
immortality of human intellect (and not merely the active part of it) must be taken 
seriously.69 This is because, as Aristotle is endeavoring to illustrate, thought itself is 
conditioned by the activity of intellect. This is the conclusion of DA III 5. The sixth 
point is a further elaboration of the third. The seventh point is that, although the activity 
of intellect is continuous, its continuity does not involve memory. This is because 
memory is bodily and fades with the body.70 The eighth and final point is that, without 
the continuous activity of the intellect, nothing thinks.71 
We can now fully appreciate what nous is for Gerson, what it means for it to be 
"the place of forms", and the efficient causal role nous plays in intellectual activity. Nous, 
it turns out, is the locus of the content and activity of thought. If the passive and content-
full aspect of intellect were to be divorced from the active, both the activity of thought 
and the substance of the activity (its meaningfulness) would be impossible. This is 
because the interaction of one with the other requires their simultaneous co-existence in a 
single subject. Accordingly, the presence and potency of nous is the efficient cause of 
the subject/object relationship—in its absence only object/object relations obtain. The 
sensible forms of tangible objects are not the forms that are actualized in the intellect and 
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not that with which intellect comes to be identical through its activity. The activity of the 
intellect is the actualization of the intelligible object in itself.72 Knowledge arises in the 
intellect through its creation and becoming in this literal, but still qualified, sense. Our 
knowledge of the intellect itself is possible given its immediate awareness of its own 
activity. 
Conclusion: The First Actuality o/Nous 
It is clear from the preceding precis that all of the above interpretations emphasize a 
particular mode of causation and, in most cases, they do so explicitly. Brentano cites 
passages predominantly drawn from DA I (402a9, 403a3, 407a2, 41 lbl4, and 413a4) and 
429a27-29 and 430al0 to firmly fix nous to the "spiritual part", the form, of the body. 
Caston's reading of nous is ancillary to, and conditioned by, his reading of DA III 3 and, 
more specifically, of Aristotle's notion ofphantasia. The passages crucial to his reading 
of nous are 432a24, 432b4-7, and 433al4-17, where Aristotle's treatments of various 
faculties of the soul demonstrate a preference for economy over multiplicity. Caston 
points to these passages to support his contention that Aristotle would not, and did not, 
bifurcate nous. Wedin's reading of nous in DA is fundamentally an attempt to reconcile 
the characteristics of nous found in 429al3 through 430a5 by positing serialized moments 
in the actualization of nous. Finally, Gerson's reading of nous is drawn from passages 
throughout the whole of DA, however, his reading is fundamentally based upon 408a34-
b29, 412a27-bl, 413a4-9, and 413b24-27, with which he establishes the initial set of the 
nested composites—form/matter, soul/body, intellect/soul—that occupies the core of his 
interpretation and his account of the first actuality of nous. 
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Despite their variability, all of these readings have in common their 
acknowledgment, in one way or another, of the multiplicity of the senses with which the 
term "nous" is used throughout DA. Each of these readings exploits this commonly 
acknowledged ambiguity in different ways: whereas Brentano claims that Aristotle's 
predication of separability, impassibility, and purity testify to the immateriality of passive 
nous which can be distinguished, in an abstract sense, from the active, Caston argues that 
those same predications are applicable to the divine. Wedin is relatively silent on the 
issue of these predicates. Even Gerson acknowledges a passive and an active sense of 
nous; his innovation is to suggest that both senses are manifest in a single subject. None 
of these readings, however, observes that these characteristics—separate (choristos), 
impassible (apathes), and unmixed (amiges)—characterize the exigency of nous 
generally, both its passivity and its activity. In DA III 4 we are told that, on the one hand, 
mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate [krate], that 
is, to know [gnorize], must be pure from all admixture; for 
the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance 
and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can 
have no nature of its own, other than that of having a 
certain capacity. (DA 429al8-24)73 
Given this characterization of nous, the soul can rightly be called the "place of the forms" 
but it is only potentially the place of the forms. (DA 429a27) In DA III 5, on the other 
hand, where Aristotle speaks of nous in the sense of actuality, we find what is otherwise 
the same characterization of nous: "Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible, 
unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity." (DA 430al7-18)74 The conclusion we 
are led to is this: It must be the case that, in some sense of the term, the first actuality of 
nous is not concomitant with the "actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life 
potentially in it" (DA 412a27-412bl),75 for the identity of the first actuality of nous with 
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the first actuality of the body would preclude the characterization of nous (qua passive 
and qua active) as separate, impassible, and unmixed. Furthermore, that sense of the 
term, the one that suggests that nous is indeed an attribute "peculiar to the soul", is 
relevant to human intellectual activity. It must be remembered that the definition of the 
soul offered at DA II1 is a general (koinotatos) one, not a universal one. (DA 412a5-6) It 
does not preclude the understanding of nous proposed here because it never definitively 
included it. This is clear when Aristotle says 
We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to 
think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, 
differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone 
is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic 
powers. (DA 413b24-29)76 
What this means is that, notwithstanding his preceding definition of soul, nous may still 
fall beyond its purview. 
The capacity for thought is, as we have said, the first actuality of nous. That said, 
Aristotle tells us that nous represents a perpetual actuality of the sort analogous to a 
capacity possessed—nous is said to have "no nature of its own, other than that of having 
a certain capacity"—in other words, there is no point at which the actuality represented 
by nous ever exists in potentiality. Using the technical language of first and second 
actualities, according to which a first actuality arises out of a first potentiality, and is 
synonymous with a second potentiality, there is no first potentiality that precedes the first 
actuality of nous—for "this alone is immortal and eternal." 
Here the fundamental difference between the first actuality ofaisthesis and nous 
is revealed: Whereas the first actuality of aisthesis involves the actualization of certain 
conditions—namely, as we have seen, the presense of a medium and the actualization of 
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an organ that is partially composed of elements that are homogeneous with the medium— 
the first actuality of nous is, in all ways, independent of physical conditions. 
Furthermore, the activity of aisthesis is one that is triggered by the presence of some 
other object that affects the second actuality of aisthesis. The first actuality of nous, on 
the other hand, constitutes a certain activity in and of itself, "since it is in its essential 
nature activity." The first actuality of aisthesis, on the other hand, is not an activity but a 
state. But the activity Aristotle associates with the first actuality of nous cannot be 
understood as thought proper: Aristotle tells us that "without it [referring to the first 
actuality of nous] nothing thinks," it is not possible for the activity of nous to be identical 
with the activity for which it is the antecedent condition. What DA III 4 and 5 tells us is 
that the first actuality of nous constitutes a primitive mode of activity that is the 
antecedent condition for intellectual activity (the second actuality of nous). In contrast, 
Aristotle associates the activity of aisthesis with its second actuality. Such activity is 
aisthesis; whereas both the first and second actualities of nous entail activity of a ceratin 
sort only one of which—the later—constitute the intellectual activities of dianoia, 
hupolepsis, phronesis and all the species of thinking (noein). 
In further contrast to aisthesis generally, activity associated with the first actuality 
of nous is generative in nature: "it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things", it "is 
what it is by virtue of making all things" and is comparable to "a sort of positive state like 
light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours." This reading of 
nous in Aristotle's psychology—understood as a primitive and persistent mode of 
activity—is not only probative with respect to its role in intellectual activity, it alludes to 
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a potential for a comprehensive understanding of the many occurrences of the term 
throughout Aristotle's corpus. 
Despite the apparent similarities between my interpretation of nous and that 
offered by Gerson, my interpretation differs from Gerson's in that it does not necessarily 
imply a wholesale rejection of the other interpretations discussed above. Given that my 
interpretation is based upon Aristotle's distinction between first and second actualities, I 
am able to unite nous in a way that accounts for both its active and its passive senses 
without privileging one over the other. It is my intention that if my interpretation were to 
be applied in certain contexts, it might not only affirm the validity of readings like those 
offered by Caston, but also, in different contexts, affirm the validity of readings like those 
offered by Brentano or Wedin. The following chapter will examine Aristotle's treatment 
of the second actuality of nous, that is, intellectual activity. This discussion will indeed 
be one far more sympathetic to both Brentano and Wedin than the preceding discussion. 
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Chapter 8. THE SECOND ACTUALITY OF NOUS 
Introduction 
As has been suggested in previous chapters, Aristotle makes numerous preparatory and 
sometimes tangential comments concerning the nature of intellectual activity before 
taking up the matter directly in DA III 6 and 7. It is not until this late point in DA that 
Aristotle offers an explanation of the second actuality of nous. His most likely 
justification for this delay is the complexity of the subject and, more specifically, as we 
have seen, the difficulty with articulating the antecedent conditions for intellectual 
activity—that is, the first actuality of nous. For this reason, this discussion will again 
survey the earlier portions of text, this time aiming at teasing out of them that which is 
relevant specifically to the second actuality of nous. Despite their significance in 
Aristotle's account of thinking, surprisingly little contemporary literature treats DA III 6 
and 7. For this reason the later portions of this chapter will rely heavily upon Apostle's 
1981 commentary and a few other secondary sources. This chapter will proceed to 
examine DA III 6 and 7 to discover the fundamental differences between thinking and 
sensation. This chapter will conclude that thinking, unlike sensation, is essentially both 
genetic and active. 
173 
§1. DeAnima / & II 
To begin with, we recall from the previous chapter that Aristotle says the following near 
to the very beginning of DA at 403a3-10: 
A further problem presented by the affections of soul is 
this: are they all affections of the complex of body and 
soul, or is there anyone among them peculiar to the soul by 
itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we 
consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in 
which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving 
the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation 
generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but 
if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be 
impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a 
condition of its existence. (DA 403a3-10)77 
Previously we read this passage as a suggestion on Aristotle's part that the first actuality 
of nous might not involve any sort of material manifestation, and that it might be 
"peculiar to the soul by itself." Concerning his reading of this passage, we accused 
Apostle, who affirms that thinking presupposes sensation and imagination, of 
equivocating when he concludes, based upon this affirmation, that nous cannot be 
peculiar to the soul. At this point, having distinguished between the activity concomitant 
with the first actuality of nous and intellectual activity proper, Apostle's equivocation 
becomes even more apparent. However, more importantly to our present concerns, we 
can appreciate how we can affirm, on the one hand, that the first actuality of nous is 
separate from the body, and, on the other, affirm that the second actuality of nous might 
presuppose the second actuality of aisthesis and/or phantasia. In other words, the second 
actuality of nous may indeed involve the body. 
This seems to be what Aristotle affirms, or at least is open to, when he concludes 
DA 11 with the suggestion that "It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities 
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or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul." (DA 
408b 11-13)78 According to Gerson, when Aristotle describes the soul as the first actuality 
of a potentially living body at DA II 1, it is the composite body—in other words the 
form/matter composite that makes up the body—that is, he says, subject to the efficacy of 
the soul.79 Further, according to Gerson, just as the soul alone is not the subject of pain, 
the intellect alone is not the subject of thought. Rather, the subject of thought is that 
which has intellect, i.e. soul.80 Finally, given that the soul is described as the subject of 
thought "in so far as it has intellect," (DA 408b26-27) Gerson reads such a qualification 
as an early indication by Aristotle of the causal, or at least explanatory, efficacy of 
intellect.81 Gerson's suggestion here is clearly similar to my own. Gerson too points to 
DA 408b 11-13 to support his claim. The suggestion being that the activity of thinking— 
the second actuality of nous—involves the second actuality of aisthesis (this might also 
implicate phantasia) and the activity we have associated with the first actuality of nous. 
We begin to see confirmations of this reading in DA III 4 and 5. 
§2. De Anhna III 4 & 5 
Aristotle's earliest direct statement concerning the nature of the second actuality ofnous 
takes the form of a disjunction. He tells us at DA III 4 that "If thinking is like perceiving, 
it must be either [1] a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being 
thought, or [2] a process different from but analogous to that." (DA 429al3-15)82 Here 
Aristotle is ambiguous, and, perhaps, intentionally so. (1) might refer to: (a) the possible 
object of thought, e.g., when I think about the computer in front of me, it is acting upon 
my cognitive faculty and causing me to think about it; or (b) more precisely the 
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intelligible form of the object of thought; or (c) the activity concomitant with the first 
actuality of nous, which, as Aristotle argues in the concluding portions of DA III 4, "is 
capable of being thought". In other words, when Aristotle tells us that (1) thinking might 
be a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, he can 
be interpreted as affirming one of the following: 
la. Thinking is a process in which the soul is acted upon by the possible object of 
thought. 
Or, 
lb. Thinking is a process in which the soul is acted upon by the the intelligible 
form of the object of thought. 
Or, 
lc. Thinking is a process in which the soul is acted upon by the activity 
concomitant with the first actuality of nous. 
When, on the other hand, Aristotle tells us that (2) thinking might other wise be a process 
different from but analogous to a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is 
capable of being thought, he can be interpreted as affirming one of the following: 
2a. Thinking is a process different from but analogous to a process in which the 
soul is acted upon by the possible object of thought. 
Or, 
2b. Thinking is a process different from but analogous to a process in which the 
soul is acted upon by the the intelligible form of the object of thought. 
Or, 
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2c. Thinking is a process different from but analogous to a process in which the 
soul is acted upon by the activity concomitant with the first actuality of nous. 
The double entendre of the phrase "what is capable of being thought [paschein ti an eie 
hupo tou noetou]" is revealed in the concluding portions of DA III 4 where Aristotle says 
that, "Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are [kai autos de 
noetos estin hosper ta noeta]. For in the case of objects which involve no matter, what 
thinks and what is thought are identical; for speculative knowledge and its object are 
identical." {DA 430a2-6)83 As it turns out, 2 is a red herring: Thinking is a process that is 
different from but analogous to the second actuality of aisthesis but in making such a 
suggestion, Aristotle implies that only (la) and (lb) are acceptable construals of (1). To 
the contrary, I believe that by the conclusion of DA III 7, Aristotle will have affirmed 
(la), (lb), (lc), and, their collective equivalent, (2). 
Brentano's attempts to interpret DA III 4, in a manner that is coherent with (lb), 
are in fact complementary to the reading articulated so far. Brentano poses the question: 
how is it that nous comprehends intelligible forms without, at the same time, becoming 
"mixed" and, in so doing, limiting its potency? His answer is that intellectual activity 
does not involve a corruption of the sort that results from the conventional84 actualization 
of form in matter, i.e., the sort of corruption that occurs when one thing becomes another 
thing. As Brentano explains: "It [intellectual activity] is an actual change; not a 
corruption but a perfection of its natural condition."85 Thought, like sensation, according 
to this reading, is not a learned capacity. The subject is capable of thought from birth. It 
is, however, something that is perfected through exercise. Brentano tells us that "Only 
when it has achieved potential [habituelle] knowledge, which happens either through 
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learning or through one's own discovery, can it actually comprehend thoughts within 
itself whenever it wants to and without outside help."86 In this way nous is able to 
comprehend everything in such a manner that nothing, not even the faculty itself, 
transcends the potentiality of nous. Engaging in intellectual activity has the effect of 
broadening the scope of the faculty and refining its capacities for discrimination. For this 
reason too, says Brentano, Aristotle is not led to postulate a second distinct intellectual 
faculty (for the purpose, for example, of acquiring knowledge of intellect itself). 
Brentano's reading employs explicitly the language of intelligible forms that are 
suggested by (lb). He proceeds to describe a process analogous to sensation as (2) 
suggests, but it is a process only analogous in terms of how the object of thought interacts 
with the thinking subject. Brentano's reading suggests that, as is the case in sensation, it 
is the object's form actualized in some secondary way that is engaged in the process of 
thinking. Brentano's Aristotle says that the two powers differ in that one—namely, 
thought—is perfected through practice. Brentano speaks of potential knowledge, but 
what is here translated as "potential" is the German "habituelle" which, in this context, 
might better be understood more literally as "habitual", for the view that Brentano seems 
to want to attribute to Aristotle is that through practice one's intellectual powers are 
enhanced and their ability for conceptualization increases. In other words, for Brentano's 
Aristotle, one's intellectual prowess is habituated. 
Although, as we have seen, Wedin's reading of DA III 4 offers little by way of an 
understanding of the first actuality of nous, his reading does, however, strive towards a 
thorough account of its second actuality. Wedin87 maintains that DA III 4 identifies seven 
distinctive 'marks' of nous: (1) "Thinking is something like being affected", (2) "One can 
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think what one wishes",88 (3) "Actual thinking is produced by the object of thought", (4) 
"Mind is nothing actual until it thinks", (5) "Mind is the same as its object", (6) "Mind 
thinks itself',89 and (7) "Whenever one actually thinks (that is, when one's mind is the 
same as the object of thought), then the mind thinks itself."90 Items (1) through (4) 
convey a commitment to the underlying physicality of nous: Items (1) through (4) 
stipulate that mental states are caused by physical states. Items (5) through (7) ensures 
that intellectual activity is a possible object of intellectual activity itself in a way that, as 
we shall see, is not suggestive of some mental event independent of a physical event. As 
we can see from these seven items Wedin is reading nous strictly as a subjective activity 
and without regard for its status as potentially separable. Accordingly, to Wedin DA III 4 
speaks to the functions of nous only, and not to the functional organization of the mind— 
as a cognitive theory demands. 
§3. DeAnima/tftf 
As we have seen, all of the comments and suggestions concerning the second actuality of 
nous made throughout DA I, II, and in the early chapters of III, are preparatory for his 
proper treatment of the matter beginning at DA III 6. Aristotle begins by stipulating the 
following: 
The thinking then of the simple objects of thought is 
found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where 
the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find 
a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity. 
(DA 430a26-28)91 
Here Aristotle seems to identify two levels of intellectual activity: one in which truth and 
falsity are not applicable, and a second in which truth and falsity are applicable. The 
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second, Aristotle tells us, is primarily distinguishable by the fact that it involves 
synthesis, that is, "a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity." That 
thinking involves synthesis suggests that it involves a genetic principle of the sort denied 
to aisthesis. Aristotle says as much when he tells us that "falsehood always involves a 
synthesis; for even if you assert that what is white is not white you have included not 
white in a synthesis." {DA 430b 1-3)92 
Furthermore, Aristotle is explicit with regard to the agent of the synthesis out of 
which falsity might arise: 
It is possible also to call all these cases division as well as 
combination. However that may be, there is not only the 
true or false assertion that Cleon is white but also the true 
or false assertion that he was or will be white. In each and 
every case that which unifies is mind. {DA 430b3-6)93 
A striking contrast can be drawn here between the second actuality of aisthesis and the 
second actuality of nous, whereas aisthesis is the affect of the sense object in an active 
capacity and its encounter with the sense organ in a passive capacity, the second actuality 
of nous seems to be the result of the activity of nous, that is, the activity that nous is 
constantly engaged in as a function of its first actuality. 
As Aristotle returns to the apprehension of "simple objects", the scope of the 
genetic principle active in the positing of synthesis is expanded. Aristotle does so when 
he exemplifies an object, a line, that is sensed as a common sensible—namely, a 
magnitude—to explain the delimitation of the object of thought, the implication being 
that this is a function of the second actuality of nous. This expansion is articulated in two 
steps. First we are told: 
Since the word 'simple' has two senses, i.e. may 
mean either 'not capable of being divided' or 'not actually 
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divided', there is nothing to prevent mind from knowing 
what is undivided, e.g. when it apprehends a length (which 
is actually undivided) and that in an undivided time; for the 
time is divided or undivided in the same manner as the line. 
(DA 430b6-10)94 
Here Aristotle begins to broach the mereology of thought: Aristotle explains that a 
thought is co-extensive with its object. Aristotle explains what he means further when he 
writes: 
It is not possible, then, to tell what part of the line it was 
apprehending in each half of the time: the object has no 
actual parts until it has been divided: if in thought you think 
each half separately, then by the same act you divide the 
time also, the half-lines becoming as it were new wholes of 
length. But if you think it as a whole consisting of these 
two possible parts, then also you think it in a time which 
corresponds to both parts together. (DA 430M0-14)95 
What is being said here is that object, in thought, is not expansive in the sense that this or 
that part (of the object) is thought in this or that moment (or part) of thinking. Aristotle 
seems to suggest that thoughts are atomic wholes, they are unbroken and unbreakable. 
Thoughts are, and thinking is, serialized—i.e., one thought may precede or follow 
another. However, the thought of a line is indivisible. As Apostle notes: 
If the intellect thinks each half [of a line] separately, then it 
thinks not the line as a whole but two separate parts and at 
different times; and if the parts are so thought, this is as if 
the intellect were thinking two different whole lines in two 
separate intervals and not one line.96 
What this means is that, even prior to any sort of synthetic postulation, the second 
actuality of nous involves the objectification of the object of thought. That is, the activity 
of thinking itself defines and delimits its object. Indeed, the second actuality of nous is 
constitutive of the object of thought. This position stands in juxtaposition to that offered 
by Plato in the Timaeus and refuted by Aristotle in DA I. 
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DA III 6 concludes with a discussion of the apprehension by nous of the absence 
of things that we might expect to be present. Aristotle writes: 
Points and similar instances of things that divide, 
themselves being indivisible, are realized in consciousness 
in the same manner as privations. 
A similar account may be given of all other cases, 
e.g. how evil or black is cognized; they are cognized, in a 
sense, by means of their contraries. (DA 430b20a-23)97 
Apostle explains this passage as follows: "Just as blindness is known and defined in 
terms of vision, (for it is the absence of vision in that whose nature is to have vision), 
toothless in terms of absence of teeth, and darkness in terms of light....The same applies 
to the knowledge of evil and of other privations, for they are known by the knowledge of 
their contraries."98 
§4. D e A n i m a / / / 7 
Whereas in DA III 6 Aristotle is subtle with respect to the role of sensation in the second 
actuality of nous—referring to an object of the common sense in order to make a point 
concerning the genetic nature of intellectual activity—in DA III 7 he is more explicit 
about the role of sensation. After reiterating the priority of potential knowledge, the same 
point made earlier in DA III 5, Aristotle states that "[t]o perceive then is like bare 
asserting or knowing; but when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes a sort of 
affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object." (DA 421a8-10)99 Here again, 
Aristotle posits characteristics of intellectual activity quite distinct from those attributed 
to the second actuality of aisthesis. Here, in a general way, Aristotle speaks to what we 
have previously, in the context of intentionality, referred to as the meta-character of 
psychological states. Here Aristotle situates the sort of aversion or attraction to a sensed 
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object generally within the soul. He then tells us that "the faculty of appetite and 
avoidance are not different, either from one another or from the faculty of sense-
perception; but their being is different." (DA 431al2-14)100 This is misleading because 
shortly thereafter Aristotle clarifies, "[t]o the thinking soul images serve as if they were 
contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or 
pursues them)." (DA 431al4-16 emphasis added)101 It is significant that Aristotle here 
speaks of "dianoetike psyche" and, in so doing, distinguishes the discursive from the 
objectifying mode of thinking. Apostle seems to concur. As he explains, "it is the 
thinking soul which judges that P is or is not Q, that asserts or denies P of Q, and that 
pursues what it asserts to be good but avoids what it asserts to be bad."102 
What complicates this point is that it is made in conjunction with Aristotle's 
expression of the dependence of intellectual activity upon the activity of the senses. This 
dependence begins to emerge in DA 431al2-14, quoted above, and is made explicit in the 
assertion: "That is why the soul never thinks without an image." (DA 431al6-17)103 
Aristotle elaborates upon the intersection of the second actuality of ais thesis with the 
second actuality of nous: 
The faculty of thinking then thinks the forms in the 
images, and as in the former case what is to be pursued or 
avoided is marked out for it, so where there is no sensation 
and it is engaged upon the images it is moved to pursuit or 
avoidance. E.g. perceiving by sense that the beacon is fire, 
it recognizes in virtue of the general faculty of sense that it 
signifies an enemy, because it sees it moving; but 
sometimes by means of the images or thoughts which are 
within the soul, just as if it were seeing, it calculates and 
deliberates what is to come by reference to what is present; 
and when it makes a pronouncement, as in the case of 
sensation it pronounces the object to be pleasant or painful, 
in this case it avoids or pursues; and so generally in cases 
ofaction.(Xl4 431b2-10)104 
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Here Aristotle offers a far more elaborate example than that of the line offered in DA III 
6, DA 431b2-10 offers a serialized account of the integration of aisthesis with intellectual 
activity. Aristotle makes it clear that what is sensed through the second actuality of 
aisthesis is endowed with meaning through the second actuality of nous, the activity of 
which culminates in its pronouncement that the object is either pleasant or painful, and 
subsequently, that it should be pursued or avoided. Apostle concurs with this reading: 
"judgements and deliberations require thoughts, and thoughts are impossible without 
images (for the thinking part thinks its objects in images); so images alone are not 
sufficient."105 
Conclusion: The Second Actuality o/Nous 
Aristotle's account of intellectual activity qua the second actuality of nous brings to the 
fore a number of stark contrasts with sensation, i.e., the second actuality of aisthesis. The 
first and most significant distinction that we made, however, was between the activity of 
nous according to its first actuality (DA III 5) and the activity of nous according to its 
second actuality (what is alluded to throughout DA and is more thoroughly explicated in 
DA III 6 and 7). Throughout DA I, II, and in DA III 4 specifically, we saw it suggested 
that the activity of thinking—the second actuality of nous—involves the second actuality 
of aisthesis (and possibly phantasid) in conjunction with the activity concomitant with 
the first actuality of nous. 
DA III 6 and 7 explore the relationship between sensation and thinking first by 
assigning to them specific roles. In DA III 6 Aristotle bifurcates the second actuality of 
nous by identifying two levels of intellectual activity, both of which represent the 
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exercise of a genetic principle. One such level of intellectual activity involves synthesis, 
that is, "a putting together of objects of thought in a sort of unity." Prior to the synthetic 
postulation spoken of here, the second actuality of nous involves the objectification of the 
object of thought, that is, the constitution of the object in its activity. This genetic 
character, we recall, is explicitly denied to aisthesis mDA II 5, where he says that "man 
can exercise his knowledge when he wishes, but his sensation does not depend upon 
himself—a sensible object must be there". (DA 417b24-26)106 In DA III 7 the disparity 
between sensation and thinking is made even more explicit when Aristotle attributes to 
thought a meta-character of the sort spoken of previously in relation to 
psychological/intentional states. Aristotle situates the sort of aversion or attraction to a 
sensed object within the soul and in the effect of the second actuality of nous. (DA 
431al2-14) 
Ultimately, Aristotle's account of the second actuality of nous culminates in a 
serialized account of the integrated activities of the second actualities of aisthesis and 
nous. Aristotle makes it clear that what is sensed is sensed indifferently and is endowed 
with meaning only through the second actuality of nous (the discriminatory powers of 
sensation are limited to the discrimination between qualities of the object proper and not 
its subjective, or judged qualities). This activity culminates in the pronouncement, by 
intellect, that the object is either pleasant or painful and that it should be pursued or 
avoided. Accordingly, in his accounts of the first and second actualities of aisthesis and 
nous Aristotle offers a comprehensive account of cognitive activity and its preconditions. 
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Chapter 9. Nous AND THE ORIGIN OF INTENTIONALITY 
Introduction 
We are finally prepared to draw the comparison between nous in Aristotle and Brentano's 
theory of intentionality in order that we might come to a better understanding of 
intentionality based upon its proper analogue, nous. This concluding chapter will 
proceed with a brief summary of the conclusions concerning nous that we have arrived at 
in the preceding three chapters. It will then begin to enumerate the integral points of 
similarity between the two notions. We shall begin our comparison by addressing the 
commonly accepted primary function of intentionality in psychological states—namely, 
the constitution of the object of thought. We will, again, witness that, like intentionality, 
it is nous that is constitutive of the object of thought. I will then discuss what we have 
previously referred to as the "meta-character" of psychological acts and how both nous 
and intentionality account for this phenomenon in their respective psychologies. Further, 
we shall see that both nous and intentionality represent a certain genetic principle that, in 
both Aristotle and Brentano, is a fundamental to thinking. With these three explicit and 
fundamental similarities accounted for, I will then proceed, by extrapolation, to suggest 
one further similarity with respect to a characteristic of nous that Aristotle makes explicit 
and that, with further study, may prove to be implicit in Brentano's formulation of his 
theory of intentionality—namely, I will suggest that both nous and intentionality exhibit a 
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certain primitivity. The revised understanding of intentionality that I will defend 
emphasizes the ontological significance of the concept in order to address both the 
conventional problem of intentionality and the fundamentally ontological genetic 
problem of intentionality. 
§ 1. Nous Summarized 
In the previous three chapters we explored nous in the context of Aristotle's DA and we 
did so according to the three senses of the term found throughout the treatise: (1) "nous" 
according to its first actuality, (2) "nous'''' according to its second actuality, and (3) "nous" 
with respect to its causal relationship to the soul. 
§ 1.1. NOUS ACCORDING TO ITS FIRST ACTUALITY 
As we saw in Chapter 7, nous is characterized generally—that is, with respect to both its 
passivity and its activity—as separate (choristos), impassible (apathes), and unmixed 
(amiges). DA III 4 tells us that these characteristics are integral to the omnipotence of 
thought (i.e., it can think anything) and the exigencies of its function. (DA 429al8-24) 
Accordingly, the soul can be called the "place of the forms" but it is so only in 
potentiality. (DA 429a27) 
According to DA III 5, with respect to nous in the sense of actuality, "Mind in this 
sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity." 
(DA 430al9-22) We are therefore led to conclude that the first actuality of nous is 
distinct from the soul qua "an actuality of the first kind of a natural body having life 
potentially in it". (DA 412a27-412bl)107 This is because such an identity would preclude 
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the separability, impassibility, and purity of nous. Aristotle tells us that nous represents a 
perpetual actuality of the sort analogous to a capacity possessed. Consequently, nous, 
according to its first actuality, never exists in potentiality, for "this alone is immortal and 
eternal." 
Whereas the activity of aisthesis is one that is triggered passively by the sense 
object, nous constitutes a certain activity in and of itself, "since it is in its essential nature 
activity." This activity, however, is not thought proper. We know this because Aristotle 
tells us that "without it nothing thinks", and so, unless Aristotle is committing a blatant 
petitio principii, the activity of nous cannot but be the antecedent condition of thought 
and not thought proper. The inference we are led to by Aristotle's claims in DA III 4 and 
5—i.e. that the first actuality of nous is not preceded by a state of potentiality taken in 
conjunction with its status as an antecedent condition for thinking—is that the first 
actuality of nous constitutes a primitive mode of activity. By this I mean, as Aristotle 
tells us, that the first actuality of nous is preceded by no state of potentiality. The 
implication of Aristotle's suggestion is that the activity he associates with the first 
actuality of nous is—as are the basic elements of earth, air, and water—a simple, or 
primitive, constituent of the world. Furthermore, such an activity is genetic in nature: "it 
is what it is by virtue of becoming all things", it "is what it is by virtue of making all 
things", and it is comparable to "a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense light 
makes potential colours into actual colours." 
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§ 1.2. Nous ACCORDING TO ITS SECOND ACTUALITY 
In our discussions concerning the second actuality of nous it was settled that, unlike in its 
first actuality, the second actuality of nous—that is, thought—is contingent upon the 
second actuality of aisthesis (and possibly phantasia)—that is, sensation and 
imagination—as well as, of course, the activity associated with the first actuality of nous. 
DA III 6 identifies two levels of intellectual activity: the synthetic, on the one hand, and 
the objectifying, on the other. Both represent the exercise of a genetic principle. The 
synthetic mode of the second actuality of nous, for example, involves "a putting together 
of objects of thought in a sort of unity." However, before such synthetic postulations can 
occur the object must be constituted through a prior activity associated with the second 
actuality of nous. This genetic character is denied to aisthesis in DA II 5. DA III 7 
widens the chasm between sensation and thinking when Aristotle attributes to thought 
that which we have come to refer to as a sort of meta-character, speaking of the sort of 
aversions or attractions to sensed objects that are affected by the second actuality of nous. 
(ZX4 431al2-14) 
Having reviewed our treatment of nous in Aristotle's psychology, we can now 
proceed to compare it with Brentano's notion of intentionality. 
§ 2. The Constitution of the Object of Mental States 
Throughout Part I it was repeated that the single most important distinction made by 
Brentano in the articulation of his psychology was the distinction between mental and 
physical phenomena. According to Brentano, "All the data of our consciousness are 
divided into two great classes—the class of physical and the class of mental 
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phenomena."108 Significantly, Brentano articulates this distinction as one that delineates 
two sorts of "data of our consciousness." As it turns out, this subtlety will lead to later 
complications with respect to (a) the epistemological entailment of 
psychological/intentional states, (b) the ontological status of the object of thought, and (c) 
the genesis of consciousness itself. For now, however, it is important to note that what 
distinguishes the mental from the physical phenomena is their possession of content. To 
be precise, Brentano tells us: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or 
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, 
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood 
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way.109 
What Brentano here tells us is that mental phenomena are distinctively content-full and 
that they are so because, in a literal sense, some content exists within them. Brentano 
makes this explicit in those portions of his text that speak to the priority he affords to 
mental phenomena. He says, "We have no right, therefore, to believe that the objects of 
so-called external perception really exist as they appear to us. Indeed, they demonstrably 
do not exist outside of us."110 He subsequently reaffirms his position with respect to the 
ontological status of mental phenomena: 
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are 
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as 
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire 
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a 
phenomenal and intentional existence.111 
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For Brentano, intentionality is in fact constitutive of the object of thought and should be 
understood as the ontic basis of mental contents. In other words, the object of any 
specific mental phenomenon exists in the intention of the mental phenomenon. 
Aristotle's psychology too involves an act through which the object of thought is 
constituted as such. In DA III 6 we are told: 
there is nothing to prevent mind from knowing what is 
undivided, e.g. when it apprehends a length (which is 
actually undivided) and that in an undivided time; for the 
time is divided or undivided in the same manner as the line. 
(DA 430b7-10)112 
As we discussed in Chapter 8, the second actuality of nous is the activity of thinking. 
Thought is serial in nature and each moment of thought is constitutive of, and co-
extensive with, its object. By this, as was explained, Aristotle meant that neither thought 
nor its object are expansive (thoughts are not magnitudes as Plato suggests). Rather, 
thoughts are serialized atomic wholes that define and delimit their object. Accordingly, 
the second actuality of nous involves the objedification of the object of thought. And so, 
just like intentionality in Brentano, the second actuality of nous in Aristotle's psychology 
is that in which the object of thought is constituted. 
§ 3. Nous and the Meta-Character of Intentionality 
Chapter 2 offered an explication of the conventional problem of intentionality based upon 
analyses of the problem offered by Chisholm, Caston, and Simons. We observed that, 
specifically with regard to the analyses of Chisholm and Caston, the conventional 
problems of intentionality can be traced to the meta-character of the intentional act. By 
this we refer to the subjective character of the psychological act that varies from act to 
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act, from one instance of thought (used in a most general sense) to the next. Brentano 
suggests a few of the potential characters a psychological act might take when he says, 
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object 
within itself, although they do not all do so in the same 
way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate 
hated, in desire desired and so on.113 
Here the various possible meta-characters that the intentional/psychological act might 
take include the presentational character of a presentation, the judgemental character of a 
judgement, the loving of an instance of love, the hating in an instance of hate, and the 
desiring in an instance of desire. In all such cases these terms can be understood 
adjectively, as describing the way in which the object of thought is given in the mental 
phenomena in which it exists."4 This list is by no means comprehensive, but, a certain 
meta-character can be identified for each and every mental phenomenon. Even when the 
subject is indifferent to the object, we might say that the meta-character of such an 
intentional act is its indifferent character. 
In Aristotle, this character, as we have already observed, is accounted for in the 
second actuality of nous. This is clear when Aristotle states that "[t]o perceive then is 
like bare asserting or knowing; but when the object is pleasant or painful, the soul makes 
a sort of affirmation or negation, and pursues or avoids the object." {DA 421a8-10)115 
Here Aristotle seems to have influenced Brentano in that he too, speaks of a certain meta-
character of psychological states and does so in two broad categories: aversions, and 
attractions. In this passage Aristotle identifies one's aversion or attraction to a sensed 
object generally within the soul. Shortly thereafter he clarifies in which part of the soul 
that aversion or attraction originates: "[t]o the thinking soul images serve as if they were 
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contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or 
pursues them)." (DA 431al4-16)116 Here again, we are confronted with a similarity 
between Brentano's theory of intentionality and nous in Aristotle. 
§ 4. The Primitivity o/Nous and Intentionality: The Genesis of 
Consciousness 
In Chapter 2 our deconstruction of the ontology articulated, both explicitly and implicitly, 
in Brentano's Psychology revealed apetitio principii of the sort that theoretical 
constructions are susceptible to. The manifestation of this fallacy results from Brentano's 
claims that certain real physical events are temporally prior to the emergence of real 
mental phenomena. This is because, as Brentano says, consciousness is always 
consciousness of something. However, the thing of which we are conscious is some 
physical phenomenon that exists only in the act of intention. A circularity arises when 
Brentano says, "intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental 
phenomena."117 Put more succinctly, the emergence of consciousness is conditional upon 
the presence of its object; the presence of the object is conditioned by its intentional 
inexistence; and intentional inexistence occurs only in consciousness. We depicted this 
interdependency as follows: 
Consciousness = Object 
Object = Intentionality 
Intentionality = Consciousness 
This analysis reveals the single greatest deficiency of Brentano's psychology— 
specifically, its inability to account for the genesis of consciousness. 
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No such problem arises in Aristotle's psychology. Or does it? Recall that in our 
discussion concerning the second actuality of nous we distinguished between the activity 
associated with it, thinking proper, from the activity that is associated with the first 
actuality of nous. In line with comments made in DA III 5, the perpetual activity of the 
first actuality of nous was said to be one of the antecedent conditions for thought but not 
identical to thought. This interpretation is most explicitly supported by the statement 
concluding DA III 5 that "without [nous in the sense of its first actuality] nothing thinks." 
Furthermore, this suggests that to interpret the activity of the first actuality of nous as 
thought in the proper sense is tantamount to attributing to Aristotle apetitioprincipii. In 
fact, it is tantamount to attributing to Aristotle apetitioprincipii of the same sort we 
identified in Brentano's psychology in Chapter 2. 
Again, in order to escape this fallacy the activity of the first actuality of nous was 
interpreted as the antecedent condition of thought proper and, as was noted in Chapter 8, 
this interpretation brings to bear a further implication with respect to the essential 
character of nous: DA III 4 and 5 stipulate that the first actuality of nous is not itself 
preceded by a state of potentiality. This means that the sort of activity associated with 
the first actuality of nous constitutes a primitive mode of activity, in other words, it is, in 
a sense, elemental to the extent that, like earth, air, water, and fire, it is a constitutive 
principle of certain real things. Aristotle indeed defines the first actuality of nous in 
terms of these three essential characteristics: (1) its purity (amiges), (2) its primitivity— 
"it is in its essential nature activity", "this alone is immortal and eternal.. .and without it 
nothing thinks"—, and (3) its genetic character—"it is what it is by virtue of becoming all 
things", it "is what it is by virtue of making all things", and it is comparable to "a sort of 
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positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours." 
It is according to these three essential characteristics that Aristotle accounts for both the 
exigencies, and the genesis, of the second actuality of nous, i.e., thinking. 
It is explicit in Brentano's Psychology that intentionality shares with nous at least 
the third characteristic listed above—namely, its genetic character. Indeed, Brentano is 
clearly willing to accept interaction between the mental and physical realms. He says, 
Not only may physical states be aroused by physical states 
and mental states by mental, but it is also the case that 
physical states have mental consequences and mental states 
have physical consequences.118 
This passage does retain the ambiguity with respect to Brentano's usage of the qualifier 
"physical", however, the potential effectiveness of the mental remains clear. The genetic 
character of intentionality in Brentano's psychology is most prominent in that it 
represents the ontic foundation of the object of thought. In a literal sense, it is that in 
which it is, hence Brentano's use of the compound terminology "intentional inexistence" 
and the suggestion of containment in the phrase "includes something as object within 
itself."119 The genetic character of intentionality underpins his insistence upon the 
elevated reality of the mental over the physical: 
We could just as well say that they [mental phenomena] are 
those phenomena which alone possess real existence as 
well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire 
really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a 
phenomenal and intentional existence.120 
This passage is, in fact, reminiscent of Aristotle's claim in DA III 5 concerning the 
elevated status of nous: "for always the active is superior [timioteron] to the passive 
factor, the originating force to the matter which it forms." (DA 430al8-19)121 The parallel 
is clear: Brentano affords intentionality the same elevated status because it is that in 
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which the object is constituted. This genetic principle is extended in conjunction with the 
causal dependencies that he draws out when he writes, "the term 'consciousness,' since it 
refers to an object which consciousness is consciousness of, seems to be appropriate to 
characterize mental phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing characteristic, i.e., 
the property of intentional inexistence of an object",122 and when he continues by saying, 
"[a]ll mental phenomena are states of consciousness."123 These passages extend the 
genetic role of intentionality by affirming that it is also constitutive of consciousness 
itself. Such a conclusion, however, raises the question: In what is intentionality itself 
constituted? As we have discussed at length in Chapter 2, the only explicit answer to this 
question Brentano offers leads to a circularity and the petitio principii that defines what 
we have called the genetic problem of intentionality. 
On the other hand, I contend that the similarities already established between nous 
and intentionality are sufficient to substantiate the extrapolation of the primitivity of nous 
in Aristotle to Brentano's notion of intentionality. The primitivity of intentionality can 
ground the genesis of consciousness in the same mode of activity as Aristotle grounds 
thought and suggests a strong analogy between nous in Aristotle and intentionality in 
Brentano. And so an understanding of intentionality as a concept analogous to nous in 
Aristotle escapes the petitio principii latent in Brentano's formulation of intentional 
inexistence—or, rather, intentionality—and overcomes the genetic problem of 
intentionality. 
But what does it mean for intentionality to be primitive rather than an attribute of 
consciousness? First and foremost it does preclude us from understanding intentionality 
as a mere attribute of consciousness. Quite to the contrary, it suggests that consciousness 
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is an instance of intentional activity just as thinking, according to Aristotle, is an instance 
of the activity of nous (according to its first actuality). Articulated in Aristotle's 
terminology, consciousness is a second actuality of intentionality. Understanding 
intentionality as a first actuality analogous to the first actuality of nous in Aristotle 
affords it the same causal efficacy: it defines intentionality as the final and efficient cause 
of consciousness to the extent that intentionality represents the antecedent condition for 
consciousness. 
Conclusion: Origin of Intentionality 
In our first chapter we witnessed the probable analogy between Brentano's notion of 
intentionality as described in his Psychology and Aristotle's notion of mind, that is nous, 
as read by Gerson (2001). Towards a more thorough substantiation of the analogy 
suggested in the first chapter, Chapter 2 proceeded with an investigation into the nature 
of intentionality and the problems that have come to be associated with intentionality 
since its re-emergence in Brentano. Chapter 2 accounted for two essential features of 
intentionality in Brentano: (1) its manifestation of a concrete object, i.e., the "inexistence 
of an object," and (2) the meta-character of the act in which the object of thought is 
manifest, e.g., "in judgement something...affirmed or denied."124 Furthermore, Chapter 2 
explained the conventional problem of intentionality as the inability to account for the 
indifference of intentional states with respect to their epistemic entailments, i.e., the fact 
that in thought what is posited is, or can be, entirely fictitious. 
Part II sought to establish thoroughly the differences between Aristotle's theory of 
sensation (aisthesis) and Brentano's theory of intentionality. Chapter 3 revealed what 
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Aristotle held to be the two conditions with respect to the constitution of the sense organs 
that constitute the first actuality of aisthesis: (1) The material constituents of the organ 
must be contiguous with the sensitivities exhibited by elemental constituents of the 
external environment. The elemental constituents of the external environment are able to 
mediate sensual activity because of the common sensitivities of the elemental 
constituents of the external environment and the sensitivities of the organ. {DA 419al 1-
21, 420a3-5, 421b9) The second condition is (2) the qualitative neutrality with respect to 
a certain range of sensible qualities that the actualization of the form of the sense organ 
manifests within them. {DA 424a4-5) 
In Chapter 4 we saw how Aristotle characterizes the second actuality of aisthesis 
as an entirely passive condition. {DA 417b24-26) It follows from its passivity that there 
is no generative principle proper to the act of sensing. It was concluded that Aristotle's 
identification of sensation with a second actuality is a clear endorsement of the 
physiological readings promoted by Shute, Barnes, Apostle, and Burnyeat and an explicit 
rejection of the so-called literalist reading offered by Sorabji who follows Slakey. 
Whereas their readings suggest that the activity of aisthesis involves the literal 
actualization of a sensible quality in the sense organ, Aristotle's characterization of 
sensation as a second actuality requires that it is not a change of the sort that is, in any 
straightforward sense, manifest in matter. This distinction sets it apart from the 
conventional sort of change discussed in GC17. 
In our survey of the extensions of aisthesis that occupied Chapter 5 we saw how, 
in the early chapters of DA III, Aristotle extends his theory of aisthesis to account for 
three things not accounted for by aisthesis proper: (1) how it is that we come to know that 
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we are sensing, (2) the common sensibles—including movement, rest, number, figure, 
and magnitude, and (3) phantasia, the capacity according to which we are able to render 
images unto ourselves. 
Chapter 6 brought together the findings of the previous three chapters to illustrate 
the differences between aisthesis and intentionality. Upon scrutiny, it is clear that 
aisthesis and intentionality differ in two important respects: (1) according to Aristotle, the 
identity of the bearer of sensible qualities is not something that is sensed according to the 
second actuality of aisthesis, (2) given that the ontic foundation of consciousness is 
bound to its intentional character, its analogue in DA must also possess, or be identified 
with, some sort of power capable of affecting the genesis of cognitive activity. This sort 
of genetic character is clearly excluded by the thoroughly passive character attributed to 
aisthesis. For this reason we concluded that any understanding of intentionality that is 
strictly based upon the apparent similarities between it and Aristotle's notion of aisthesis 
is inevitably deficient. 
Part III began the constructive portion of the study. In parallel with Part II, 
Chapters 7 and 8 explicated the first and second actualities of nous respectively. Nous, 
according to its first actuality, is not preceded by a state of potentiality. It represents a 
state of perpetual actuality having "no nature of its own, other than that of having a 
certain capacity." It is an activity that constitutes the essential antecedent condition for 
thinking but it is not thinking itself. Thinking proper is the activity concomitant with the 
second actuality of nous. 
The similarities between nous and intentionality that are revealed in our exegeses 
substantiate the overarching thesis of this study that nous in Arisotle, and not aisthesis, is 
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the closer analogue to intentionality in Brentano. Brentano defines mental acts as those 
that exhibit the intentional inexistence of their object. This, as has been explained, is 
analogous to Aristotle's claim that the second actuality of nous involves the 
objectification of the object of thought. A further similarity emerges with respect to the 
second actuality of the respective concepts, that is, their meta-character. 
Aristotle also seems to have influenced Brentano in that he, too, speaks to the 
meta-character of psychological states in two broad categories: aversions and attractions. 
At DA 421a8-10 Aristotle identifies one's aversion or attraction to a sensed object with 
nous. This runs parallel to Brentano's identification of, for example, the presentational 
character of intentional acts that involve presentation, or the judgemental character of 
intentional acts that involve judgement. These essential similarities with respect to the 
character of nous and intentionality led us to extrapolate that just as Aristotle's analyses 
in DA III 4 and 5 require that nous, according to its first actuality, is a primitive 
component of his ontology, Brentano too suggests the primitivity of intentionality in the 
dependencies that obtain among the various elements of the model of consciousness he 
articulates in his Psychology. 
Of course, the suggestion that intentionality is primitive in the same sense as the 
first actuality of nous in Aristotle is no small claim. Substantiating such a claim would 
require far more reasearch, analysis, and a complete study unto itself. This suggestion, 
however, is not entirely novel: in his "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow" (2004) 
Mitscherling proposes what he refers to as a new Copernican revolution which involves, 
with reference to the Brentanian model of consciousness referred to throughout this 
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study, the inversion of the positions of consciousness and intentionality such that 
consciousness could be construed as an instance of "intentional being".125 
This suggestion, the suggestion that intentionality is a primitive component of 
Brentano's implicit ontology, is the suggestion we are led to by the great preponderance 
of similarities between nous in Aristotle and intentionality. An exploration of this idea is, 
I believe, an appropriate extention of the present study. This is the trajectory I hope to 
pursue in my further studies: I believe that this idea has the potential to affirm not merely 
a certain causal efficacy with respect to intentionality, but it represents a reversal wherein 
consciousness itself is in fact understood as the effect, and not, as convention would have 
it, the cause of intentionality. This suggestion has the potential to account for, or at least 
substantiate the possibility for, an account of the genesis of consciousness within a realist 
paradigm—the sort that is, for the most part, uncontroversially attributed to Aristotle 
himself—that seems to elude modern scholars to this date. The substantiation of the 
analogy between Aristotle's theory of nous—a theory that, I contend, is obfuscated more 
by the prejudices of its modern reader than the obscurities of its articulation—with 
Brentano's theory of intentionality—a theory that incorporates what is, by and large, an 
undeniable, but up to now inscrutable, quality of psychological states—opens an avenue 
for investigation into the nature of consciousness closed to us for over two millennia, and 
it does so in a way that has proven effective in changing paradigms throughout history— 
namely, by putting forth a simple suggestion. The suggestion of this study is this: Just as 
Aristotle tells us the genetic principle active in thinking exists prior to thinking itself and 
is, for lack of a better term, primitive, so too does the genetic principle active in 
consciousness exist prior to consciousness itself, and so too is it primitive. Intentionality 
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is not, as we conventionally understand it, a quality of consciousness. Quite to the 
contrary, consciousness is a manifestation of intentionality, just as the soul and its bodily 
activities, which include thought, is a manifestation of the first actuality of nous. 
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NOTES TO PART III 
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It is reasonably clear from the sum of the other passages Brentano cites that his 
ontological presupposition is that the human subject contains a spiritual part. The 
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substance of his argument is essentially that nous corresponds to no other part of the 
human subject and must, therefore, correspond to the spiritual part of the subject. 
Recognition of this presupposition explains how Brentano might construe DA 403 a3— 
where Aristotle suggests that nous might be the only part of the soul that is difficult to 
correlate with a part of the body—as stipulating that nous is immaterial. That this is 
indeed Brentano's presupposition is further reinforced by 413a4: "From this it clear that 
the soul is inseparable from its body.... Yet some may be separable because they are not 
the actualities of any body at all." It ought to be fairly clear that Brentano is arguing 
according to a process of elimination: if nous is a part of the soul, and if the soul is, in 
some way, attached to the subject, and if nous is not attached to the subject's physical 
body, then it must be attached, in some way, to the spiritual part of the subject. In 
Brentano's own words, "Here it is very definite that a certain part of the soul is not 
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animals, great and small, high and low, but mind (in the 
sense of intelligence) appears not to belong alike to all 
animals, and indeed not even to all human beings. 
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Tris uXriS. OUTGO Kai TOC TTEpi TOV vouv. (DA 429b 18-22) 
25Brentano(1977):74-75. 
26Brentano(1977):75. 
27Brentano(1977):75. 
28
 Brentano (1977): 76. 
29
 Brentano (1977): 76 cf. 21. 
30
 Brentano (1977): 77. 
31
 'ElTEl 8' [cOOTTEp] EV dTTdOTJ Tfj (pUOEl EOTl [Tl] TO |iEV uAr| EKaOTCp yEVEl (TOUTO 
8e 6 TrdvTa Suvdnei EKeTva), ETEpov 8e TO aiTiov Kai TroirjTiKov, Top TTOIETV 
TrdvTa, oTov n TEXVTI npos TT\V uAr)v TTETTOVSEV, dvdyKr) Kai EV Trj yuxfj uTrapxeiv 
TauTaj Ta$ 8ia<popd$- Kai EOTIV 6 [ikv TOIOUTOS VOGS TCO TTOVTO yivsaSai, 6 8e 
Tcp TrdvTa TTOIETV, d>s fe'^15 T15, oTov TO cpcos- TpoTrov y a p Tiva Kai TO cpcbs TTOIET 
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TCC 8uvd|aei ovxa xpcoiiaTa EVEpysig xpconaxa. Kai OUTO$ 6 vouj x ^ P 1 0 ^ ? Kotl 
diraSris Kai duiyris, Trj ouaig cbv EVEpysia- OCEI y a p TinicoTepov TO TTOIOUV TOU 
TT&axovxos Kai fi dpxr) T % vXris. [TO 8' auTO EOTIV f\ KOT' EVEpysiav ETrioTrmr) 
Tcp TTpdyuaTi- fi 8E KaTa 8uvauiv XPovcP "npoTEpa ev Tcp evi, oXcos 5e OUSE 
Xpdvcp, dXX' oux OTE [xkv VOET OTE 5' ou VOET.] X"P' a9E i? 5' EOTI IJOVOV TO08 ' OTTEP 
EOTi, Kai TOUTO UOVOV dSdvaTov Kai d'i'Biov (ou MVTIU.OVEUOU.EV 8E, 6TI TOUTO uiv 
diraSEs, 6 8E Tra6r|TiK6s voug q>6apTO$)- Kai &VEU TOUTOU OU8EV VOET. (DA 430al0-
25) 
32
 See: Harold Henry Joachim, Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1951); Charles H. Kahn, "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology," 
Archivfuer Geschichte der Philosophie 48 (1966): 43 - 81; K. W. Hamlyn, "Koine 
Aisthesis," Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 
52 (April 1968): 195 - 209; Stephen Richard Lyster Clark, Aristotle's Man: Speculations 
Upon Aristotelian Anthropology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Franz Brentano, The 
Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, trans. Rolf 
George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). 
33
 See Michael Wedin, "Keeping the Matter in Mind: Aristotle on the Passions and the 
Soul," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 3 & 4 (September - December 1995): 183 
- 221; "Content and Cause in the Aristotelian Mind," Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 
(1992): 4 9 - 1 0 5 ; Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1988). These first two strategies are identified in Michael J. White, "The Problem of 
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Aristotle's Nous Poietikos." Review of Metaphysics 57.4 (2004): 726. Numerous other 
attempts to categorize interpretive approaches to nous in Aristotle can be found 
throughout the literature including Wedin's (1988): 160. 
34
 See: Victor Caston "Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal," Phronesis: A 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy AA, no. 3 (August 1999): 199 - 227; Jonathan Barnes 
"Aristotle's Concept of Mind," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (1972): 101 -
114; and G. E. M. Anscombe, Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1961). 
35
 See: S. Marc Cohen, "Hylomorphism and Functionalism" in Essays on Aristotle's De 
Anima, eds. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 57 -
74; Robert Heinaman, "Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem." Phronesis: A Journal of 
Ancient Philosophy 35 no. 1 (1990): 83-102; and Lloyd Gerson, "The Unity of Intellect in 
Aristotle's De Anima," Phronesis: A Journal of Ancient Philosophy 49, no. 4 (2004): 348 
- 3 7 3 . 
36
 The controversy has a long history indeed dating back at least as far as Alexander of 
Aphrodisias in the second century AD. See Kristeller (1979) as well as Kupreeva (1999 
unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation Alexander of Aphrodisias on Soul as Form [de anima 1-
26 BrunsJ, Graduate Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto). 
Zeller's Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics is, in fact, a collection of excerpts from 
his voluminous Die Philosophic Der Griechen in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung, the 
first edition of which was published in 1845. 
38ZellerVol2(1897): 130-31. 
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39
 For a full account of the polemic see Joseph Novak, "The Zeller-Brentano Debate on 
the Origin of Mind," Journal ofNeoplatonic Studies 3, no. 2 (Fall 1995). 
40
 Brentano (1977): 107. 
41
 Brentano (1977): 107-108. 
42
 Brentano (1977): 108. 
43
 Brentano (1977): 108. 
44
 Brentano (1977): 111. 
45
 As we will see later, Caston reads the 'in' {en) that occurs in 430al0 (and later at 
430al4) in a much different way. Brentano's own reading is supported by the authority 
of Themistius, Aquinas, Trendelenburg, Brandis, and "others". (Brentano [1977]: 111.) 
46
 Brentano (1977): 110,112-113. 
47
 Brentano (1977): 112. 
48
 Brentano (1977): 113. 
49Wedin(1988): 168. 
50
 Wedin (1988): 185. 
51Wedin(1988): 185. 
52
 Caston (1999): 200. 
53
 Caston (1999): 200. 
54
 Caston (1999): 200. 
55
 Caston (1999): 203. 
56
 Caston (1999): 203. 
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Caston reinforces this point with a blanket rejection of attempts to "fill in the gaps" of 
Aristotle's psychology by plugging in the active intellect wherever it is arguably possible. 
This sort of approach to the active intellect and the gaps that it might fill is tantamount, 
says Caston, to proposing a deus ex machina, an inexplicable potency that is no more 
valuable in terms of the understanding it conveys than is the maintenance of the gap it is 
meant to fill. (Caston [1999]: 204.). 
58
 eirei 8' otAXo ecm TO neyeSos KCU TO iaeyE0Ei eTvcu, KCU u8cop KCU UBOCTI ETVCU... 
(ZX4 429M0-11) 
59
 Caston (1999): 206. 
60
 Caston (1999): 206. 
61
 Caston (1999): 209. 
62
 Caston (1999): 211 - 212. It is worth noting that the passages Caston identifies in 
Metaph. 12.7 - 9 that comprise the comparable list of attributes are, just as Caston says, 
comparable and not, by any means, identical. The list Caston's draws out of Metaph. is 
as follows: (1) kechorismene ton aistheton, 1073a4, (2) apathes kai analloioton, 1073al 1, 
(3) ouk echei hulen, 1074a33 - 34, (4) energeia ousia, 1072a25 - 26 and b27 - 28, (5) 
timiotaton, 1074a26 and ariston, 1072a35 - bl and b28, (6) he episteme to pragma, 
1075al - 5, (7) 1072b25, (8) ton apanta aidna, 1075al0, (9) 1075al - 5, (10) aidion, 
1072a25 and 1073a4, and (11) 1072M3 - 14. (Caston [1999]: 212) Indeed, there are, in 
the minority of cases, clear similarities in the expression of the characteristics attributed 
to intellect in DA III.5 and to God here. However, for the majority of the characteristics, 
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there are significant differences between the way in which Aristotle expresses them in 
DA III.5 and here. 
63Caston(1999):212. 
64
 They are again: (1) How is thinking possible if thinking seems to be an affection of the 
intellect yet the intellect is unmixed and unaffected? And (2) is intellect intelligible? (DA 
429b22-26) 
65
 Gerson (2004): 362. 
66
 Gerson (2004): 365. 
67
 Gerson (2004): 366. An exact quote of this passage is found at 43 lal-2. Frede (1992), 
Charles (2000), and White (2004) interpret these passages as expressing a literal identity 
whereas Ross puts forth a weaker reading: "we must suppose it to mean that when one is 
really knowing, the nature of that which is being known is exactly reflected in the mind 
of the knower, his mind exercising no disturbing influence." See Michael Frede, "On 
Aristotle's Conception of the Soul," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, eds. M. 
Nussbaum and A. Rorty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992): 93 - 108; and David 
Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), andDe 
Anima. Recognovit Brevique Adnotatione Instruxit W.D. Ross (Oxonii: Typographeo 
Clarendoniano, 1959): 295. See also Metaph. 1074b36-1075a3. 
68
 Gerson (2004): 366. 
69
 This is often the contention of those who follow what I have described as the "divine 
substance/Platonic holdover" strategy for interpreting DA III. 5. 
70
 Gerson (2004): 368. 
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Gerson (2004): 369. Gerson takes the composite of the body and soul to be the subject 
of "thinks" (noei). 
72
 Were it the case that the potency of intellect were to be expended in the actualization of 
the material object, thought would not be possible, for such actualization requires 
embodiment and, as we discussed previously, bodies do not exhibit sufficient potency for 
thought. 
73
 dvdyKri dpa , ETTEI TrdvTa VOET, duiyfj eTvai, cooTrep cpriaiv Ava£ay6pas , \ 'va 
KpotTrj, TOUTO 8' EOTIV Yva yvcop[£rj (TrapEH<paiv6|JiEvov y a p KCOXUEI TO 
dXXoTpiov Kai dvTicppdTTEi)- COOTE [xr)h' auTou ETvai cpuaiv ur|8Euiav dXX' r] 
TauTr)V, o n BuvaTos. (DA 429al8-24) 
74
 KCCI OUTOS 6 vous74 xcoptoTog KCCI d-rraOfis Kai dmyrjs, TTJ ouaia cbv EVspyEia. 
(XL4 430al7-18) 
75
 8io fi yvxA EOTIV EVTEXEXEIO f| TrpcoTr] ocbuaTog cpuoiKou 8uvduEi £cof)v 
eXovTos. (DA 412a27-412bl) 
76
 TTEpi 8E TOU vou Kai Tfjs 8Ecopr)TiKfjs 5uvdiiEco5 OU8EV TTCO cpavspov, dXX' EOIKE 
yuxns yevo$ ETepov sTvai, Kai TOUTO IJOVOV ev8exEG0ai xcopi^saOai, KaSaTrep TO 
d'i'8iov TOU cpOapTou.76 TOC 8E XoiTfd uopia TTJS vyuxfjs <pavEpdv EK TOUTGOV OTI 
OVJK EOTI xc«3PiaTd, KaGotTrep TIVE$ 9aatv- (DA 413b24-29) 
77
 dTTopiav 8' E'XEI Kai TO Trd6ri Tfjs yuxfjs, TroTEpov EOTI irdvTa Koivd Kai TOU 
E'XOVTOS rj EOTI TI Kai Tfjs yuxrjs i8iov auTfJs- TOUTO y a p Xa^sTv HEV dvayKaTov, 
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ou pdSiov 8e. <pa(v8Tai 8e TCOV U.EV TrXe(aTcov OU9EV dveu TOU acb|aaTos Trdaxeiv 
OU5E TTOIETV, oTov 6pyi£ea0cu, BappeTv, ETTIOUHETV, oAcos aio0dvEa8ai, udAicrra 5' 
E'OIKEV 18(cp TO VOETV- ei 8' eaxi KCCI TOUTO cpavxaaia T15 rj \xr\ dveu (pavxaalaj,77 
OUK EVSEXOIT' dv OU5E TOUT' dvsu acbuaTos ETVCU. (DA 403a3-10) 
78
 Gerson (2004): 350. 
79
 Although he does not follow Heinaman (1990) entirely, Gerson cites his reading. 
Specifically, Gerson cites Heinaman's analysis of the relationship between soul and the 
composite body as being analogous to that of the intellects and the soul. 
80
 Gerson (2004): 351. 
81
 Gerson (2004): 352. 
82
 ei 8r) ecm TO VOETV coonrrep TO aioSdvEaOai, r\ irdoxEiv TI dv e'tri UTTO TOU 
vor|TOU f\ TI TOIOUTOV ETEpov. (DA 429al3-15) 
83
 Kal auToj 8E voriTos EOTIV coaTrep TO vor)Ta. ETTI [xkv y a p TCOV dvsu uXris TO 
auTo EOTI TO voouv Kai TO voouiasvov- fi y a p ETTiOTrjuri r) 8Ecopr)TiKfi Kai TO 
OUTCOS ETTiaTriTOV TO aUTO EOTIV (TOU 8 E [iT] OEl VOETv TO a'lTlOV ETTIOKETTTEOV)-
(DA 430a2-6) 
84
 By 'conventional' I mean to refer to the sort of actualization that occurs in the creation 
of one thing out of another, e.g., when nutrients in soul become the tissue of a plant, or 
when building materials become a structure of something particular. 
85
 Brentano (1977): 84. 
86
 Brentano (1977): 84 - 85. 
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Wedin's work on nous in Aristotle spans numerous publications, the most accessible of 
which include his book, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (1988), and two articles, 
"Content and Cause in the Aristotelian Mind" (1993) and "Keeping the Matter in Mind: 
Aristotle on the Passions and the Soul" (1995). This last title is most telling with respect 
to Wedin's interpretive position and the tradition he represents. His reading of nous is 
heavily informed by his strictly physicalist reading of Aristotle's biology. He asserts that 
Aristotle's DA represents the first work of cognitivistic psychology, and his use of the 
language of cognitivism orients his investigation away from the ontology of soul, nous, 
and thought per se and towards the functional organization of the physical organism in 
which such capacities reside. 
88
 Number (1) and (2) can be found in Wedin (1988): 163. 
89
 Number (3), (4), (5), and (6) can be found in Wedin (1988): 164. 
90
 Wedin (1988): 167. 
91
 'H |j£v ouv TCOV ocSicupETcov vor|ai$ EV TOUTOIS Trspi a OUK EOTI TO ysuBos, EV OTJ 
5E KCCI TO ^EOBOS Kai TO a\r|0ES auvSsais TI$ f\br\ voriudTcov COOTTEP EV OVTCOV-
Ka6aTT£p. (DA 430a26-28) 
92
 TO y a p vyEuBos EV OUVBEOEI CXEI- Kai y a p av TO XEUKOV [XT\ XEUKOV <cpfi, TO XEUKOV 
Ka\> TO uri XEUKOV OUVESTIKEV- (DA 430M-3) 
evBe^exai Se Kai Siaipeaiv cpdvai Travxa. aXX' ouv eaxi ye ou novov x o yeuBoj 
r] dXr)0E5 OTI XEUKO^ KXECOV Ecrriv, dXXa Kai OTI fjv f\ EOTOI. TO BE EV TTOIOUV 
EKOOTOV, TOUTO 6 vous. (DA 430b3-6) 
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TO 8' d8ia(pETOv ETTEI Bixcog, f\ 8uvd|iEi f\ Evspysig, ouSev KCOXUEI VOETV TO 
dSiafpsTov OTav vorj TO MTIKOS (dSiaipETov y a p EVEpyEig), Kai EV xpovcp 
d5iaipETcp- 6|ao(cos y a p 6 xpovog 8iaipsTos Kai aBiaipETog TCO UHKEI. (DA 430b6-
10) 
95
 OUKOUV EOTIV E'ITTETV EV TCO fiiaiaEi T( EVOEI EKaTspcp- ou y a p EOTIV, dv \ir\ 
8iaipE0fj, dXX' fi 8uvd|jEi. x^P^S 8' EKdTEpov vocbv TCOV fiuioEcov 8iaipsT Kai TOV 
Xpovov a n a , TOTE 8' OIOVEI urJKTV si 8' cos sE, diacpotv, Kai EV TCO xpovcp TCO ETT' 
du<poTv. (DA 430bl0-14) 
96
 Apostle (1981): 170 note 11. 
97
 <TO 8E [xt] Kara TO TTOOOV d8ia(p£Tov dXXd TCO ET8EI VOET EV d8iaipETcp xpovcp 
Kai dSiaipETcp <TCO> TTJS yuxf)s.> 
fi 8E oTiynf) Kai iraaa 8iaipEais, Kai TO OUTCOS d8ia(pETOV, 
8r)XouTai COOTTEP f] crrepriais. Kai onoios 6 Xoyos ETTI TCOV dXXcov, oTov TTCOS TO 
KaKov yvcopi^Ei f\ TO ueXav- Tcp evavTicp y a p TTCOS yvcopiCei. (DA 430b20a-23) 
98
 Apostle (1981): 170 - 171 note 16. 
99
 TO HEV ouv aio0dvEO0ai onoiov TCO 9dva i \xovov Kai VOETV- OTOV Ss f|8u f\ 
Xuirripov, oTov KaTacpaaa f\ dirocpaaa 8ICOKEI f\ cpEuysi- (DA 421a8-10) 
Kai i] cpuyri OE KOI ri ops^is TOUTO, i] KOT Evspysiav, Kai oux ETEpov TO 
opsKTiKov Kai TO cpEUKTiKov, OUT' dXXr|Xcov OUTE Tou aia0r|TiKou- dXXd TO slvai 
dXXo. (DA 431&12-U) 
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101
 Tfj Se 8iccvor)TiKfj yuxfi TO. cpavTdanaTcc oTov aiaSruaaTa imapxEt, OTCCV 8E 
dya06v f\ KCCKOV cpiiari f\ dirocpriori, cpEuyEi f\ BICOKEI- (DA 431al4-16) 
102
 Apostle (1981): 175 note 10. 
103
 816 OUSETTOTE VOET OCVEU cpavTdanaTog fi yuxTl- (P-A 431al6-17) 
104
 TOC |i£v o\5v Ei8r| TO voriTiKov EV TOT$ cpavTdonaoi VOET, KOCI COS EV EKE(VOIS 
copiorai auTcp TO SICOKTOV KCCI cpsuKTOv, KCCI EKTOS Tfjs aia0r|O"Ecos, 6TCCV ETTI TGOV 
(pavTaaiaaTcov rj, KIVETTCU- oTov, aia0av6u£vos TOV cppuKTov OTI m/p, Trj KOIVTJ 
opcbv KIVOUJJEVOV yvcopi^Ei OTI TTOXEHIOJ- OTE 8E TOT$ EV TTJ yvyjS <pocvTdG|iaaiv f\ 
voriuaaiv, COOTTEP opcov, Xoyi^ETca KCCI (BOUXEUETCU TCC UEXXOVTCI irpog Ta 
irapovTa- KCCI 6TCCV EiTrri cbg EKET TO f|8u f\ Xuirripov, EVTCCUOOC cpsuysi f\ BICOKEI-KCCI 
oXcos EV Trpd^Ei. (DA 431b2-10) 
105
 Apostle (1981): 178 note 21. 
106
 816 vofjoai UEV ETT' ai/Tcp, OTTOTCCV POUXTITCCI, aia0dvEO0ai 5' OUK ETT' auTop-
dvayKocTov y a p uirapxEiv TO aia0rjTov. (DA 417b24-26) 
107
 816 fi tyvxA EOTIV EVTEXEXEICC fi TrpcoTTi acbuctTos cpuaiKou 8uvd|jEi £cof|v 
E'XOVTOS. (DA 412a27-412bl) 
108Brentano(1995):77. 
109Brentano(1995):88. 
110
 Brentano (1995): 10. 
mBrentano(1995):92. 
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OUGEV KCOAUEI VOETV TO d8iaipETov OTCCV vofi TO lifJKOs (a8ia(pETOv y a p 
svspyEig), Kai EV xpovcp aBiaipsTcp- onolcog y a p 6 xpdvo$ BiaipsTog Kai 
dBiaipETOs TCO UTIKEI. (DA 430b7-10) 
113Brentano(1995):88. 
114
 In fact in his later Descriptive Psychology Brentano reorients his analysis of 
consciousness in order to explicitly account for what he calls its adjectival character. 
115
 TO UEV ov5v aio0dvEo8ai ouoiov TCO cpdvai uovov Kai VOETV- OTOV 8E f|8u r] 
XuTrripov, oTov KaTacpdaa r] dirocpdaa 8ICOKEI r] cpsuyEi- (DA 421a8-10) 
116
 Trj 8E 8iavor|TiKrj yuxrj T& cpavTaaiaaTa oTov aiaSrmaTa uTrdpxEi, OTOV 8E 
dya86v rj KOKOV (priori f\ dircxpriar], cpEuysi r] 8ICOKEI- (DA 431al4-16) 
117
 Brentano (1995): 89. 
118
 Brentano (1995): 6. 
119
 Brentano (1995): 88. 
120
 Brentano (1995): 92. 
121
 dEi y d p TiuicoTEpov TO TTOIOUV TOU TrdoxovTog Kai f) dpxn Trig OAriS- (DA 
430al8-19) 
122
 Brentano (1995): 102. 
123
 Brentano (1995): 102. 
124
 This, i.e., judgement, as we have already seen, is precisely the sort of act that occurs in 
the second actuality of nous. 
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125
 Jeff Mitscherling, "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow", Symposium: Journal of the 
Canadian Society for Hermeneutic and Postmodern Thought 8 no. 2 (Summer 2004): 
379-388. 
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